# Chapter 4. Government and Politics

Buildings of Congress in the Plaza of the Three Powers (Brasília);
architect: Oscar Niemeyer

THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM in 1982 was in a crucial stage of a process of liberalization from military dictatorship to what promised to be, sometime within the coming decade, a return to liberal democracy directed by civilians. The political dynamics of this process, known as *abertura* (literally, opening), involved the interaction of popular pressure from below and, from above, the extensive powers of the executive branch of government and its coercive mechanism, both of which remained in the hands of the armed forces. Although *abertura* was protracted, the holding of the scheduled popular elections of November 1982 was the most important indication to date that it would proceed on course into the mid-1980s, when a successor would be chosen to President João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, who in 1979 had been chosen as the nation's fifth military president since the coup d'etat of April 1964.

Economic factors posed one of the greatest threats to *abertura*. After increasing to record levels between 1968 and 1974, Brazil's growth rate gradually slowed after the shock of 1973-74 oil price hikes and was negative in 1981, a year that also saw inflation reach over 100 percent and the foreign debt hit record heights. Analysts agreed that the economy had the strength to overcome these difficulties. The timing, however—when the population was being allowed, for the first time in many years, to make its own wage demands heard—was most inopportune. The specter of popular demands for redress of past losses had been raised during the late 1970s in widespread labor strikes, but in the early years of the new decade, the government had skillfully combined "carrots" and "sticks" to mute wage demands. This issue would become increasingly vital, however, as *abertura* proceeded.

Another long-term threat to *abertura* (although in the short run it may have made it easier for Brazil's military leaders to initiate and proceed with the process) lies in the relatively undeveloped nature of Brazil's political institutions. As labor unions were weak, so were interest groups representing business, students, agriculturalists, and other sectors of society that one might expect to be highly organized in a nation as large as Brazil. Political parties also lacked an in-depth organizational capacity. Analysts explain this phenomenon as a product of Brazil's patrimonial heritage: deference to one's "superior" in his or her immediate environment (be it farm, factory, neighborhood, or village) runs deep in Brazilian society. In politics this is translated into political bossism, called *coronelismo* in traditional rural Brazilian society, which began a slow death in the 1950s but continued to play a major, if declining, role in the 1980s. This tradition was reinforced by the corporatist threads that ran through the regime of President Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s and 1940s as well as the post-1964 military regime. In Brazil's entire history, liberal democratic institutions, such as interest groups and political parties,

had a chance to develop only during the Second Republic (1946-64). While this inexperience in popular government may have made it easier for the nation's military leaders to loosen the reins of power, it also made the future uncertain due to a lack of strong democratic traditions.

The people were nearly unanimous in their support of *abertura*. Its only apparent opponents were found in a segment of the armed forces known as the hard-liners, which had been quite powerful in the early 1970s, although its influence steadily declined thereafter. By the early 1980s the hard-liners, who wanted military rule to be perpetuated indefinitely, had been removed from a number of top positions of authority. There was, in other words, a growing consensus within the armed forces to return to its purely military, professional role in society.

A consensus also existed among Brazilian elites that their nation, having one of the largest, richest, and most dynamic societies in the Third World, was destined in time to become a major world power. Brazil's increasingly far-reaching diplomatic and commercial ties had significantly raised its stature among the developing nations at the same time that they reduced the nation's dependence on the northern industrialized nations. The United States remained Brazil's single most important foreign relation, although by the early 1980s its significance had been declining for a full decade as Brazil diversified its foreign contacts. Two especially interesting aspects of Brazil's foreign policy were the somewhat surprisingly small military component of its growing power and the widespread public support that Brazil's new directions in foreign policy had attained. Foreign policy was virtually absent as an issue in the otherwise bitter 1982 election campaign.

Structure of Government

Constitutional Structure

Brazilian constitutions, by and large, have served to legitimize existing political institutions rather than to provide for future continuity. The 1967 Constitution, the nation's sixth, superseded the 1946 constitution, which had guided Brazil during 18 years of democratic rule during the Second Republic. Between the 1964 coup d'etat and the promulgation of the 1967 Constitution, four so-called Institutional Acts and a large number of Complementary Acts were decreed by the military government that modified the 1946 constitution as necessary in order to legitimize the imposition of the dictatorship. The 1967 Constitution, which was promulgated on January 24 of that year by the rubber-stamp Congress, was essentially a reconfirmation of the modifications of the three previous years.

The 1967 Constitution was frequently and substantially amended during its first 15 years as Brazil's highest law. By 1982 over half of its original 200 articles had been altered through one of 22

constitutional amendments promulgated by the military government, and 10 additional articles had been added. After 1967, a further 15 or more Institutional Acts and many additional Complementary Acts had been decreed to modify Brazilian constitutional law; by 1982, however, these had all been either abrogated or incorporated into the constitutional amendments.

The 1967 Constitution changed the formal name of the country from the United States of Brazil to the Federative Republic of Brazil (República Federativa do Brasil). In spite of the name change, the provisions of the 1967 Constitution significantly increase the power of the federal (or central) government with respect to the state governments. This centralization of power in federal authorities, seated in the national capital in Brasília, is most apparent in Articles 10 and 11, which allow the federal president to intervene in the affairs of state government (to the point of removing the state governor) for a wide variety of reasons. In spite of this rather severe limitation, state governments did retain important prerogatives of the past, including significant powers of taxation. Each state has its own constitution, although none can contradict the terms of the federal Constitution.

The Constitution is divided into five major sections. The first, consisting of 144 articles, details the system of government. The second section spells out the nation's declaration of civil rights in 15 articles. The subsequent 15 articles outline the nation's economic and social order. Articles 175 through 180 discuss the family, education, and culture; Articles 181 through 210 are under the heading of general and transitory provisions.

The Constitution may be amended on a proposal by Congress or by the federal president. Constitutional Amendment Number 8, dated April 1977, made it more difficult for Congress to propose an amendment, and easier for the president. For the former, one-third of the members of each legislative body must sponsor an amendment. An amendment must be approved by two-thirds (it had been a simple majority between 1977 and 1981) of the members of each legislative body. The Constitution cannot be amended during a state of siege. It should be noted, however, that on two important occasions, in December 1968 and April 1977, the president sidestepped these constitutional provisions by closing Congress in order to decree important constitutional provisions. On these occasions when Congress threatened to challenge the executive authority, Institutional Act Number 5 and Constitutional Amendments Numbers 7 and 8 (the so-called April package of 1977), both of which greatly increased the powers of the executive, were issued by decree.

The Executive

Article 73 of the Constitution reads: "The executive power is exercised by the president of the republic assisted by the minis-

ters of state." A vice president serves jointly with the president and replaces him in the event of temporary impairment or the death of the president. Under military rule the vice presidency has often been held by a civilian. It was a tribute to the process of *abertura* that Vice President Antônio Aureliano Chaves de Mendonça (a civilian) served as interim president for seven weeks following President Figueiredo's heart attack in September 1981. In 1969, under similar circumstances, military commanders had prevented the civilian vice president from assuming the presidency as mandated in the Constitution. Both the president and the vice president must be Brazilians and at least 35 years old.

President Figueiredo assumed office on March 15, 1979, for a six-year term (the presidential term of office was raised from five to six years in 1977). Popular, direct elections of the president ended with the fall of the Second Republic in 1964. The five subsequent military presidents were "elected" indirectly by an electoral college, consisting of all members of Congress plus delegates of the state legislatures. (The number from each state depended on its population until 1982, when a constitutional amendment changed the makeup of the electoral college to include six representatives from each state legislature, irrespective of size.) In fact, however, these indirect elections were no more than pro forma exercises because Congress and the state legislatures, between 1964 and 1982, were stacked with regime appointees and other delegates certain to endorse the candidate chosen by the outgoing military president. The real presidential politicking during these years took place among the military hierarchy in a process that was not publicly visible. Much of the excitement over the 1982 popular elections was that they held the prospect of electing a Congress and state legislatures that for the first time since 1964 would be truly independent of the military government. Thus the indirect election of Figueiredo's successor, scheduled for October 15, 1984, held the potential of being a meaningful democratic event (see Elections under Military Rule, this ch.).

The constitutional powers of the president are many and are varied. In the legislative area, he may issue decree-laws on matters concerning "national security, public finance, including standards on taxation, and the establishment of public posts and setting of salaries." He also is given exclusive power to propose laws in these and other matters, including administrative and judiciary organization, a variety of concerns with respect to the civil service, and amnesty for political criminals. In the event of "war, or serious disturbance of order or threat of the outbreak of such disturbance," the president is also empowered to decree a state of siege, under which he may take virtually any measure he deems necessary to restore order.

Aside from his power to legislate, the president appoints and removes key advisers and ministers of state without the need for

President's residence, Brasília
Courtesy Embassy of Brazil, Washington

congressional approval. State governors were also appointed by the president until the 1982 elections. He also approves gubernatorial appointments of a large number of key mayors to head local governments in areas deemed essential to national security. After 1982 the president retained the power to intervene in state and local governments, and an uncooperative governor could be removed under the authority of the Constitution.

In August 1982 the president's cabinet was enlarged from 20 to 21 members. It included the ministers of aeronautics, agriculture, army, communications, education and culture, finance, foreign affairs, health, industry and commerce, interior, justice, labor, mines and energy, navy, transportation and public works, and welfare and social security. Also within the cabinet were five officials who were considered to be the president's closest advisers. These were the minister-chief of the Planning Secretariat of the Presidency, who in 1982 was Brazil's so-called economic czar, Antônio Delfim Netto; the chief of the Civilian Household (Casa Civil) of the presidency, the president's principal political adviser; the chief of the Military Household (Casa Militar) of the presidency, who acts as a liaison to the armed forces; the chief of the National Intelligence Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações—SNI), the position held by Figueiredo before he became president; and the chief of the Special Ministry for Land-Related Issues, a new

cabinet position that was initially filled by Brigadier General Danilo Venturini, who also served as secretary of the National Security Council (Conselho de Segurança Nacional—CSN).

The holders of these five posts have, under military rule, generally been regarded as the most powerful men in Brazil after the president, because of their direct, daily access to the president (see fig. 8). The relative power of each, however, has varied over time. For many years the chief of the Civilian Household, for example, was retired General Artur Golbery do Couto e Silva, who was considered the architect of much of the regime's political evolution from 1964 until his retirement in August 1981. After that time the position lost much of its previous influence. The importance of the minister-chief of the Planning Secretariat is commonly attributed to the economic and political skills of Delfim, who was appointed in August 1979. The SNI chief has nearly always been powerful. The fact that presidents Figueiredo and Emílio Garrastazú Médici had both held that position led many observers to consider General Octávio Aguiar de Medeiros, who in late 1982 had been SNI chief since early 1978, a prime candidate for the presidential term to begin in 1985.

This "inner cabinet" also included Figueiredo's personal secretary, Heitor Aquino Ferreira, until his fall from grace in late 1981. Before that time he and the other five officials were referred to as the "palace group" (*grupo palaciano*, after the Planalto Palace, the seat of government in Brasília). This inner group of presidential advisers was also known as the "9 o'clock group" because they met with the president every day at 9:00 A.M.

Another important advisory body is the CSN, which consists of the president, the vice president, the cabinet ministers, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (Estado-Maior das Fôrças Armadas—EMFA), and the chiefs of staff of the three armed services. First created under the 1946 constitution, the CSN did not become a vital political institution until 1964. It was particularly important in the years immediately following the 1964 coup; in 1982 it remained powerful, though some of its prerogatives may have been lost to the "inner cabinet." Among the powers granted the CSN in the 1967 Constitution are "to establish the permanent national objectives and the bases for national policy" and to give prior consent in executive decisions considered indispensable to national security, including land concessions, installation of means of communication, opening of transportation routes, and establishment and operation of industries affecting national security.

Within the Brazilian executive there are hundreds of agencies for the provision of social services, the operation of government-owned industries, and the administration and regulation of many aspects of national life. Brazil is somewhat infamous for its bureaucracy. For a time during the 1970s the government created a Ministry of Debureaucratization (complete with its own

Figure 8. Structure of Government, December 1982

bureaucracy) to try to remedy the many problems created by the growth of so many government agencies. Basically, there are five kinds of agencies: the interministerial councils use person-nel from various ministries to make up such organizations as the Economic Development Council, National Monetary Council, and

241

the Industrial Development Council; federal *autarquias*, or semi-autonomous enterprises, such as the Central Bank of Brazil; federal institutes; government corporations; and mixed-economy corporations, which may be wholly owned or partially owned by the government. Some prominent examples of these are Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica), a Brazilian aeronautics enterprise, the Bank of Brazil, and the Brazilian Petroleum Corporation (Petróleo Brasileiro—Petrobrás).

Since 1964 many of these agencies have been headed by military officers. The bureaucracy also acts as a power base for the so-called technocrats. For politically motivated civilians such as Delfim, the government executive agencies provide ample opportunity to build a following through patronage (see Conservative Groups, this ch.).

The Legislature

Brazil has a bicameral legislature, consisting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, which is in session in Brasília every year from March 1 to June 30 and again from August 1 to December 5. Senators serve eight-year terms of office and must be at least 35 years old; deputies serve for four years and must be at least 21.

Since the early 1960s the Congress has gone through continual evolutionary change in terms of its composition and its relationship with the executive. This evolution sped up in the early 1980s; the executive branch used its prerogatives to retain control over the legislature at the same time that it pursued the process of democratization under *abertura*. (The 1982 congressional elections, in particular, produced a Congress that was widely viewed as more popularly representative and independent of the executive branch than any legislature since 1964.)

Under the administration of João Goulart, the Congress played the role of an effective opposition, blocking many of the reforms proposed by the executive (see The Presidency of João Goulart, ch. 1). After the 1964 coup d'etat some 100 members of Congress, stripped of their political rights, were removed from their posts and replaced by alternates who were more amenable to the wishes of the executive. Nonetheless, a political crisis ensued in December 1968 when the Chamber of Deputies refused to accede to an executive request to strip a deputy of his parliamentary immunity. The executive closed Congress and decreed Institutional Act Number 5, which vastly increased executive powers. Congress did not reconvene until April 1970. Congressional elections held later that year, under new rules that lowered the number of deputies from 409 to 310 and altered the system of proportional representation, resulted in a Congress more compliant with executive wishes. The 1974 elections, however, brought significant victories for the opposition, and between 1974 and 1978 (a period that saw the initiation of the process of political "decompression," or *distensão*,

under President Ernesto Geisel) the legislature again gained a real, though limited, role in government decisionmaking.

By April 1977 the prospects of an even larger opposition victory in the 1978 elections led President Geisel to close Congress once again in order to decree "new rules of the game." The "April package" increased the number of deputies to 420, again altered the system of proportional representation to favor rural areas more prone to support the government, and instituted the "bionic senators." (One of each state's three senators was indirectly elected by the state's legislature in 1978; subsequent legislation barred this procedure for the 1986 election.) These changes ensured a government victory in the November 1978 congressional elections, after which the National Renovating Alliance (Aliança Renovadora Nacional—Arena) assumed 41 seats in the Senate and 231 seats in the Chamber of Deputies while the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro—MDB) held 25 Senate seats and 189 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (see Electoral Politics, this ch.).

After 1978 the Congress again became a stabilizing influence in providing political support and legitimacy to President Figueiredo's efforts at *abertura*. New political party legislation in 1979 had the effect of gradually eroding the executive's base of support in Congress, however, as the new government party, the Democratic Social Party (Partido Democrático Social—PDS) experienced numerous defections as the 1982 elections approached. By late 1981 opposition parties held a majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time since 1965, thus forcing the executive to negotiate with the opposition over controversial legislation. Alignments continued to shift, however, and in September 1982 Brazilian officials reported that the PDS held 36 of 69 Senate seats and 225 of 420 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. A series of presidential decree "packages" in 1981 and 1982 again changed the rules of the game in anticipation of major opposition victories in the 1982 congressional elections. Included among them was an increase in the size of the Chamber of Deputies from 420 to 479.

Every four years at least one-third of the Senate (two-thirds in alternate elections, e.g., 1986, 1994) and the entire Chamber of Deputies are elected. After the election each new legislative body elects a president and a steering committee to determine the chamber's agenda and guide its work. Legislation, except on subjects that are the exclusive prerogative of the president of the republic, may be proposed by a simple majority of either chamber. Legislation proposed by the president becomes law either if both chambers approve it by a simple majority or if no action is taken in Congress for 90 days (40 days if the president considers the bill urgent). The president holds veto powers, and a two-thirds majority in each chamber is required to override.

In addition to legislative functions, the Chamber of Deputies

has exclusive power to initiate impeachment proceedings against the president and his cabinet ministers. The Senate then judges impeachment charges; the Senate also serves as a court for judges of the Supreme Federal Tribunal or an attorney general charged with crimes of responsibility. The Senate also confirms presidential appointments of an attorney general, certain judges, and chiefs of permanent diplomatic missions. One of the most important functions of Congress designated by the 1967 Constitution, of course, is its members' participation in the electoral college that elects the president of the republic.

The Judiciary

The judicial branch of government has undergone considerable change during the years of military rule. The jurisdiction of the federal courts increased at the expense of the state courts, which lost their power to try infractions of federal laws in the first instance. The role of the military courts, not surprisingly, increased dramatically; and a new court, the National Magistrate Council, was created. While Institutional Act Number 5 was in force (1968-78), the power of the president to dismiss judges cost the judiciary its traditional independence from the executive. Nevertheless, there was little publicly aired conflict between the judiciary and the military government; the traditionally conservative Supreme Federal Tribunal was reluctant to use its powers of judicial review to declare legislative or executive action unconstitutional. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, lower courts often challenged the government in cases involving the constitutional rights of citizens, e.g., issuing writs of habeas corpus. All federal judges are appointed by the president for life (they must retire at age 70); they can be removed from office only as a result of judicial sentence.

Supreme Federal Tribunal justices are appointed by the president, with the approval of the Senate, from among citizens at least 35 years old and "of notable juridical leaning and of spotless reputation." The size of the Supreme Federal Tribunal has varied under military rule: in 1965 President Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco enlarged the court from 11 to 16 (to dilute the influence of several justices sympathetic to the populist ideals of former president Getúlio Vargas); in 1969 President Artur da Costa e Silva (using executive powers granted by Institutional Act Number 5) lowered the number back to 11, removing judges believed to be supporters of Vargas' policies. The court may meet in panels or in plenary sessions.

In addition to its power to rule on the constitutionality of laws, the Supreme Federal Tribunal holds original jurisdiction in a number of matters, including crimes committed by certain high officials (including the president), lawsuits between a foreign government and an agency of the Brazilian government or between

National Congress, Brasília
Courtesy Embassy of Brazil, Washington

a state government and the federal government, and jurisdictional disputes between various lower courts. Most of its efforts, however, are spent in hearing appeals from lower courts. The National Magistrate Council, created by constitutional amendment in April 1977, consists of seven justices from the Supreme Federal Tribunal. It is convened to hear criminal complaints levied against federal judges.

The Federal Court of Appeals, also located in Brasília, consists of 27 judges. They sit in plenary, in chambers, or in panels according to specialization. The court has original jurisdiction over appeals of the decisions of lower federal judges.

The 1967 Constitution created, for the first time, federal courts in the capitals of each state, territory, and in the Federal District (Brasília) to try cases involving infraction of most federal laws. One judge sits on most of these courts of first instance.

Special courts under federal jurisdiction, also mandated as part of the judiciary in the 1967 Constitution, include military, electoral, and labor courts. In addition to trying military persons of crimes under military law, the system of military courts hears cases involving civilian infractions of the National Security Law of 1979 (see Criminal Law and Procedure, ch. 5). Lower military courts hear the majority of such cases being tried in the first instance. The Superior Military Tribunal consists of 15 judges appointed by the president for life. Those convicted by the Superior Military Tribunal have the right to appeal to the Supreme Federal Tribunal.

The electoral courts were created by Vargas with the objective of making elections more meaningful and honest. Both their administrative and judicial functions were broadened in the 1967 Constitution. The Superior Electoral Tribunal, seated in Brasília, consists of five judges (three from the Supreme Federal Tribunal, two from the Federal Court of Appeals) and two lawyers chosen by the president of the republic. Regional electoral courts, found in the capital of each state and in the Federal District, also consist of five judges and two lay persons. Local arms of the electoral court system consist of electoral judges and electoral boards. These judges have wide competency in matters pertaining to elections as well as the registration and financing of political parties.

The system of labor courts, instituted to resolve disputes between management and labor, consists of the Superior Labor Court, regional labor courts, and local boards of conciliation and judgment. The Superior Labor Court is composed of 17 judges, all appointed by the president of the republic. Eleven are magistrates for life, six are temporary; half of the latter represent management, the other half, labor.

The Public Ministry, although formally an arm of the executive branch, is attached to all levels of the judiciary. It acts as the legal representative of the government in all cases involving the public interest. In addition to defending the rights and promoting the interests of the federal government, the Public Ministry sees that laws are obeyed and safeguards the right of individuals unable to provide for their own legal defense. It is headed by the attorney general, who is appointed by the president and approved by the Senate, and is staffed by career attorneys. Each state also has a public ministry. All state and local governments also preside over their own system of civil, criminal, and military courts. Article 144 of the Constitution lays out broad outlines for certain features of these courts, including the qualifications and remuneration of judges, the kinds of state and local courts, and their membership.

State and Local Government

The Brazilian system of government is federative in name only. A number of developments, particularly the overwhelming economic power of the federal government and provisions in the Constitution allowing federal authorities to intervene in the affairs of state governments, have led to an ever-increasing concentration of authority in federal officials at the expense of their counterparts in state governments. In addition to the federal government, governmental units in Brazil consisted of 23 states, three federal territories, a Federal District (Brasília) and, in 1980, 4,011 *municípios* (see Glossary).

The states are granted the power to create their own constitutions and their own government; both must conform, however, to

those found at the federal level. The chief state executives, governors, were popularly elected from 1946 to 1965 and indirectly elected by the state assemblies (which, in effect, meant they were appointed by the federal president) from 1966 until 1982, when the first popular elections for governor in 17 years were held. Each governor—whose term of office is four years—has a number of secretaries of state, comparable to the ministers at the federal level. Each state also has a unicameral state assembly, whose members are popularly elected for four-year terms on the basis of proportional representation. Each state also has an independent judiciary headed by an appellate court known as the Court of Justice.

The Constitution grants the states all powers not conferred on the federal government or the *municípios*. In a few areas, most notably education, the states have concurrent powers to legislate along with the federal government. In fact, the real power of each state has depended on its economic resources: states may levy taxes on sales (some 70 percent of their revenue), inheritances, transfers of property, and exports. This power brings significant clout to the governments of rich states, such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul, whose governors may be major national public figures (see fig. 1). Because economic power generates political power, the political power is in turn used to garner a larger share of revenues and services dispensed by the federal government. This system, of course, works to the detriment of poorer states.

Municípios are granted autonomy in the 1967 Constitution, although in fact their authority has gradually been encroached upon by state governments much as states have been by the federal government. *Municípios* are headed by mayors (also called prefects) and quasi-legislative councils, most of which are popularly elected for four-year terms. Under military rule, however, a number of mayors and councilmen have been appointed by state governors with the approval of the federal president. Formally justified in terms of "national security" (mayors were appointed in border areas, areas of major mineral deposits, industrial establishments, and military bases), the appointments were actually used to ensure the control of major cities by supporters of the government political party. Initially, almost 700 local governments were thus appointed; by 1976 the total had been reduced to 175 appointed in key cities and all state capitals. *Município* councils vary in size, though they may have no more than 21 members. Each *município* also has at least one trial court, and most have a justice of the peace.

There were three federal territories—Amapá and Roraima in the North and Fernando de Noronha, a group of small islands in the Atlantic Ocean, northeast of the city of Recife. All are remote and sparsely populated. Because of the growing population and

economic importance, Rondônia was upgraded from a territory to a state in 1982. Municipal government is administered by a mayor appointed by the governor of the territory who, in turn, is appointed by the federal president. The governor of the Federal District is also a presidential appointee. Brasília also has an elected, 20-member legislative council (four-year term) and its own system of courts.

Interest Group Politics

Although in 1982 the nation's attention was focused on electoral politics, a more timeless and, in many respects, more meaningful analysis of Brazilian politics may be pursued by examining various interest groups and the interaction among them. Because Brazil is a large and complex society, these groups are many and varied and rarely are united in their political points of view. Therefore, the following presents a simplification of Brazilian reality for the sake of clarity: groups labeled "conservative" represent, for the most part, those that have benefited from the period of military rule; those labeled "liberal" represent groups that have sought fundamental changes in the policies pursued since 1964.

Conservative Groups

The Military

The armed forces have long played a pivotal role in the nation's politics. As in other nations of Latin America, military officers acted as the moderators of intra-elite disputes, at times temporarily assuming the reins of government in order to facilitate the transfer of political power. On other occasions officers assumed power through the force of arms, then institutionalized a system of personal dictatorship (see The Vargas Era, 1930-45, ch. 1). The post-1964 military regime has been unique in that it has been neither a short-lived transition nor a period of personalistic rule. Rather, the armed forces have ruled as an institution, faithfully adhering to hierarchical principles of discipline, promotions, and retirement in order to preserve the institutional integrity of the officer corps. It has not been an easy task. Most analysts point to inevitable strains on institutional integrity created during almost two decades in power as the primary explanation of the regime's pursuit of *abertura*, which is designed eventually to remove the military from a direct, if not indirect, role in the political system.

The post-1964 military government was by no means run exclusively by military officers. In late 1982, for example, only six of the 21 cabinet members were active-duty officers. The armed forces retained control of the government by holding key positions, most important of which, of course, was the presidency. The presence of active-duty officers in other key positions, most notably as the heads of the CSN, the SNI, and the president's Military Household, guaranteed that executive policymaking would reflect the wishes

of the military hierarchy who, given a compliant electoral college, would also control the presidential succession (see The Executive, this ch.). By holding high government positions, military officers secured financial security and prestige for their institution, as well as access to patronage jobs for active and retired officers, their families, and friends.

An alternate source of power for military officers lay in the command of troops. Some two dozen division generals, brigadiers, and colonels who command troop units must be considered by policymakers. In the event of severe disunity within the officer corps, these commanders have the power to use armed force, or to threaten the use of force, in a coup d'etat (see Administration, Organization, and Training, ch. 5).

In many nations military personnel are forbidden from taking part in political activity. This is not the case in Brazil, where officers and noncomissioned officers may vote and, under certain circumstances, run for public office (see Constitutional Basis, ch. 5). This freedom, together with the tradition of political activity within the Brazilian military, leads to a high level of political expression and controversy within the armed forces. Every attempt is made to shield such controversy from the public view in order to preserve a public image of institutional integrity and harmony. Nevertheless, controversy within the military high command frequently has spilled into the open and, taken together, these incidents present a fairly clear picture of the political concerns of the Brazilian armed forces.

Interservice rivalries seem to be less of a problem in Brazil than in other military-led governments. The parceling of the military budget inevitably leads each service to extol its special need for a larger share. In mid-1982, for example, the commander of the navy cited the Argentine debacle against the British in the Falklands/Malvinas war as evidence of the need for greater Brazilian naval power. In larger political issues, however, the army has always prevailed over the navy and the air force. This is evidenced most clearly by the fact that all five presidents in the 1964-82 period of the military regime came from the army.

Analysts have usually discussed political factions within the contemporary Brazilian military in terms of hard-liners (*linhas duras*) and moderates. The meaning of these terms changed significantly, however, between 1964 and 1982. During the early years of the military regime, controversy centered on the definition of the regime in terms of political economy. Most of the officers who engineered the 1964 coup, led by the first military president, Genéral Castello Branco (hence sometimes called *castellistas*), were considered moderates. Highly influenced by the United States as a result of having fought as part of the United States Fifth Army in Italy during World War II and being educated at Brazil's prestigious Superior War College (Escola

Superior de Guerra—ESG), which was founded in 1949 with the assistance of a United States military mission, these officers were anticommunist, developmentalist, and internationalist in political orientation. Their hard-line opposition consisted of more authoritarian and nationalist younger officers who called for stronger military participation in the institutions of government and for development policies more immediately beneficial to Brazilians, thus creating a strong national constituency. The retirement in 1970 of their leading spokesman, General Afonso Augusto de Albuquerque Lima, led to the eclipse of this nationalist group of military hard-liners.

During the 1970s the political lines within the military were drawn by one's attitude toward the liberalization of military rule. The hard line was defined by General Médici, whose 1969-74 term of office was the most repressive period of military rule, with the least concern for civil liberties. His successor, General Geisel, was a moderate who launched the decompression under which the worst of the repressive apparatus was dismantled. This ongoing controversy within the military hierarchy came to a head with the process of naming Geisel's successor. After the forced retirement of two hard-line members of the high command, generals Hugo de Abreu and Sílvio Coelho da Frota, Geisel was able to prevail and name a fellow moderate, General Figueiredo, to succeed him. Figueiredo continued the process of liberalization under the catchword *abertura*,. which opened the political system to popular political expression and participation.

Such strains within the High Command of the Armed Forces (Alto-Comando das Fôrças Armadas—ACFA) undoubtedly caused a modification in the process of political liberalization. The apparent compromise between moderates and hard-liners led to the continuation of the political opening, but under slower and carefully controlled conditions. Such strains also reinforced the need for the armed forces to retreat from its direct control of the government in order to forestall further erosion of the military institution. The governing role was increasingly seen as detrimental to its professional role as a purely military institution. Furthermore, with the end of the period of Brazil's "economic miracle" in 1974, governing was not as enhancing to the public image of the armed forces. This was made clear in the elections of 1974 and 1978, when the governing party lost the public mandate it had held previously. Finally, the original justification of military rule, the need to enforce national security in the face of domestic threats, no longer rang true by the mid-1970s, when guerrillas had been defeated and liberal politicians had lost any effective voice in public life.

Despite the continuity of two successive moderate governments, hard-line opposition continued to be voiced from within the armed forces. This fact was brought to light most forcefully in April 1981 when two members of the army intelligence service

were implicated when a powerful bomb exploded prematurely outside a stadium in Rio de Janeiro where a rally in favor of *abertura* was to be held the next day. The government's apparent cover-up of the investigation led to speculation that hard-liners in the military forced the concealment of what had been an attempt by opponents of *abertura* to discredit the process through the use of terrorism designed to create a hard-line backlash to the liberalization (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5).

In the early 1980s hard-line opposition to *abertura* was generally estimated to be supported by one-fourth to one-half of the officer corps. Colonels were commonly thought more likely to be hard-line than were generals. Intelligence and police organizations were said to contain a relatively large number of hard-line officers. This group remained opposed to the reintroduction of civil liberties and political pluralism and felt that conditions demanded a continuation of military rule beyond the timetable prescribed by the Figueiredo government. Analysts agreed in 1982 that hard-liners continued to carry influence, albeit reduced. Should key tests of *abertura*, such as the 1982 elections or the 1984 contest for the presidency, indicate that the High Command was losing control of the process, then military hard-liners would seek a resurgence of their influence, thus forcing a slowing or reversal of the moderate program of *abertura*.

Technocrats

The political power of the technocrats (*técnicos*)— the civilian elite of planners, economists, and administrators at the top of Brazil's burgeoning bureaucracy—is partly due to the sheer size of the organizations they oversee. In addition, the above-average educational level, as well as family and political connections, of senior civil servants makes the bureaucracy a formidable pressure group. The bureaucracy also serves as the most important channel for the exercise of influence by other interest groups, owing to the weakness of such institutions as Congress and political parties that perform such functions in other countries (see The Executive, this ch.).

Even responsible government officials do not know the number of people on the government payroll. A 1975 study estimated 500,000 for the federal government and twice that figure for state and local government. The lure of patronage and the growth of governmental functions since that time have undoubtedly raised that figure still higher. The government does have a civil service system whereby appointments are made on merit. The system does not function in all areas of government, however, and in addition to patronage, political loyalties often determine the fate of the civil servant. After the 1964 coup there was a widespread purge of career and appointed civil servants whose political leanings did not match those of the military government (see The Takeover, ch. 1).

The technocrats, who emerged from the purge as the architects of Brazil's post-1964 development strategy, were supposedly "apolitical." Guillermo O'Donnell, in his brilliant 1973 study of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, defines the frame of mind of the technocrat: "Their training stresses a technical problem-solving approach . . . the ambiguities of bargaining and politics are hindrances to rational solutions; and conflict is by definition dysfunctional . . . That which is 'efficient' is good . . . " Such a point of view may have been apolitical in the pre-1964 context of liberal democratic institutions, but in designing and maintaining the development policies of the military regime—e.g., industrialization, export expansion, foreign investment, political stability, low wages—the technocrats were, by necessity, thrust into the political life of the nation as the primary civilian allies of the military rulers.

The myth of an apolitical technocratic establishment at the helm of the nation's giant bureaucracy lasted as long as the combination of brutal dictatorship and economic success kept the development strategy from becoming a subject of national debate. The year 1974 proved to be a watershed on both counts: it was not by chance that the beginning of the political liberalization coincided with the end of the "economic miracle." The attack on the technocrats came primarily from two quarters: nationalists (especially businessmen), who saw the development strategy as favoring international capital to the detriment of domestic private industry, and organized labor, which had seen real wages fall precipitously after 1964. How to control Brazil's endemic problem of price inflation also became a subject of political controversy, as did the problem of Brazil's foreign debt in the early 1980s (see Growth and Structure of the Economy, ch. 3).

The bastion of the power of the technocrats was in the Planning Secretariat of the Presidency (previously known as the Ministry of Planning). Delfim Netto, who was named chief of the Planning Secretariat in August 1979 and continued to hold that post in late 1982, had become perhaps the most powerful civilian in Brazil through his role as the nation's economic czar. Delfim (as well as other, less powerful, technocrats) was given a large degree of authority over economic policymaking, although ultimately his power depended on the acquiescence of the armed forces. The increased economic difficulties in 1982 and the election campaign of that year brought unprecedented criticism of the government's economic policies, criticism that ultimately found its way to Delfim. His anti-inflationary policies were attacked from both sides of the political fence: conservatives, such as former planning ministers

Roberto Campos and Mário Henrique Simonsen, called for tougher deflationary policies, while liberals, such as Celso Furtado, criticized Delfim's policies as causing unnecessary recession and called for, among other measures, a renegotiation of the foreign debt.

Industrialists and Landowners

Political groupings of industrialists and landowners in Brazil are not as powerful as one might expect in a nation with such vast economic resources. The largest organizations—the National Confederation of Industries, the National Confederation of Commerce, and the Brazilian Rural Confederation—were originally formed as part of the corporatist structure created under the tutelage of President Vargas. Forty years later these organizations retained their corporatist flavor and their dependence on the state in an essentially paternalistic relationship. Some analysts argue that post-1964 government policies with respect to such issues as wages and land reform are testimony to the influence of the groups. In other areas—particularly the growing importance of the state and of foreign economic interests—the interests of Brazilian businessmen have clearly not been served, however. The preservation of old systems of land tenure is attributed more to the electoral sphere—where the rural tradition of *coronelismo* guides peasants to vote the dictates of large landowners—than to the effectiveness of the Brazilian Rural Confederation (see Rural Society, ch. 2; Electoral Politics, this ch.).

In response to the ineffectiveness of traditional interest groups in combating the inroads made by government corporations and multinational corporations into areas of production previously held by the private sector, a number of new businessmen's associations were formed that by the early 1980s had proved to be more adept at lobbying government policymakers. Three of the more powerful groups were the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo, the Brazilian Association for the Development of Basic Industry, and the National Federation of Banks. These organizations were small, but they were well funded and highly visible in Brasília and in the national press.

Industrial and landowning interests also retained a direct role in policymaking in semiautonomous enterprises (*autarquias*), such as the Brazilian Coffee Institute and the Sugar and Alcohol Institute. These and similar *autarquias*, which function to promote exports and set prices, standards, and quotas for exports, are staffed by civil servants and by representatives of the relevant industries.

Liberal Groups

In the early 1980s the Roman Catholic Church and a number of incipient independent labor unions were by far the most significant liberal interest groups. Students were the most radical, but their importance diminished markedly after being severely repressed

during the late 1960s and early 1970s. A number of less significant organizations, many of which emerged during the post-1974 liberalization, could also be labeled as representing interests in the "liberal" camp. Organizations of women, which in the early 1960s had precipitated demonstrations that helped galvanize opposition to the João Goulart regime, assumed a liberal flavor in the 1970s as they sought equal rights for women, a quickened pace of liberalization under the military regime, and just solutions to the economic dislocation created by growing inflation. Blacks also sought equal political, economic, and cultural rights within a number of organizations, the most important of which was the United Black Movement Against Racial Discrimination. The Indigenous Missionary Council, an organization of the Catholic church, was formed in 1974 to defend the rights of indigenous people in Brazil's interior. The Brazilian Order of Lawyers was a professional organization interested in improving the system of justice and has often addressed the regime's abuses of human rights. Brazilians have long been noted as highly individualistic, however, and such organized pursuits of equal rights concerns were relatively new phenomena. Their future effectiveness was probably dependent on continued political liberalization.

The Church

The church in Brazil has been in the forefront of the growing activism of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America since World War II. The major organ of this activist role has been the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops, which was created in 1952 and initially led by Bishop Hélder Câmara (later named archbishop of Recife and Olinda). The majority of Brazil's bishops deny that their activities are specifically political in nature; rather, they say, the cause of social justice for the poor and the victims of discrimination is a pastoral prerogative and a fulfillment of the teachings of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, in Brazil (particularly during the 15 years following the 1964 coup) such activities inevitably became political in nature, given the lack of political institutions legitimately representing these interests. During the 1970s political observers all pointed to the church—because it was unique as an institution that enjoyed a degree of immunity from government repression—as the most effective voice of opposition to the regime. By the early 1980s *abertura* had changed that role; if and when the fledgling political parties and interest groups become stronger, the direct political involvement of the church may become redundant.

The political leanings of church officials, of course, are by no means homogeneous: sentiments vary from those who openly advocate socialism as a solution to income inequality (detractors of leftist prelates, such as Archbishop Câmara and Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, archbishop of São Paulo, have dubbed them "red

Planalto Palace, Brasília
Courtesy Embassy of Brazil, Washington

bishops") to ultraconservative bishops associated with the São Paulo-based Brazilian Society for the Defense of Traditional Family and Property (an anticommunist lay organization founded in 1960 by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira). Disagreement did occasionally surface, particularly with respect to the appointment of new bishops; but on the whole, the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops has managed to achieve a high degree of agreement and, after 1967, consistency in its public pronouncements against the military government.

Shortly after the coup the bishops issued a statement in favor of "the Armed Forces [which] responded in time and prevented the implantation of a Bolshevik regime from being consummated in our land." This was a reflection of the anticommunist sentiment of the majority of the church hierarchy, which sought to patch up relations with the new government as well as to diminish the influence of the so-called Catholic left, whose adherents had worked closely with radical student and rural labor organizations during the early 1960s. The position of the church soon began to change, however, as its personnel became victims of increased government repression. Harassment of church officials identified with opposition to government policies, charges of subversion against some, the expulsion of foreign priests, and the arrest and torture of numerous laity engaged in church activities increasingly led the Catholic hierarchy to oppose the government in order to defend the sanctity of the religious institution. In November 1967

255

the same Central Commission of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops that only three and one-half years earlier had praised the new military government issued a document entitled "Why the Bishops Cannot Remain Quiet," in which they strongly criticized the government.

By 1970 such public expressions of the church went beyond self-defense to address the human rights concerns of the public as a whole. In that year the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops first publicly criticized torture, illegal imprisonments, judicial restrictions, and denials of habeas corpus. Human rights became a major concern of Cardinal Arns, and the Commission of Justice and Peace, an agency of his archdiocese, became the principal organization actively defending the victims of the regime's security apparatus during the early and mid-1970s. Church-led protests over the deaths of Vladimir Herzog and Manoel Fiel Filho in 1975 led to the definitive end of the practice of torture by government security agencies (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5).

A May 1973 document entitled "I Heard the Cries of My People," issued by 17 members of the church hierarchy in the impoverished Northeast, signaled the revival of the church in the role of social critic. It criticized the economic miracle, arguing that the regime's economic program had led to an increased concentration of income, structural unemployment, malnutrition, and inadequate housing, education, and health services for the poor. This role was maintained and refined during the next decade, when church officials became the chief activists on behalf of the nation's poor. In urban areas the church worked with labor unions and with residents of the growing shantytowns, called *favelas* (see Urbanization, ch. 2). In rural areas church officials concerned themselves with questions of land tenure and inadequate social services. Although the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops and other forums of the church hierarchy continued to speak out on such issues, perhaps the most politically significant vehicles for the church's social role were the grass-roots organizations known as ecclesiastically based communities.

First appearing in the early 1970s in the wake of Vatican II in order to relieve the workload of overburdened priests, the ecclesiastically based communities grew in number to an estimated 80,000 by 1980, having a membership of some 1.5 million. Attached to local parishes, most have purely religious functions, such as prayer and Bible study, although according to longtime observer Thomas G. Sanders, a large and apparently increasing number are "assuming an active role in articulating group interests, making changes in the community, and putting pressure on politicians and public officials to promote policies benefiting their interests." During the first decade of their existence, the ecclesiastically based communities limited their concerns to local issues, and

there was little linkage between the various organizations. Political observers took note, however, of their rapid growth and of the larger potential of the ecclesiastically based communities, which by the early 1980s were the most extensive grass-roots organizations in the nation.

Labor

Labor unions in Brazil, estimated to encompass 10 to 15 percent of the work force, were, by and large, weak institutions. On only two occasions in its modern history—the early 1960s and the late 1970s—has organized labor been an effective, independent voice of the working class. Otherwise, labor unions have displayed a remarkable continuity since the 1930s, when they were reorganized under the paternalistic, corporate controls of President Vargas' Estado Novo (see The Estado Novo, ch. 1). Labor's growing independence from state controls during the 1960-64 period was seen by some observers as one cause of the political crisis that culminated in the 1964 coup d'etat. After the coup the military government reasserted and refined the corporatist system, whereby the state controlled wages, union leadership, and finances and made strikes essentially illegal. Unions were not eliminated as they were under other South Amercian authoritarian regimes, but activities outside those sanctioned by the government were repressed. Many analysts at the time claimed that authoritarian control of organized labor—enforcing low wages in a growing export-oriented industrial sector—was the key to the viability of the development scheme pursued in these years. High wages, they argued, would cost Brazil its competitiveness in world markets. The 1978-79 period brought a reawakening of independent union activity, but the next three years saw reversals and left doubts among those who had hoped that the growth of independent and representative labor unions would keep pace with the process of political liberalization.

The corporatist nature of labor unions was reflected in labor legislation, which in the early 1980s still defined the union as an "organ of collaboration of the State." Unions were supervised and regulated in detail by the Ministry of Labor; comprehensive labor legislation guaranteed benefits, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, and paid vacations; unions were financed by the government (from a union tax collected from workers); and labor courts, rather than collective bargaining, settled labor disputes. Perhaps the most pervasive instrument of state influence, however, lay in the control of union leadership. According to Sanders, the traditional union leader, known as a *pelego*, "has the mentality of a bureaucrat or administrator, and he is more concerned with maintaining the confidence of employers and government officials than that of the workers whom he theoretically represents. He is loyal to the system because of the access it provides to influence,

gifts, and positions in the labor courts and union hierarchy." On numerous occasions since 1964, the Ministry of Labor has removed more independently minded union leadership in order to reinstitute the system of *peleguismo*.

Competition among different unions for membership was precluded by law. Only one union per category of worker (profession) could be formed in any locale. Five or more unions in the same sector of the economy could form a federation; a minimum of three federations was required to establish a national confederation. A national organization of workers from a variety of crafts or skills was forbidden. *Peleguismo* dominated the leadership of the federations, the confederaions, and the smaller unions. The independent leadership that emerged first during the early 1970s as the trade union opposition (*oposição sindical*) then blossomed during the late 1970s, was found largely in local unions in the major urban areas.

The most prominent of these leaders was Luís Inácio da Silva (known popularly as "Lula"), president of the metallurgical workers union in the São Paulo suburb of São Bernardo. Often compared to Poland's Lech Walesa, Lula was the principal leader of several hundred thousand strikers who demanded that wages lost from the government's falsification of the inflation index (which determined wage increases) in 1973 be granted retroactively. In addition to metallurgical workers, strikers came to include teachers, television workers, construction workers, garbage collectors, and medical personnel; strikes spread from São Paulo to workers in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, Paraná, and Acre. The strikes peaked in 1978 and 1979; in the latter year, a week after the inauguration of President Figueiredo, the strike in São Paulo was declared illegal, and Lula was placed under arrest.

The long-dormant National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (Confederação Nacional de Trabalhistas Agrícola—CONTAG) also became active during this period. In October 1979 some 18,000 sugarcane workers in Pernambuco struck and won large salary increases and a number of improvements in benefits and working conditions. The landowners failed, however, to observe the new contract, and much of the effort of CONTAG continued to be directed toward making landowners uphold these and other legal requirements, such as minimum wages and social security payments. Rural labor had an important ally during the late 1970s and early 1980s in the Catholic church's Pastoral Land Commission, which worked directly with peasants and rural proletariats, particularly in growing concerns over questions of land tenure (see Rural Society, ch. 2).

The lack of militancy displayed by workers from 1980 through 1982 was attributed to a variety of causes. Slowed growth, combined with accelerated inflation, led to greater government

willingness to repress wage demands; workers, aware of the growing pool of unemployed potential strikebreakers, were more cautious. Also, a new wage law in 1979 partially addressed the worker dissatisfaction of the previous years by making wage adjustments based on inflation and increases in productivity every six months rather than annually. Yet another factor was the growing division among the union leaders. After the successful 1979 strikes the new leadership (independent of the traditional system of *peleguismo*) had united under the banner of the Labor Union Unity (Unidade Sindical). The subsequent growth of a number of competing political parties, however, each vying for the allegiance of organized labor, led to the splintering of Unidade Sindical along party lines. It was reported in 1982 that the major division was between moderates, who retained the name of Unidade Sindical, and the more militant leaders, linked to Lula's Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT), who called themselves the authentics (*autênticos*).

Students

Like students throughout much of Latin America, university students in Brazil have been the most radicaly leftist of organized interest groups. This was particularly true during the mid-1960s, when People's Action (Ação Popular—AP), a radical student group organized in 1962, worked closely with the Catholic left in the organization of workers and peasants until the coup and subsequently was in the forefront of organized opposition to the military regime. Institutional Act Number 5 of December 1968 and Decree-Law 477, issued two months later, prohibited all political activity by students or faculty and effectively quashed student activism until 1977. In the atmosphere of political liberalization that year, students organized protest demonstrations unlike anything seen in Brazil for almost a decade. During the next five years, large public demonstrations by students were not in evidence, although under the political liberalization of *abertura* leftist students revived the old National Union of Students (União Nacional dos Estudantes—UNE) that had been declared illegal in the wake of the 1964 coup.

Like so many of Brazil's associational groups, the UNE had been founded during the Vargas regime as part of the corporatist structure under the aegis of the state. During the Second Republic (1946-64) the UNE came under a variety of influences, and by early 1964 it was dominated by the radical AP. Both groups were officially abolished after the coup, but students reorganized clandestinely and in 1966 and 1968 spearheaded the two largest protest demonstrations during the early years of the military regime. The government formed its own student organization, but it failed to attract supporters and was abolished in 1968. The repression of late 1968 and early 1969 effectively put an end to

organized student activism for a period of eight years, although the initial impact was to drive many students into the revolutionary guerrilla groups that plagued Brazilian cities between 1968 and 1972. A 1973 study by Amnesty International reported that students accounted for some 40 percent of the victims of torture and assassination in Brazilian prisons during the early 1970s.

The decline in the quality of higher education during the military regime has been widely reported: between 1960 and 1980 enrollment grew from 100,000 to 1.5 million, while the percentage of the federal budget allocated to all levels of education went from 9.2 percent in 1961 to 13 percent in 1964, then declined steadily until 1977, when the percentage was a mere 3.6. By 1980 the federal education budget had reportedly grown to over 5 percent of the total, though tuition and fees in private universities (accounting for over half the total university enrollment) were also rising dramatically (see Education, ch. 2). When organized student protests reemerged in São Paulo in March 1977, it was these deteriorating conditions that provided the initial spark. Again in September 1980 all 57 of the nation's public and private universities went on strike for several days to protest increased fees and the general deterioration of university conditions.

Student activism with respect to larger political issues during the late 1970s and early 1980s was significantly muted compared with the heady days of the 1960s, however. Between May and August 1977 a number of demonstrations were organized (some of which turned violent) to protest police repression of the student activists. Demonstrators also called for the release of all political prisoners and the restoration of political liberties. The universities were relatively quiet during the next five years. The UNE was formally reconstituted in 1979, and its delegates endorsed a charter pledging to "fight against oppression" and to support "the demands of the working class." Several thousand students attended the annual congresses of the UNE in 1979 and 1980. The leadership elected at each represented a variety of leftist positions.

Electoral Politics

Electoral politics have had a checkered history in post-World War II Brazil. After being waged vigorously during the Second Republic by a multiparty system and a growing electorate, the post-1964 military government imposed an artificial electoral system designed to give the illusion of democratic competition while preserving the rule of the armed forces and their civilian allies. By the mid-1970s, however, the contrived opposition began acting like a real opposition, and the regime found it prudent to alter drastically the system that had been in place since 1965. A new law promulgated in 1979 governing political parties and a new electoral system, which had its first test in November 1982, reinstated the popular election of major federal, state, and local

officials. (The president, however, continued to be elected indirectly by an electoral college.) Critics argued, though, that executive officials would continue to use their legislative prerogatives (as they had in the past) to modify the electoral system further to their advantage. The next test of the evolving electoral system lies in the selection of the president: first, whether the opposition within the electoral college will have a hand in naming Figueiredo's successor in 1984; and second, whether future presidents will once again be elected by a popular, direct vote.

Political Parties

The origins of Brazil's political parties, like so many of its political institutions, go back to Vargas, who organized the rural-based Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático—PSD) and the urban-based Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro—PTB) in 1945 to support his declining political fortunes (see The Crisis of 1945, ch. 1). The National Democratic Union (União Democrática Nacional—UDN), the last of the three major parties that were to dominate electoral politics for two decades, was organized by Vargas' opponents. Neither ideological nor representative of constituent interests, these parties functioned to channel local political machines, headed by paternalistic bosses (*coronels* in rural areas) into the national electoral arena. Personal ism pervaded the party machinery: delivering votes brought patronage in the form of government jobs, federal development projects, and cash to the local bosses. To a considerable extent this characterization of Brazilian party politics persisted into the 1980s (see Political Dynamics under the Second Republic, ch. 1).

The PSD was the most successful of the Second Republic parties (see fig. 9). Its candidates won the presidency in 1945 and 1955, and the party supported the PTB victor in 1950 (Vargas) and President Goulart (1961-64). Only during the brief incumbency of Jânio Quadros in 1961 was the PSD "out of favor" with the president, and it consistently dominated both houses of Congress. Nonideolgical, though conservative in the sense that it supported the status quo, the PSD attracted many traditional *coronels,* as well as bureaucrats, industrialists, landowners, and bankers who benefited from the Vargas and PSD economic programs.

The PTB acted as the "partner" of the PSD thoughout most of the 1945-64 period. Its strength grew steadily and culminated in the Goulart presidency. Its appeal was populist, drawing on nationalistic sentiment in calling for active state intervention in the economy and extended benefits for the working class. The makeup of the PTB was heterogeneous: Goulart was one of the nation's wealthiest landowners, while new urban middle and upper classes, as well as leftist intellectuals, were party adherents. The PTB tried, but generally failed, to gain a working-class following.

PRESIDENT (percentage)

	1945	1950	1955	1960
PSD	52.4	20.6	33.8	30.6*
PTB	—	46.6	—	
UDN	32.9	28.4	28.7	44.8
PSP	—	—	24.4	17.4
Other and void	14.7	4.4	13.1	7.2

SENATE/CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (number of seats)

	1966	1970	1974	1978
Arena	43 / 254	59 / 223	46 / 199	41 / 231
MDB	21 / 150	7 / 87	20 / 165	25 / 189
Other	2 / 5	0	0	0

—means party did not run candidate.
*Electoral alliance. In 1961 Vice President João Goulart (PTB) succeeded Jânio Quadros (UDN) as president.

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (number of seats)

	1945	1950	1954	1958	1962
PSD	151	112	114	115	122
PTB	22	51	56	66	109
UDN	77	81	74	70	94
PSP	4	24	32	25	22
Other	32	36	50	50	62

1982 ELECTIONS (number of seats)

	PDS	PMDB	PT	PDT	PTB
Governor	12	9	0	1	0
Senate	15	9	0	1	0
Chamber of Deputies	235	200	7	24	13

PSD Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party)

PTB Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party)

UDN União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union)

PSP Partido Social Progressista (Social Progressive Party)

Arena Aliança Renovadora Nacional (National Renovating Alliance)

MDB Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement)

PDS Partido Democrático Social (Democratic Social Party)

PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party)

PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)

PDT Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Labor Party)

Source: Based on information from "Brazil," *Europa Year Book, 1980: A World Survey*, 1, London, 1980, 1681; Riordan Roett, *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society*, New York, 1978, 66, 68; and *Folha de São Paulo*, November 27, 1982.

Figure 9. Election Results, 1945–82

Except during the brief rule of Quadros in 1961, the UDN acted as the opposition party thoroughout the Second Republic. Moderate and middle class, attracting urban professionals and conservative intellectuals, the UDN espoused amorphous issues, such as individual liberties, honesty and efficiency in government, and government decentralization. Essentially, it wanted to reverse the Vargas legacy. Many civilian allies of the military government ·were recruited from the UDN.

Eleven other parties competed in elections between 1946 and 1964. Only one of these, the Social Progressive Party (Partido Social Progressista—PSP), was significant in the electoral arena. Dominated by its personalist leader, Adhemar de Barros, it appealed to the urban lower class in the tradition of Vargas. PSP success peaked in the mid-1950s, then gradually waned.

Increasingly during the Second Republic, various parties formed temporary alliances for electoral purposes. This was especially true in congressional elections, where votes cast for alliances rose to over 40 percent of the total by 1962. Alliances ended on election day, however, and candidates elected on an alliance ticket assumed their positions in Congress as party members. Indicative of the shallowness in party platforms, the electoral system thus contributed to depriving the political parties of purpose beyond serving as electoral machines for personalistic leaders.

In the public's mind, nevertheless, these parties continued to retain their identities long after they were officially abolished in October 1965 under the provisions of Institutional Act Number 2. Two months later two new parties, the National Renovating Alliance (Alicança Renovadora Nacional—Arena) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro— MDB), were formed under the terms of restrictive legislation that required new political parties to have at least 120 adherents in Congress. Arena, the majority party of the government, was formed largely out of the UDN and the conservative wing of the PSD; the MDB, the minority party of the opposition, was made up largely of the PTB, PSD liberals, and adherents of a wide spectrum of smaller parties. The contrived nature of these two parties, unrepresentative of national political sentiment, was widely acknowledged. For years the Brazilian press continued to include the pre-1965 party affiliation, in the political identification of politicians, e.g., MDB, ex-PSD.

The party system that was to persist until 1979 was further distorted by the government's practice of suspending, for a period of 10 years, the political rights of individuals they deemed threatening to their political designs. This action was taken against over 1,500 persons, mostly politicians. Not surprisingly, most were associated with the MDB. Such practices led to widespread cynicism and apathy among both politicians and voters during the first decade of military rule.

The Government Party

Cynicism and apathy favored Arena, which in 1970 gained overwhelming control of both houses of Congress, thanks largely to 6.6 million blank or spoiled ballots and another 10 million voters who did not bother to participate. Thereafter, however, Arena's fortunes steadily declined, and it faced the possibility of losing its congressional majority in the 1978 elections. In 1977 the

Geisel administration averted this possibility however, by closing Congress and amending the Constitution by decree so that one-third of the senators were elected in the state assemblies, which Arena controlled, rather than in direct, popular elections. Arena's association with the government gave it another advantage—access to patronage—which made it the most important party in rural areas and in most state and local governments, where the traditional political machinery of *coronelismo* was strongest.

Factionalism within Arena threatened it from its birth to its death under the November 1979 Law of Party Reform. The major division was defined by individual pre-1965 party loyalties. In addition to PSD and UDN factions, however, Arena was factionalized at the local level by personal loyalties. The government dealt with this factionalism among its supporters by an electoral device known as *sublegenda,* which allowed separate tickets to compete in elections under the same party label. Its effect was to institutionalize rather than resolve the factionalization that was inherited, in part, by Arena's post-1979 reincarnation as the Democratic Social Party (Partido Democrático Social—PDS).

The end of the *sublegenda* electoral device led a considerable number of Arenistas (members or adherents of Arena) in electoral districts where rival factions predominated, to shun the PDS. Other Arenistas joined the opposition in the belief that the momentum of political liberalization would inevitably lead to a loss of popular support for the new government party. Nevertheless, factional struggles between PDS candidates and powerful rivals within the party cost the PDS a number of important races in the 1982 elections.

Such factionalism was probably inevitable as long as the PDS lacked a cohesive party platform, having little identity beyond being the party of the government. The electoral strength of the PDS was strongest in rural areas and in the Northeast and North, where the powers of patronage and the tradition of "clientelistic" politics were strongest. Both its lack of ideological definition and its reliance on local political machinery to deliver votes gave the PDS a large measure of continuity with traditions first established in Brazilian political parties during the Vargas era.

Opposition Parties

The opposition party formed in December 1965, the MDB, was ineffective for nearly a decade. With political rights stripped from many of its principal leaders, gubernatorial and mayoral elections barred in many of its local strongholds, and little access to the patronage and other prerogatives of power granted its opponents, the MDB had few options. It boycotted the 1966 elections and lost disastrously in the 1970 national and 1972 local elections. Then its fortunes began to change. In 1973, for the first time, it nominated candidates for president and vice president, who gained a mere 76 of 502 votes in the electoral college. In the 1974 popular elections for

Congress, state legislatures, and municipal councils, however, the MDB made a surprisingly strong showing, adding 13 Senate seats and 78 seats in the Chamber of Deputies to its previous total. The electoral success of the MDB, attributed largely to the protest vote arising out of the nation's mounting economic difficulties, continued in the 1976 local and 1978 national elections. In all probability only the manipulation of the electoral system in 1977 and its complete overhaul in 1979 prevented the MDB from shedding its minority status to become the majority party in Congress.

Factionalism within the MDB, a heterogeneous agglomeration of groups from conservatives to Marxists who shared only their opposition to the government, was more rife than that within Arena. During its early years the principal division was between the "moderates" and the more leftist "authentics." With the passage of time each of these splintered further. The left was especially factionalized, the "authentics" dividing into the "historical" and "new authentics," and the "popular tendency" coalescing around Lula and others associated with organized labor. The "moderates" were divided by the questions of whether to collaborate with Marxists as well as whether to collaborate with the government. As anticipated by its architects, the November 1979 Law of Party Reform, which made it much easier to organize a political party than had the 1965 legislation, led to various MDB factions each forming its own party. A divided opposition, it was assumed, would be a less potent opposition.

Although some MDB leaders were glad of the opportunity to organize a party to distinguish themselves from other MDB leaders with radically different ideologies, still others held the opinion that a large, though ideologically diverse, party of the opposition could successfully challenge the PDS in the elections. It was this latter group that formed the core of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro—PMDB) in January 1980. A considerable number of disaffected Arenistas also joined the PMDB over the course of the next two years.

In February 1982 the PMDB received a tremendous boost when the Popular Party (Partido Popular—PP), after two years as the third largest party, disbanded in order to merge with the PMDB. The PP had been formed by an MDB "moderate," Tancredo Neves, and a dissident Arenista, Magalhães Pinto, to represent businessmen who generally supported the status quo but resented the domination of the government by the military and their technocratic allies. By early 1982, to many observers' surprise, the PP had gained nearly 100 adherents in Congress. The subsequent merger, prompted by a government ruling that disallowed alliances for the 1982 elections, contributed in large measure to the PMDB success in that election.

The PMDB remained factionalized, though less so than its predecessor, the MDB, had been. In 1982 the major sources of dispute seemed to be the inclusion of the leadership of the outlawed

Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro—PCB) on the one hand and former Arenistas on the other. These disputes were suppressed for purposes of the 1982 election but in all likelihood would reappear in the future. The business faction surrounding Neves, formerly president of PP but made first vice president of the PMDB in 1982, may also reassert its separate identity.

In late 1982 the PMDB remained headed by Ulysses Guimaraes, who had also served as president of the MDB. During the early 1980s the PMDB had made a large effort to increase party membership and develop a widespread base of local organizations. It had the most success in the urban areas of southern Brazil.

The program of the PMDB, as articulated in 1982, called for the full exercise of the political rights of all citizens, including the rights of illiterates to vote, and free and direct elections for governmental representatives at all levels, including the presidency. Ultimately, the PMDB called for the convocation of a representative constituent assembly that would write a new, liberal-democratic constitution. Its economic program called for the renegotiation of the foreign debt, the lowering of interest rates, and public works programs to combat unemployment. It generally supported the government's independent foreign policy.

Although the 1979 Law of Party Reform was designed to ensure the division of the MDB into a number of parties, requirements for legal registration as a party were stringent enough to prevent an unstable proliferation of small parties. To compete in the 1982 elections, a party, therefore, was required to gain the support of at least 10 percent of the members of Congress or to have branch organizations in at least one-fifth of the *municípios* in each of at least nine of Brazil's 23 states. Three parties, in addition to the PDS and the PMDB, met these qualifications. To be legally recognized after 1982, a party will have had to receive 3 percent of the vote of nine states and 5 percent nationwide for the Chamber of Deputies.

The post-1982 fates of the three smaller opposition parties under such restrictions were uncertain. Perhaps the most endangered was the Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro—PTB), organized in 1981 by Ivete Vargas, the niece of the founder of the original PTB, and Quadros, attempting a political comeback two decades after his brief presidential tenure. Similarly attempting to resurrect the urban populist tradition of the Second Republic was the Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista—PDT) of Leonel Brizola. The symbol of radical popularism during the early 1960s when he was governor of Rio Grande do Sul, then a federal deputy from Rio de Janeira, Brizola undertook a more moderate stance while in exile, where he was influenced by European social democrats.

The third party to be formed out the of opposition MDB between 1980 and 1982 was the PT. The PT was unique among all post-World War II Brazilian political parties in that it was organ-

*Leonel Brizola, elected
governor of Rio de Janeiro
in November 1982 elections
Courtesy United Press
International*

*Franco Montoro, elected
governor of São Paulo in
November 1982 elections
Courtesy United Press
International*

ized in a grass-roots fashion, rather than in the top-down, personalistic, and clientelistic tradition of other parties. In one sense it was forced into this position by the Law of Party Reform. Lacking the support of a sufficient number of congressmen to qualify for the 1982 election, it was allowed to compete only because of its widespread organization at the local level. Its grass-roots organization was, in another sense, a product of the belief of the PT leadership in democratic decisionmaking within the party to distinguish itself from the personalism that pervaded other parties.

Conceived in 1978 by the "authentic" trade union leadership, the PT elected Lula as its president at its first national party congress in 1981. Party membership was dominated by workers, both blue collar and white collar. The PT also attracted a number of students, leftist intellectuals and, especially in the rural Northeast, the Roman Catholic clergy. In 1982 the party claimed a membership of 300,000 in local organizations in all but one of the 23 states.

Because its membership adhered to a wide variety of leftist political philosophies, the PT had difficulty in articulating a concise platform of its own. Its long-term goal was the establishment of a vaguely defined socialism. In the short term it sought restrictions on the activities of multinational corporations operating in

267

Brazil and a variety of benefits for workers, including trade union freedoms and government programs to address unemployment and low wages.

Barred from participation in the 1982 elections, although operating openly in the early 1980s for the first time since 1964, were the pro-Soviet PCB and a variety of smaller, splinter communist groups. In 1980 the aged and longtime general secretary of the PCB, Luís Carlos Prestes, was ousted upon his return from exile and replaced by Giocondo Gervasi Dias. The PCB subsequently supported the PMDB in the 1982 elections, while Prestes was said to favor the PT. The major activity of the PCB during the early 1980s, however, was its concerted effort to gain legal recognition. Other communist parties, the products of earlier factionalization, included the Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil—PCdoB), formed in 1962, not to be confused with the pre-1960 PCdoB, which was pro-Albanian (formerly pro-Chinese); the pro-Cuba Revolutionary Communist Party (Partido Comunista Revolucionaria—PCR); and another Castroite group that had been active in the guerrilla activities of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Revolutionary Movement of October 8 (Movimento Revolucionario 8 de Outubro—MR-8). A number of Trotskyite groups also existed, one of which, Socialist Convergence, was said to work closely with the PT (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5).

Elections under Military Rule

One important characteristic that distinguished military rule in Brazil from that in other Latin American nations ruled by military governments during the same period was the fact that elections continued to be held after 1964. Not all offices that had traditionally been filled by elected officials were contested, however. Formally elected by an electoral college, the president and vice president were, in fact, selected by the military hierarchy. From October 1965 until November 1982 state governors were indirectly elected by government-controlled state assemblies. After 1966 a large number of local mayors and councilmen in many of the most important *municípios* were appointed state governors. And finally, in 1978, half of the 44 contested senatorial seats were selected by the government-controlled state assemblies.

On one occasion—the 1980 elections for local government officials—scheduled elections were canceled. The major reason given by officials for this decision was that candidates would not have had time to prepare themselves, given the newness of the Law of Party Reform. With this exception, then, popular elections for some of the elected officials (federal deputies and senators, state assembly members, and most local mayors and councilmen) were held every two years between 1966 and 1982. (Another reason given for the 1980 cancellation was to bring local elections into step with state and national elections, so that henceforth

there would be elections only every four years.)

There were very few accusations of vote fraud made during those years. The Brazilian electoral code was administered and enforced by a widespread system of electoral courts, headed by the Superior Electoral Tribunal, which was generally accepted as efficient, honest, and nonpartisan. These courts lacked any power to alter the electoral system, however. This prerogative was used extensively by the federal executive through numerous constitutional amendments, as well as a new electoral code in 1965 that was amended repeatedly in subsequent years in order to retain political control over the system of government under the guise of democratic procedures (see Structure of Government, this ch.).

Elections were halted during the mid-1960s for the president, governors, and local officials in key *municípios* because military authorities believed that they would lose control of these positions should they be contested in popular elections. For a decade the government was able, through the Arena party, to win comfortable margins in elections for federal and state legislatures and in the overwhelming majority of local government contests. This was made possible by a combination of its holding a near monopoly on the benefits from patronage and *coronelismo*, gerrymandering and, when necessary, intimidation (such as revoking the political rights of powerful opponents). Heavy Arena losses in federal elections in 1974 and again in local elections in 1976 led the government to amend substantially the electoral code governing subsequent elections in order to retain its controlling majorities within the elected bodies.

The "April package," decreed in April 1977 after Congress had been summarily closed, addressed the 1978 federal elections. To prevent the opposition MDB from gaining a majority in the Senate, the regime amended the Constitution so that one of each state's three senators was selected in the Arena-controlled state assemblies. With respect to the Chamber of Deputies, the system of proportional representation was changed in two ways designed to increase the representation given to smaller rural states, where Arena held a stronger voter appeal. First, the minimum number of deputies for the smallest states was doubled to six; second, the number of seats accorded each state became calculated on the basis of total population, rather than the number of registered voters as in the past. Clearly, the higher proportion of nonvoters in rural areas meant that this subtle change gave additional representation to Arena-controlled states.

The 1982 elections—the first conducted under the 1979 law that created a multiparty system of electoral competition—were widely viewed as the most open and free elections in 18 years of military rule. Indeed, they included the first popular elections held for state governors since 1965. Of equal or greater significance, they were the first elections under the political liberalization of *abertura*

269

that had allowed exiled opponents to return under the 1979 amnesty, returned political rights to those who had previously had them revoked (the so-called *casados*), and ended the harsh media censorship that had been in place since 1968. More broadly, it was the first electoral contest since the January 1979 abrogation of Institutional Act Number 5, which had been the principal source of the military regime's dictatorial powers. Potentially the most significant aspect of the 1982 elections was that its victors—all the senators and deputies and six members of each state assembly— would comprise the electoral college that two years later would select the successor to President Figueiredo.

The liberalized atmosphere of the 1982 elections did not prevent the government, nevertheless, from what had become a tradition: the alteration of the electoral system to the advantage of the government party, now under the banner of the PDS. The size of the Chamber of Deputies was raised from 420 to 479; although government spokesmen stated that this reflected population increases measured in the 1980 census, others labeled the redistricting as a gerrymandering exercise and charged that the newly created districts were in regions of PDS strength. More clearly partisan in design was the voting procedure that emerged out of a series of electoral "reform packages" introduced between November 1981 and August 1982. A single ballot was used for all six electoral contests. The blank ballot contained only the title of each position to be filled (governor, senator, deputy, state assemblyman, mayor, and city councilman) followed by a blank space where the voter was required to write in the candidate's name or four-digit number assigned to each contestant. Furthermore, each voter was required to vote a straight party ticket. Ballots with votes that crossed party lines, those without a name or number after each position, and those indicating the name of the party, rather than the individuals of choice, were declared invalid.

All parties concerned agreed that these voting regulations were designed to favor the PDS. Such manipulation, in the Brazilian context, was considered a prerogative of those holding power. First of all, the complicated voting procedure led to many ballots' being invalidated; had 50 percent or more been invalidated, the entire election would have been annulled. Second, the straight party ticket (*voto vinculado*) requirement led rural voters, primarily concerned with local affairs in which PDS candidates were strongest, to vote for the PDS at the national level, where their candidates were often weaker than those of the opposition parties. Third, although the estimated 25 percent of the voting population that was illiterate had legally gained suffrage rights, the complicated procedures and the need to write a name or number on the ballot effectively barred them from casting a valid vote.

Legal manipulations designed to hinder the oppositions in electoral contests went beyond the electoral laws to include access

to the mass media. Restrictions on the media were far less than they had been previously, however. Censorship was first imposed in 1968. The degree of censorship varied greatly, from cases where every word was subject to prior censorship to those where only occasional, ex post facto censorship came into play. In general, however, it was not as stringent as the censorship practiced by many comparable regimes.

The most common explanation for this fact was the generally conservative point of view of the majority of the mass media organs. The government's own news service, Agencia Nacional, and its radio program, "Hora do Brasil," gave widespread distribution to its interpretation of events. REDE Globo (formerly known as TV Globo) was launched in the mid-1960s with considerable financial backing from private United States interests, and by the mid-1970s the highly successful network dominated 60 to 70 percent of the 45 million-viewer television audience. Its apolitical programming and conservative projection of the news made Globo enterprises, which diversified into magazines, newspapers, and radio stations, as well as nonmedia concerns, an important de facto supporter of the military government. A total of over 200 radio stations broadcast to an audience estimated in the mid-1970s at 85 million. Low literacy levels and a generally low consumption of printed media made television and radio (along with word of mouth) particularly important vehicles for the transmission of political values.

The most important daily newspaper was the conservative *O Estado de São Paulo*, having a daily circulation in early 1982 averaging 200,000 and nearly twice that figure on Sundays. The three other major dailies—*O Globo* and *Jornal do Brasil*, in Rio de Janeiro, and *Fôlha de São Paulo*—were also conservative. There were 23 additional daily newspapers, although their circulations were much smaller. A number of these smaller dailies, generally known as "alternative dailies," were inaugurated in the late 1970s and were openly critical of the government. Weekly newsmagazines had a considerable political impact. By far the most influential was *Veja*, published by large São Paulo corporate interests. *Isto É*, also from São Paulo, ran a poor second among weeklies.

Censorship was gradually eased during the late 1970s. By 1982 there was no prior censorship of the variety that had been ubiquitous a decade earlier. Even the technically outlawed PCB published its own newspaper. By no means, however, did it print whatever it wanted to: self-censorship was assiduously practiced by the "alternative dailies" and all other media that criticized the government. The 1979 National Security Law established prison terms up to 13 years for nebulous "crimes," such as "creating subversive propaganda" and "enabling or permitting . . . the use of communications media for the execution of a crime against

national security." Television and radio station managers and publishers were understandably careful to avoid such penalties. Certain subjects, such as the private lives of military officials, were taboo.

Self-censorship played a major role in limiting the subjects of discussion and moderating the tone of electoral campaigns. Another piece of legislation, popularly known as the Falcão Law (after its primary author, Armando Falcão) also restricted access to the media during the 1978 and 1982 electoral campaigns. During the two months prior to each of these elections, the Falcão Law limited television and radio campaigning to a small number of five-second spots (paid for by the government) showing only a photograph of the candidate, his name, party, and the position for which he was running. Debates or any statement of a candidate's position on an issue on radio or television were outlawed. The law was widely criticized, particularly because the president continued to appear on a weekly, prime-time television discussion, called "The President and the People," throughout the period up to the elections.

As had been widely predicted before the 1982 elections, the manipulation of the electoral laws and the mass media was not able to prevent (although it undoubtedly did lessen its magnitude) the victory of the opposition parties over the PDS in the gubernatorial and congressional races. Although the PDS won 12 gubernatorial seats as opposed to nine for the PMDB, the opposition won in all but one of the important industrial states in the populous southern part of the country. PDS victories were concentrated in the rural northeast. Brizola captured the state of Rio de Janeiro for the PDT; neither of the other two parties competing gained a gubernatorial seat. One surprise of the election was the poor showing of Lula's PT, which gained only about 10 percent of the vote in São Paulo, its regional stronghold.

The *voto vinculado* led to election results for other offices that closely paralleled the vote for governor. The PDS won 15 Senate seats, giving them a total of 46, or exactly two-thirds of the seats in that chamber. The PMDB won nine Senate seats for a total of 21. In the Chamber of Deputies the PDS won 235 and the PMDB 200, so that neither major party commanded a majority. The electoral college, to be made up of members of the national congress and those elected in the state assemblies, remained firmly in control of the PDS, thus enabling the government to control the indirect election of the successor to President Figueiredo in October 1984.

Foreign Relations

Brazilian foreign relations are highly complex and fraught with subtleties that often defy attempts to peg Brazil in easily definable categories. During the early 1970s Brazil's rapid economic growth,

coinciding with the rapid expansion of its diplomatic pursuits, frequently led analysts to refer to Brazil in such sanguine terms as "future world power" and "the first Southern Hemisphere star in the world galaxy." A decade later the increases in world petroleum prices, triggered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the growth of Brazil's foreign debt had dramatically illustrated Brazil's ongoing vulnerabilities and led analysts to be much more circumspect in their projections of Brazil's future place in the world. Nevertheless, given that solutions would be found to these important problems of economic dependency, many observers continued to view Brazil as emerging into a position as an important world power by the turn of the twenty-first century.

The nation's leaders were careful to avoid the expression of such ambitions in an overt, chauvinistic fashion. Rather, they viewed Brazil's importance as the inevitable result of its geographic domination of the South American continent, its large population and, most importantly, its dynamic economy. Foreign policy was viewed, first and foremost, as a tool for the nation's economic development. In the early 1980s trade matters (particularly access to foreign markets in order to finance the balance of paments) topped the foreign policy agenda. For a nation that had been ruled by the military for nearly two decades, there was a strikingly small component of military power projection in its foreign relations.

The nation's growing economic strength allowed it to pursue foreign relations during the decade of the 1970s that were increasingly independent of the hegemonic political interests of the United States in the region. This orientation was in marked contrast to the periods prior to 1960 and immediately following the 1964 coup, when Brazil was perhaps the most devoted follower of United States leadership in the region. By the early 1980s Brazil's foreign policy orientation had much in common with the so-called "independent foreign policy" pursued under the administration of President Goulart during the early 1960s. Whereas Goulart's foreign policy had been the source of considerable controversy, two decades later similar policies failed even to evoke a debate prior to the 1982 elections. Whereas *abertura* sparked heated criticism of the domestic policies of the military government, in the arena of foreign policy there existed a remarkable consensus among the political elites in favor of the government's pragmatic, self-serving "no automatic alliances" approach.

Foreign policy continued, as in the past, to be directed by the political elites surrounding the president. There was little room for policy input by Congress, academia, business, labor, and other such groups that play roles in the formation of foreign policy in more democratic çountries. The Constitution requires Congress to approve most presidential actions in foreign affairs, including treaties, declarations of war and peace, the passage and stationing

of foreign troops, and the participation in international organizations. Since 1964, however, Congress' freedom to disagree with the president has been severely restricted. This fact was most clearly illustrated in 1974 when, having criticized Chilean president Augusto Pinochet, a congressman was prosecuted under the statues of the National Security Law that forbids any public insult of a foreign head of state. Although this law remained in effect in 1982, it might be expected that if *abertura* continued apace during the 1980s, Congress would gain a larger role in foreign relations through the participation of its foreign affairs committees.

Even in that event the preponderant role in decisionmaking would continue to reside with the president, his advisory and staff agencies, the military hierarchy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (known as Itamaraty, after the building it formerly occupied in Rio de Janeiro), and a number of other ministries within the president's cabinet. The delegation of authority and the interrelationships among these actors have varied according to the style of decisionmaking preferred by each president. Two trends were discernible: the growing importance of economics in foreign relations has brought influence to economically related agencies at the expense of Itamaraty, and the post-1974 political liberalization has lessened the institutional role of the military in foreign policy decisionmaking.

While discussions of foreign policy among these actors were more wide ranging under presidents Geisel and Figueiredo, the final decisions were more likely to be made at the top. Under previous military presidents, decisions were often delegated to military officials in the National Security Council (Conselho de Segurança Nacional—CSN), the National Intelligence Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações—SNI), or in the Armed Forces General Staff (Estado-Maior das Fôrças Armadas—EMFA). By the early 1980s the High Command of the Armed Forces (Alto-Comando das Fôrças Armadas—ACFA) retained an important foreign policy role through its control over military attachés stationed in foreign embassies, over the war matériel industry (increasingly important in Brazil's exports), over the Brazil-United States Military Commission, and over the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra—ESG), which remained influential in defining national security concerns. Other individuals and bodies within the military establishment continued to influence foreign policy decisions, though largely on an ad hoc, rather than institutionalized basis.

Itamaraty has a proud tradition of service of over 100 years. It is considered one of the most professionally organized bureaucracies within the government and the most competent diplomatic corps among the nations of Latin America, or possibly the entire Third World. Candidates for Brazil's foreign service must have completed a university degree, then compete in a rigid entrance

examination, attend the Rio Branco Institute for diplomats for two years, then complete two additional years of on-the-job training before joining the elite diplomatic corps. Promotion is based principally on merit, although political considerations do play a part. In recent years the minister of foreign affairs has nearly always been a career diplomat chosen from among the so-called "inner circle" of Itamaraty. This group also includes the ministry's secretary general, its chief of staff, and a handful of department heads.

As economic matters have grown to dominate Brazilian foreign policy, numerous parts of the government's economic bureaucracy have entered the foreign policy stage at the expense of Itamaraty. The degree of influence of each often depends on the personalities involved. Under Delfim Netto, the Planning Secretariat played a crucial coordinating role, and the minister-secretary led many foreign trade missions abroad. During the Médici administration, Delfim had served as minister of finance, and that ministry often competed with Itamaraty for influence over foreign policy. The Ministry of Mines and Energy, with authority over powerful state corporations, such as Petrobrás, Brazilian Nuclear Enterprises (Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras—Nuclebrás), and the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, which had major import-export roles, was also important. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce also preside over numerous agencies involved in the formulation and execution of foreign trade policy. The Central Bank of Brazil and the interministerial National

Monetary Council are the principal policymaking bodies in the area of international finanace.

Multilateral Relations

Few countries in the world participate in as many intergovernmental organizations, both global and regional in scope, as does Brazil. It was a founding member of the League of Nations (although it dropped out in 1928), and United Nations (UN), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); and it held membership in nearly all other specialized agencies of the UN. Brazil was one of the few nations that was a member of both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Group of 77. It was instrumental in the formation of the International Coffee Organization and the Cocoa Producers Alliance and participated in a host of additional multilateral commodity agreements. It was a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and its specialized agencies and a variety of other inter-American regional organizations, including the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA); its successor, the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI): and the Latin American Economic System (SELA). Finally, Brazil was an active contributor and participant in major multilateral lending institutions, the World Bank (see Glossary), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

During the late 1960s, when Brazil's participation in these organizations was growing precipitously, many observers saw Brazil as emerging as a natural leader of the nations of the Third World within these multilateral forums. For a variety of reasons, however, this never happened. In part this was due to political differences (Brazil being pro-capitalist, favorable toward multinational corporations, and not prone to blame the United States for the world's ills) with the majority of Third World nations that formed the Group of 77 within the UN. In part it was due to Brazil's own proclivities: "no automatic alliances" could apply to the Group of 77 as well as the United States. Brazil has proved to be a highly independent actor in the multilateral arena, unwilling to sacrifice what it perceives as its own interests for the sake of group solidarity.

While Brazil retained membership in a wide array of intergovernmental organizations, only rarely did it undertake major multilateral initiatives. For the most part Brazil played a quiet role and held limited expectations of its activities in multilateral forums. They were viewed as necessary for the projection of international stature, to avoid isolation (particularly in regional affairs), to prevent actions against Brazilian interests, and as valuable for informational purposes and to make contacts for subsequent bilateral diplomacy. Their value in the pursuit of national interests was seen as clearly secondary to bilateral relations.

Brazil was not averse, however, to assuming an active role when the activities of international organizations were perceived to coincide with its own national interest. This was the case particularly with the so-called access issues (markets, technology, energy and raw materials, and international financing) and commodity price stabilization concerns raised within the overall discussions of the "new international economic order." Thus, increasingly throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, Brazil was an active participant (although not a leader) in the so-called North-South dialogue taking place within the UN and a number of its specialized agencies. It is worth emphasizing that Brazil's position was not ideologically motivated but was based on the priority given to trade issues within its overall foreign policy goals. As one of the Third World nations with the most at stake in the present economic order, Brazil was able to play a moderating role in these forums, calling for orderly and gradual change.

Pragmatic economic concerns dictated shifts in Brazil's stance in the UN General Assembly during the 1970s. Being a major importer of Middle Eastern oil, it became a supporter of the Arab position with respect to the Arab-Israeli dispute following the 1973-74 oil crisis. The strength of that support became apparent in November 1975 when, in a very controversial action, Brazil voted in favor of Resolution 3379, which condemned Zionism as a form of racism. Brazil has used an honor traditionally granted it—giving the opening speech for each annual General Assembly—as an effective voice for its foreign policy concerns. In 1979 Minister of Foreign Affairs Ramiro Elísio Saraivo Guerreiro reiterated his nation's support for the end of apartheid in South Africa—support that coincided neatly with a leap in Brazilian trade with Black Africa. Then in 1982, when Brazil's foreign debt hovered precariously at unprecedented levels estimated at between US$60 and US$90 billion, President Figueiredo called on the General Assembly to help find solutions to the debt crises facing a number of Third World countries.

Access to international finance was also Brazil's major concern in its relations with multilateral lending institutions. After the 1964 coup, World Bank and IDB loans, which had virtually ceased in the inflationary and politically uncertain atmosphere of the preceding years, returned as a major component of Brazil's development financing. By the early 1970s Brazil was among the largest Third World borrowers from each institution. In 1977 this access was threatened by efforts in the United States Congress to link United States contributions to these institutions to borrowers' adherence to minimum standards of human rights. This effort failed, but in the early 1980s Brazil's access to conciliatory financing (long-term, low-interest loans) was again threatened by efforts to have Brazil reclassified, because of its rising gross national product (GNP), from a "developing" to "newly

industrializing" country. Being pegged with the majority of Third World countries also afforded Brazil important advantages in access, through GATT and UNCTAD mechanisms, to markets in the developed world. As of late 1982 Brazil had successfully fought for what one longtime analyst termed "the right to stay in kindergarten," although this issue was likely to reappear in the atmosphere of world recession, rising trade barriers, and declining commitment to foreign aid within the developed countries.

Brazil participates in a wide range of regional and hemispheric multilateral organizations, although it generally adopts a low profile. This is due, in large part, to its position within the hemisphere as the largest nation, after the United States and Canada, and as the only Portuguese-speaking nation. It does not feel, on the one hand, that it needs the force of numbers, as do smaller nations within the OAS, to negotiate with the United States. On the other hand, it does not wish to alarm its Spanish-speaking neighbors by assuming a hegemonic stance that could easily arise were its profile raised. In either instance its preference was for bilateral diplomacy within the hemisphere. In addition to the OAS and its specialized agencies, Brazil participated in a number of regional trade organizations, including ALADI, SELA, and the Río de la Plata Basin Treaty (with Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia). Again, however, it preferred bilateral trade negotiations, in which Brazil could be more dominant. Some analysts suggested that Brazil's primary interest in regional organizations was to make sure that its Spanish-speaking neighbors did not collude against that dominant position.

Brazil's newest venture in regional multilateral relations, the Amazon Pact, was initiated in July 1978 with the signing of the Treaty for Amazon Cooperation by the eight nations within the Amazon Basin. It is not an economic agreement, but a pledge by Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Suriname, Guyana, and Brazil to cooperate in the protection of the Amazon ecology and in the planning of the development of the entire basin. Brazil took the initiative in forming the Amazon Pact after its unilateral efforts in the development of its massive Amazon region proved unsuccessful in many respects.

Latin American Relations

One author termed Brazil's 1978 Amazon Pact initiative as "the opening salvo in a campaign to transform its relations with Latin America." Although this may overstate the Brazilian effort of the subsequent five years, it does point out two important facts: that Brazil uses its multilateral diplomatic efforts in order to pave the way for efforts in the bilateral sphere and that Brazil's economic development goals led it to upgrade substantially its bilateral relations in Latin America between 1978 and 1980. Historically, Brazil had been oriented toward Western Europe and the United

States, turning its back, in effect, on its Latin American neighbors. After the 1964 coup the military regime's United States orientation, together with its colonization projects bringing settlements along its frontiers (seen in light of Brazil's adherence to the doctrine of *uti possidetis*—sovereignty based on settlement—in the fixing of its western borders during the early twentieth century), led to considerable unease among Brazil's neighbors (see Politics as Usual, ch. 1). Only Chile and Ecuador—the two nations in South America that do not border Brazil—did not fear, to some extent, potential Brazilian expansionism. Although concerns over Brazilian hegemonic designs in South America persisted in the early 1980s, they had been greatly alleviated by a series of bilateral agreements signed in the wake of the creation of the Amazon Pact.

Rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, the two most powerful nations of South America, has traditionally been one of the most salient features of the region's diplomacy. During the 30 years prior to 1982, however, Brazil steadily gained on its rival, which became mired in domestic political, economic, and social decay. The rivalry remained, although its significance diminished considerably.

The 1967 Río de la Plata Basin Treaty, instigated by Argentina, initiated the continuing efforts by the two powers to moderate traditional rivalry with cooperation in the exploitation of the region's resources. Further discussions between 1977 and 1979 led to the resolution of the remaining differences over hydroelectric plants on the upper tributaries of the Río de la Plata and also led to a series of agreements in the areas of trade, investment, and nuclear technology. In 1980 presidents Figueiredo and Jorge Videla visited one another's capitals: this was enormously important as a symbol of diplomatic thaw, being the first such presidential exchange in some 40 years.

Nevertheless, economic difficulties and fluid political situations, together with a number of specific unresolved issues in both countries, left the future course of Brazilian-Argentine relations uncertain. Although trade between the two had picked up in recent years, Argentine pride and fear of Brazilian domination could limit future growth. Argentina's reaction to the reduced flows in its river system, once the Itaipu Dam and other massive hydroelectric projects come on line during the 1980s, was also unpredictable (see Hydrography, ch. 2). In the area of national security, analysts pointed to a number of potential causes of strain. Further competition in the area of nuclear technology, as well as the idea of one or both nations' building a bomb, was the most dangerous long-term prospect. The two differed in their approaches to security in the South Atlantic: Argentina looked toward an alliance with Uruguay,·South Africa, and Brazil, but the military leaders of Brazil, as of late 1982, had shown no interest in such an alliance. The Falklands/Malvinas war earlier in that year, during

which Brazil remained studiously neutral, dramatically brought the issue to the fore. Brazil's imminent entrance into the arena of conflicting claims on territory in Antarctica, in which its claims overlapped with those of Argentina, was also expected to complicate their relations with respect to South Atlantic security.

A major source of competition between Brazil and Argentina has been influence over the smaller, weaker so-called buffer states (Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia) bordering both nations. An important measure of Brazilian gains in recent decades has been its diplomatic and economic inroads in these nations. These have been most significant in the case of Paraguay, largely the result of building the Itaipu Dam on the Rio Paraná on their mutual border. The political significance of the dam, the largest hydroelectric project in the world, transcends its economic importance in supplying São Paulo with a large percentage of its future energy needs and Paraguay with an estimated US$130 million annually in foreign exchange from the sale of electricity to Brazil. The project (financed entirely with Brazilian money) has led to the settlement of Brazilians and their buying a considerable amount of land in western Paraguay. In addition to increasing trade and financial dependence, analysts have pointed out that the security of the dam could be a motive for Brazilian intervention in Paraguay in the case of future civil disorders there.

After widespread, though unsubstantiated, reports of Brazilian collaboration in the 1971 coup in Bolivia that returned conservative military elements to power, Brazil was careful to project a low profile in its political relations with its politically unstable neighbor. Economic relations soared, however, after the signing of the Agreement on Industrial Trade Completion by presidents Geisel and Hugo Banzer in 1974. Considerable Bolivian development, particularly in its eastern lowlands around the city of Santa Cruz, was financed by the Bank of Brazil, while Bolivia sold natural gas and other raw materials to Brazil. Despite increased trade and substantial landholdings by Brazilians in Uruguay, Brazil has not outstripped the influence of Argentina in this final buffer state. One reason for this fact, perhaps, lay in the revelation that Brazil had been prepared to invade Uruguay during the early 1970s if it felt it necessary in order to keep the urban guerrilla Tupamaro organization from coming to power.

Chile has traditionally been Brazil's "ally" in its competition for influence in southern South America. Two geopolitical realities underlay this relationship: Chile's lack of fear of Brazilian expansionism because it does not border Brazil; and Chile's continuing dispute with Argentina over their boundary in the Beagle Channel, in which Brazil was officially neutral but unofficially tilted toward Chile. ("The enemy of my enemy is my friend.") Brazil's military leaders were glad to see Chile's Marxist regime overthrown in 1973, and the new president, General Pinochet, visited Brasília in

1974. A public display of too close a friendship was prevented, however, by Chile's pariah image in the United States and Europe and by its difficulties with Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. Pinochet emulated the success of Brazil's military rulers, and close links were established between the security services of the governments. The real success of bilateral relations after 1973, however, lay in the rather spectacular growth in trade, which approached US$1 billion by the end of the decade. In general, Brazil exported manufactured goods (including a growing amount of military hardware), while Chile exported minerals, wood, and other agricultural products in return. Brazil also found opportunities for banking and direct investment in Chile during the late 1970s. Although superficially successful, the October 1980 visit by Figueiredo to Santiago revealed some mutual uneasiness between the two governments as Brazil proceeded on its path of political liberalization while Chile continued under an indefinite dictatorship. Ideology, which brought Brazil and Chile together during the 1970s, could, ironically, undermine that friendship in the 1980s.

Brazil has traditionally viewed its relations with the rest of Latin America as comparatively inconsequential. Brazil's drive to export manufactures and import energy during the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, did lead to several important breakthroughs in relations with countries that previously had been ignored. The most significant involved Mexico and Venezuela: exchanges of presidential visits between 1979 and 1981 with each country resulted in agreements to export oil to Brazil. Remarkably, Figueiredo's 1980 visit to Venezuela was the first by a Brazilian president in the twentieth century. The two share a border of several hundred kilometers. Bilateral relations had been severed between 1964 and 1969 and had languished during the 1970s until the opening provided by the Amazon Pact. It was uncertain what effect the 1982 announcement that Brazil planned to sell military equipment to Guyana (with whom Venezuela had recently pressed a substantial territorial claim) would have on the theretofore successful diplomatic opening between Brazil and Venezuela.

Figueiredo's 1981 visit to Peru, with which Brazil shares a border of well over 1,000 kilometers, was the first ever by a Brazilian head of state. Peruvian President Francisco Morales Bermúdez had visited Brazil in 1979. In addition to trade agreements, the Peruvian and Brazilian governments agreed to construct a highway between the two nations's capitals, which would become Brazil's first international highway link through its Amazon region. Visits and trade agreements were also concluded with Colombia and Ecuador at about the same time. Brazil would receive coking coal from Colombia and oil from Ecuador, as it had for several years.

In Central American and the Caribbean, Brazil generally deferred to the overwhelming influence of the United States. Slight inter-

est was indicated in the early 1980s, however, by a five-year energy accord signed with the revolutionary government in Nicaragua and a repudiation of foreign intervention in the region. Brazil was very cautious in opening relations with Cuba. An initial contact was not made until early 1982, when a group of Brazilian businessmen visited the island.

United States Relations

Brazil greatly expanded the scope of its foreign relations in the 1970s and early 1980s, but the United States remained its most important foreign relationship. Although it had lost its primacy of previous years (in 1960, for example, nearly half of Brazil's trade had been with the United States), the United States remained the single most important market for Brazilian exports, its largest single supplier of imports, its largest source of bank financing, and the largest foreign investor in Brazil.

From the Brazilian perspective, economic matters dominated the agenda between the two nations. This had not always been the case. The close cooperation between the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (Fôrça Expedicionária Brasileira—FEB) and the United Staes Army in Italy during World War II was the beginning of a long and fruitful consensus in matters of international politico-military strategy. When rising Brazilian nationalism combined with economic slowdown in the late 1950s and early 1960s to bring to power leftist-populists who threatened that consensus, the United States pursued a destabilizing policy against the government of President Goulart and then strongly supported the military government (many of whose members had been part of the FEB) that came to power in the 1964 coup d'etat (see The Presidency of João Goulart, ch. 1). The renewed consensus was symbolized by Brazil's supplying troops (including the figurehead commanding general) in the United States-sponsored intervention in the Dominican Republic. United States economic and military aid flowed freely into Brazil between 1964 and 1971.

In contrast, Brazilian foreign policy officials showed little interest in the politico-military agenda set by the administration of President Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s. Specifically, efforts to interest Brazil in the Central American problems and in a military alliance to protect the South Atlantic were either ignored or received coolly in Brasília in 1981 and 1982. United States support for Britain in the Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982 also diverged from Brazil's neutrality. In a more general sense, Brazilian leaders no longer shared, as they had during nearly three decades of consensus, the competitive bipolar geopolitical vision that had waned under the détente of the 1970s but was being renewed in the early 1980s. In a 1981 address at the ESG, Minister of Foreign Affairs Guerreiro was critical of both the United States and the Soviet Union who, in the renewed competitive climate, "seek to

reinvigorate alliances and blocs and to reaffirm vertically depen-
dent relationships." In such an atmosphere, he continued, "the
idea of an international community is replaced by a dichotomy of
friend and enemy, in which the very concept of friendship is
utilized as an instrument to further reinforce vertical dependence
and the concept of loyal friend is corrupted to mean docile ally or
satellite."

This jealously independent stance had emerged gradually over
more than a decade, which had seen an increasingly self-confident
Brazil willing to differ publicly with the United States when
important self-interests were at stake and willing to sever ties no
longer deemed necessary. In 1970 President Médici had unilater-
ally declared a 200-nautical-mile territorial sea off the coast of
Brazil. Although at odds with the 12-mile position declared by the
United States, a compromise was later made that allowed Ameri-
can shrimp boats to operate (upon payment of a tax) in the rich
waters at the mouth of the Amazon. In 1974 Brazil loudly pro-
tested when the protectionist United States Trade Act and the
imposition of countervailing duties on the importation of Brazilian
shoes threatened its most vital export market. More important,
1974 saw the United States—concerned over nuclear proliferation
and disturbed by Brazil's failure to sign either the 1967 Treaty of
Tlatelolco, which prohibited nuclear weapons in Latin America, or
the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—
remove some guarantees for the long-term supply of nuclear fuel.
The guarantees had been part of a contract between Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, which built Brazil's first nuclear reactor, and
the Brazilian government. Brazil, counting heavily on nuclear
power in its long-term development plans, was deeply disturbed
by the United States government decision and the following year
signed a wide-ranging nuclear power agreement with the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany), which provided that the
West Germans would supply facilities for nuclear fuel to Brazil.

The United States-Brazilian rift was exacerbated in 1977 when
newly installed President Jimmy Carter pressured the West Ger-
man government (without consulting Brazil) to cancel its two-year-
old deal with Brazil. Although the Carter effort failed, Brazil was
offended by what it viewed as United States efforts to undercut its
sovereign rights. The issue remained a source of sensitivity that
was partially alleviated by the new United States administration
that in 1981 pledged to make every attempt to become a reliable
supplier of nuclear fuel.

Another source of irritation during the Carter years centered on
the issue of human rights. When the administration's first human
rights report appeared in March 1977, it was uncompromisingly
critical of the situation in Brazil; in response, the Brazilian govern-
ment promptly announced the unilateral severance of their 25-year-
old military aid agreement. Although United States military assistance

to Brazil had been minimal since the early 1970s, a number of United States military personnel were obliged to return home, and the rebuff was important as a symbolic expression of Brazilian independence.

The easing of the United States government stance with respect to human rights and nuclear safeguards under President Reagan held promises of marked improvements in bilateral ties. Indeed, Figueiredo's May 1982 visit to Washington was the first by a Brazilian president since 1971, and Reagan returned the visit the following November—his first official visit to a Latin American capital—in order to illustrate the importance the United States placed on its relationship to Brazil. Both visits were marked, however, by a growing list of complaints against United States policies which, Brazil claimed, were adding to its economic difficulties. When taken together, these disagreements created what Riordan Roett of the Center for Brazilian Studies at Johns Hopkins University termed in early 1982 "the increasingly tense economic relationship between Brazil and the industrial world, particularly the United States."

One area of concern was Brazil's foreign debt, which loomed as a potential problem to both countries. American banks, which held some 60 percent of these loans, were concerned about repayment, although they, as well as the United States government, maintained a descreet silence on the subject. Brazil was neither discreet nor silent, publicly condemning high interest rates in the United States as having greatly increased the burden of Brazil's foreign debt and calling on the United States to "loosen the pursestrings" at the World Bank and the IDB. The United States had led efforts to make multilateral loans less available to Brazil and to a handful of other nations it termed "newly industrializing nations" because of their relatively large GNPs, but a promised US$1.2 billion loan announced during Reagan's 1982 trip marked what Brazilians hoped would be the beginning of greater American cooperation with respect to Brazil's foreign debt (see Multilateral Relations, this ch.).

The other object of growing tensions in the early 1980s was in the area of trade. Brazilian government subsidies in the form of export promotions and growing protectionism in the United States combined to produce a series of trade disputes beginning in the late 1970s. For Brazil, the United States had begun to remove some Brazilian imports from its list of goods that enter duty free, under the generalized system of preferences. The United States was so irritated with Brazil over export subsidies that at one time during 1982 it threatened to declare Brazil in violation of GATT. In 1982 a number of suits by American businessmen to impose countervailing duties on the importation of Brazilian products that benefited from these subsidies were pending.

Publicly, United States officials denied any hiatus in the steady improvement of bilateral relations. Both nations had a lot at stake—nearly US$8 billion in trade in 1981 and many times that amount in American private capital in Brazil in the form of loans and direct investments. It was highly unlikely that either nation, barring an eruption in the political or economic order of major proportions, would jeopardize such a lucrative relationship by escalating matters of conflict rather than seeking compromise.

European and Asian Relations

Brazil's relations with Europe and Asia are overwhelmingly commercial in nature. Cultural ties are also strong with Portugal, West Germany, Italy, and Japan because of the large numbers of Brazilians who trace their origins to those countries (see Immigrants of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ch. 2). Political relations with Portugal were important until the 1974 revolution in that country, which coincided with Brazil's sudden ending of its support for Portuguese policy in Africa and the Arab oil embargo (see Africa and Middle Eastern Relations, this ch.). Since that time, political concerns have taken a backseat to growing economic ties throughout Europe and Asia. The success of this effort has been marred only by occasional trade disputes with the European Economic Community (EEC) and with Japan.

Britain was Brazil's major trading partner throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After World War II it was replaced by the United States, and trade between Brazil and Europe slowed markedly. This picture began to change, however, under President Goulart's "independent foreign policy," and Brazilian trade with both Europe and Asia began a gradual rise that continued into the early 1980s, when nearly one-third of the total was within these two regions (see Foreign Trade, ch. 3). In Western Europe, West Germany was Brazil's most important partner. The 1975 nuclear power plant agreement was a major component of their relationship, although trade was carried on in a wide variety of goods. West German direct investment in Brazil was considerable. Italy was also an important trader and investor in Brazil and, like West Germany, engaged in joint ventures with Brazil in the manufacture of numerous products, including weaponry. Trade with other EEC countries was less substantial.

Trade with the communist nations of Eastern Europe within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) grew, albeit in fits and starts, from almost nothing in 1970 to the equivalent of almost US$2 billion by 1980. Trade with Comecon took a quantum leap in 1981 with a five-year, US$5 billion pact with the Soviet Union, which included Brazilian exports of soybeans and the importation of oil and hydroelectric turbines. Piror to this deal, Brazil's largest partner in Comecon had been Poland. Before 1980, when Brazil began to import Soviet oil, there had been a

running trade surplus with Comecon. In the political sphere, Brazil condemned the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, although it attended the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow and ignored the 1980 call by the United States for a Soviet grain boycott.

Relations were also cordial with China, and their modest trade relations were boosted by a 1980 oil contract. Japan, however, was one of Brazil's major trading partners (third, after the United States and West Germany in 1980) and was also a major source of investment capital. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Singapore were the next most important Asian trading partners at that time.

African and Middle Eastern Relations

During the 1970s Africa and the Middle East emerged suddenly as areas of primary foreign policy concern to Brazil. The foremost explanation for this development was easily defined: oil. The fact that Brazil imported about 80 percent of its petroleum needs and that those needs were substantial (Brazil was the largest oil importer in the Third World) dictated a major component of its entire foreign policy orientation (see Energy, ch. 3). Despite considerable and successful efforts to diversify its sources of imported petroleum, in the 1980s approximately one-half of Brazil's imported oil came from the Persian Gulf nations. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait were its most important suppliers.

Until the disruptions cause by the intermittent post-1980 Iran-Iraq war, the relationship with Iraq had been the most important. In return for oil Brazil undertook substantial public works projects and also sold a substantial amount of military equipment to Iraq. This trade continued between 1980 and 1982 during lulls in the fighting. It did not keep Brazil from also trading, albeit to a much lesser extent, with Iran during that time.

In northern Africa, Brazil also traded weapons for oil with Libya and Algeria (see Defense Industry, ch. 5). Food products and other manufactured products, such as automobiles, were also among Brazil's exports to the Middle East. Brazil had paid a political price for this trade. After having been moderately pro-Israel at the UN for 25 years, Brazil became staunchly pro-Arab in its voting posture, at the urging of Algeria during the October 1973 oil boycott. During the early 1980s outside observers noted an increasingly warm relationship between Brazil and the Palestine Liberation Organization at a time when loans from Arab financial institutions were on the rise.

Political considerations also played a role in Brazil's rapidly growing relationship with the nations of Africa. In 1969 Brazil changed its UN position from abstention to approval of an arms boycott against South Africa and a trade embargo against Rhodesia. Then in 1974 it ended its long-standing support of Portugal's Africa policy, and in November 1975 Brazil became the first

country (after Cuba and the Soviet Union) to recognize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA) government in Angola. This latter decision raised a storm of protest within Brazil, which died down as MPLA control of the country became solidified and as Brazil's trade with Angola grew.

By the early 1980s Brazil had placed Africa second only to Latin America in its foreign policy priorities. The political posturing of the past decade had been looking toward future rewards in the commercial field that were beginning to be realized: Brazilian exports to Africa had grown from US$66 million in 1970 to just over US$1 billion in 1980. Brazil saw Africa as a natural market for its manufactured exports, particularly automobiles. It found considerable competition in this large and mostly untapped market, however, from the EEC, which granted preferential trade arrangements to its former colonies in the region. Brazil sought an edge by emphasizing that its products were "made in the tropics" and therefore specially suited to Africa, by pointing out the common language, in the cases of Angola and Mozambique, and the ethnic affinity of the large number of its Afro-Brazilian citizens, particularly with the people of Nigeria, where a great number of Brazil's nineteenth-century slaves had originated. Cultural exchanges have grown significantly with Nigeria and a number of other African nations. By the early 1980s Brazil was also a major provider of technical assistance in several African countries, being the source of technology especially suited to Africa for building dams, roads, and other infrastructure projects.

Throughout the 1970s Nigeria and Algeria were Brazil's two most important trading partners on the continent; Algeria steadily declined and Nigeria steadily increased in importance as sources of petroleum. Automobiles and steel were Brazil's most important exports to both countries, although in the case of Nigeria, Brazil's US$250 million exports in 1980 included a wide variety of products as well as technology transfers and joint manufacturing ventures. The scope of Brazil's relations with Angola grew steadily after 1975, and by the early 1980s it had passed Algeria to become second in importance. In 1980 Petrobrás signed a contract with Angola to increase Brazil's oil imports markedly and to engage in exploration and production in Angola. Because Angola had other minerals vital to Brazilian industry and Angola's needs for manufactured products, technology, and assistance in its economic development were great, it was viewed in Brazil as a major future trading partner. Mozambique was less important, but its trade with Brazil, too, was growing rapidly. Questions of ideology and the presence of Soviet and Cuban troops were a source of controversy during Brazil's initial dealings with these two former Portuguese colonies in the mid-1970s but were progressively less so as commercial interests were developed.

Brazil has strongly supported Angola and Namibia against South Africa in the UN, and it has consistently voted against South Africa in political matters in the UN for over a decade. The two maintained diplomatic relations, but Brazil's representative in Pretoria was only a second secretary. (South Africa had an ambassador in Brasília, although Brazilian officials had as little to do with him as possible.) In contrast, Brazil's commercial relations were vigorous and growing. Brazilian officials tried to play down the relationship, but South Africa was the largest African exporter to Brazil in 1979, and South African mining interests were reportedly investing in Brazil in the early 1980s. African countries (many of whom traded with South Africa themselves) criticized Brazil for the large volume of its trade with South Africa. Although less significant in the early 1980s, Brazil also had a growing commercial relationship with a dozen or more African nations. Most of these were in West Africa; Gabon and Congo also sold oil to Brazil.

* * *

The best overall English-language study of Brazilian politics available in 1982 was Peter Flynn's *Brazil: A Political Analysis*. With the rapid pace of political events, however, it was becoming out of date, as was another first-rate study, Riordan Roett's *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society*. More up-to-date, although less comprehensive, was *Authoritarian Capitalism*, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Philipe Faucher. A series of articles on various topics by Thomas Sanders, published as American Universities Field Staff Reports, was also informative and relatively current. The most reliable current information was found in the *Latin American Weekly Report*; its sister publication on Brazil, *Latin America Regional Reports: Brazil*, both published in London; and *InfoBrazil*, published by the Center of Brazilian Studies at Johns Hopkins University. With respect to foreign policy, a large number of English-language studies were published between 1974 and 1982. One of the best was *Brazil in the International System*, edited by Wayne A. Selcher. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security

Brazilian-built multipurpose vehicle mounting antitank missiles

BRAZIL AT THE END OF 1982 was neither beset by enemies from outside its borders nor unduly threatened by subversive elements from within. João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo was the fifth successive military president since the ouster of João Goulart in 1964. The most serious threat to the stability of the regime in 1982 seemed to come from disgruntled factions of the president's own party and from within the military rather than from leftist groups that have consistently opposed military rule. Figueiredo since taking office has backed the program of *abertura* (literally, opening) that promises to return the country to democratic processes, and it was this program that drew the wrath of the military hard-liners who favored rigid authoritarianism.

Figueiredo seemed an unlikely champion of democratization when picked by President Ernesto Geisel to be his successor. Not well known outside Brazilian army circles, he was the chief of the National Intelligence Service under Geisel. The son of an army general, Figueiredo began his military career as a teenager, finished first in his class at the Military Academy, then progressed steadily through officer ranks until reaching the four star general level. His career could be considered routine only if compared to the careers of other high achievers. The Brazilian army officer is expected to complete a series of demanding courses at military educational institutions and, for those who would become generals, high standing in every class is mandatory. Figueiredo measured up to the tough standards.

The new president had first come to the attention of outside observers as chief of the Military Household and concurrent secretary general of the National Security Council under President Emílio Garrastazú Médici. Later, as Geisel's chief of intelligence, Figueiredo was considered a proponent of the hard line or at least one who leaned in that direction. Many who opposed his selection as Geisel's successor did so because of the fear that *abertura* would be shunted aside and forgotten, but in office he has continued the move toward democratization to an even greater degree than his predecessor.

The 18-year (and continuing) rule by the military is out of the ordinary in the political history of Brazil. The armed forces have in the past often figured prominently in politics, but usually their stay in the political arena was of short duration, after which they returned to barracks. That changed in 1964, however, when the military perpetrators of the coup d'etat announced that they would stay in power as long as they considered their presence necessary. By 1982 there was some indication of a possible return of the presidency to civilian hands at the end of Figueiredo's administra-

tion in 1985, but there were no guarantees. In the meantime, the armed forces provided the principal power base to maintain the military regime.

As in many other countries where the armed forces have taken control of the government, the army has been the most prominent of the services in the political role. The five military presidents have come from the army, and army officers have been the most prevalent among the military selected for cabinet positions other than the navy and aeronautics posts. In addition to the usual governmental ministers, the cabinet also included the chiefs of the Civilian Household, Military Household, and National Intelligence Service. The latter two positions have routinely been filled by army generals and, at times, so also has the Civilian Household. Until 1981 in the Figueiredo cabinet, for example, that position was held by General Artur Golbery do Couto e Silva, who had held the same post in the Geisel cabinet and was referred to by some observers as the éminence grise of the military regime. Golbery had been considered the foremost proponent of *abertura* in the cabinet. Out of 16 ministers and five chiefs holding ministerial rank in the cabinet in late 1982, seven were retired or active-duty army generals or colonels, one (navy) was an admiral, and one (aeronautics) was an air marshal.

As for the military side of the armed forces in 1982, the army was the largest, numbering almost 183,000; the navy followed with about 47,000, and the air force had 43,000. Almost half of the total force (49 percent) consisted of short-tour conscripts, the overwhelming majority of whom served in the army. The air force had no conscripts, the navy had about 2,000, and the army had 132,000 in 1982. The advancing technology of weapons and equipment has put a burden on the services to recruit, train, and retain longer term personnel, and the army will no doubt require more regulars as its weapon systems become more complex. The number of regulars, however, has been determined by law, and a change would be necessary in order to raise the quota.

Until the late 1970s the armed forces had maintained close ties with the armed forces of the United States over several decades of the twentieth century. Brazil sent an expeditionary force to fight alongside American troops in the Italian Campaign of World War II, and for years after that experience many senior officers from the two armed forces maintained close personal and professional relationships. The postwar Brazilian forces were also equipped with American hardware—tanks, ships, and airplanes—which (along with the combat experience in Italy) led to the adoption of American tactics and strategies. Many Brazilian officers attended senior service schools in the United States, and many more received training in the United States-sponsored School of the Americas in Panama. Frictions between the governments, most notably those caused by the human rights policy of Jimmy Carter's

administration, interfered with the close military relations, and for a period in the late 1970s and in 1980 the relationship was in limbo. In 1977 the Geisel government even canceled the military assistance agreement that had existed since 1952. Military ties were resumed after President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, but under changed circumstances. Brazil was buying major items of military equipment from various other suppliers and, much more important, its own armaments industry had mushroomed in the late 1970s to supply its armed forces as well as to export to countries in all parts of the world. In renewing the military bonds, the Brazilian leaders indicated that they expected a partnership rather than a sponsor-client relationship.

For the nearly two decades that the military has controlled the government, the leaders have placed extreme emphasis on internal security. Some observers have said that those leaders have been obsessed with the idea that major threats from subversion existed. Actually, since the 1969-72 period the security forces have had the situation well in hand, and no serious threats from organized subversives have been apparent. Responsibility for internal security ultimately rested with the executive in Brasília, but there were many agencies at federal and state levels—seemingly overlapping—that were involved in national security.

There has been a close relationship between the military forces, particularly the army, and the police, but all three armed forces have had agencies involved in what would usually be considered police activities. The commanding generals of the four field armies and two independent commands cover the entire country, and are responsible for internal security within their jurisdictions. The chief of the federal police force usually has been an active-duty army general, and each state has maintained a force known as the Military Police; these are, in effect, auxiliary army forces, the units of which are frequently commanded by army officers.

Position of Armed Forces in Government and Society

The Federative Republic of Brazil has been under the control of its armed forces since March 31, 1964, when Goulart, the last elected civilian president, was overthrown in a military coup d'etat. Five army officers have succeeded each other in the presidency without benefit of electoral politics: Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco—April 15, 1964, to March 15, 1967; General Artur da Costa e Silva—March 15, 1967, to August 30, 1969; General Médici—October 7, 1969, to March 15, 1974; General Geisel—March 15, 1974, to March 15, 1979; and General Figueirdo, who took office on March 15, 1979, under a 1977 law that provides a six-year term for the president. In addition to army, navy, and air force officers, civilians have held ministerial-rank positions in the cabinets of the five army presidents. Complaints of oppression and lack of democratic freedoms have been

heard from ordinary citizens and opposition politicians under the military regime, but the volume of such complaints decreased in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Criticized by some, particularly during its first decade, as being a dictatorship and by others as being much too authoritarian, the government has attempted to reform itself and to change its image in the eyes of its own citizens as well as in those of its foreign critics. Under Geisel and Figueiredo a policy known as *abertura* has been followed, which is intended to prepare the country for a return to democratic processes and "open" those processes to the citizens. For example, direct elections to the federal Congress, as well as to state and municipal offices, were conducted on November 15, 1982 (see Electoral Politics, ch. 4).

Constitutional Basis

The Constitution of Brazil, promulgated in 1967 and extensively amended (particularly in 1969), states that the country "is a federative republic, constituted—under a representative system—by the indissoluble union of the states, the Federal District, and the territories." That union (23 states, the Federal District of Brasília, and three territories in 1982) is made constitutionally responsible for national security and for the organizing of armed forces. The president of the republic has the power to declare war either when authorized by Congress or without such authorization should foreign aggression occur when Congress is not in session. The president is also designated supreme commander of the armed forces and is authorized to decree mobilization or to declare a state of siege.

According to the Constitution, every citizen has a responsibility for national security; the specifics of such civic responsibility are to be defined in the country's enacted laws. Article 92 of the Constitution states: "All Brazilians are obligated to military service or other duties necessary to the national security, under the terms and penalties of the law." The same article, however, specifically exempted women and the clergy from military service, adding that they may be called for other kinds of duties.

The army, navy, and air force are established as "permanent and regular" national institutions, having defense of the country as their primary mission. The president, who would be director of a national war effort if that became necessary, is designated chairman of the National Security Council (Conselho de Segurança Nacional—CSN). The Constitution states that the organization, competence, and functioning of the CSN is to be regulated by law, and the size of the body may be expanded to include ex officio or special members.

Some idea of the importance placed on the CSN by the drafters of the Constitution may be gained from its wording. After stating that the council "is the organ of the highest level in providing

Brasília, at night
Courtesy Embassy of Brazil, Washington

Brasília
Courtesy Embassy of Brazil, Washington

direct advice to the president of the republic for the formulation and execution of national security policy," the document goes on to specify powers of the council including, for example, the power "to establish the permanent national objectives and the bases for national policy; to study, in the domestic and foreign spheres, the matters of importance to national security; and to indicate the areas that are indispensable to the national security and the municipalities considered to be important to it." The council is further empowered to give prior consent in those indispensable areas for "concession of lands, opening transportation routes, and installation of means of communication; construction of bridges, international roads, and airfields; and establishment or operation of any industry affecting the national security" (see Administration, Organization, and Training, this ch.).

Soldiers below the rank of noncommissioned officer (NCO) and sailors and airmen of like rank are constitutionally denied the rights of registration and voting, which are referred to as "obligatory" for most other Brazilians over 18 years of age. Being denied the right to register, the lower enlisted ranks consequently are denied the privilege of becoming candidates for elective office, a privilege guaranteed to other members of the armed forces. If a member who has less than five years' service becomes a candidate for office, he must be discharged. A member with more than five years' service is temporarily suspended from active duty during a political campaign but, if elected, must be transferred to reserve status as provided by law.

Military Traditions

The armed forces trace their origins to the sixteenth-century defense of colonial Brazil against constant French incursions along the coast of the vast Portuguese colony. The officers and men under arms in the early days, fighting the French or local Indians when necessary, were primarily from the home country and had been sent out as defense forces for the colonists. These forces were more than a match for the Indians who tried to fight the newcomers to avoid being enslaved, and they also proved capable of driving out the French who had tried to establish colonies in various places along the coast, as had a few English settlers who met the same fate as the French.

A more serious threat to Portuguese hegemony in Brazil came during the period 1580 to 1640, when Spanish kings ruled the entire Iberian Peninsula. The Dutch, during their long struggle for independence from the Spanish Habsburgs, had seized territory in Brazil as a blow against Spain. When the Portuguese regained control of Portugal, they made peace with the Dutch and did not insist that the latter withdraw from Brazil. The Brazilians, however, refused to accept the idea of permanent Dutch settlements and formed their own armed forces to end the Dutch

occupation of the area around Recife (see fig. 1). A sense of Brazilian nationalism stemmed from the final victories over the Dutch in 1654. The success of the purely Brazilian effort had a strong local and historical impact. The military force known as Terço de Ordenanças (Third Command), which was left in Bahia by Dom Fradique de Toledo Osorio during the campaign to expel the Dutch, may be considered the original unit of the Brazilian army.

For about the first three decades after Pedro Alvares Cabral landed on the coast of Brazil in 1500, the Portuguese had been satisfied merely to establish trading posts in the newly discovered lands, but they then decided that much more extensive colonization would be necessary if they were to prevent the European encroachment that had already started. In addition to sending some Portuguese armed forces for the defense of the colonists, Dom João III designated 14 captaincies (see Glossary) in his Brazilian territories and granted far-reaching powers to the colonial authorities. The Portuguese nobles who were made lords-proprietor of these immense land grants were responsible for defending the lands against foreign incursion, Indian attack, or slave uprising. Although most of the original captaincies failed economically, the private plantation defense forces, which provided the homegrown troops that drove out the Dutch, later became a tradition and formed nuclei of militias when Brazil secured independence early in the nineteenth century.

Since the achievement of independence in 1822, the country has been involved in five international conflicts. The first of two wars against Argentina was fought over territory along the Río de la Plata that both countries claimed. The fighting was inconclusive, but negotiations in 1828 resulted in the establishment of Uruguay as an independent republic on the disputed land (see The Emperor's Troubles, ch. 1). Trouble in the same general area in the early 1850s led to the ouster of Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas at the hands of combined Brazilian, Uruguayan, and dissident Argentine forces. Brazil and Argentina have remained at peace since that time. In the next war, during the 1860s, Brazil and Argentina were joined by the Brazilian puppet government of Uruguay in the so-called Triple Alliance against Paraguay. The conflict proved to be long and costly, almost destroying Paraguay but also financially exhausting the alliance partners in the process. Brazil also suffered heavy casualties. The length of the war, number of casualties, and the idea in the minds of some officers that the armed forces had not been properly supported by the rest of the society led to a new military mystique that stayed with the military through succeeding generations and continued to affect the governing of the country in the 1980s. The mystique led to the belief by army officers that the military had not only the right but even the duty to intercede when civilian governments appeared to

be consistently faltering. This concept, that is, the army as guarantor of constitutional powers, has been incorporated in all Brazilian constitutions since the late nineteenth century.

The next international conflict in which Brazil became involved was World War I, but that involvement did not include sending troops to Europe. In the early years of the war, the Brazilian authorities had been intent on maintaining strict neutrality; full diplomatic relations were continued with the Central powers. Pro-Allies sentiment was strong among the people, however, and by 1917 when German U-boats began torpedoing Brazilian freighters, diplomatic relations were broken, and a state of war was declared. Participation in the war was largely limited to naval patrols in the South Atlantic but, as a belligerent, Brazil was represented at the Versailles peace conference, thereby securing a measure of prestige as well as a share of German reparations.

At the outbreak of World War II Brazil was again quick to announce its neutrality, and the government—officially at least—held aloof from any action that seemed to favor either side. Germany had become an important trading partner during the 1930s and, because the United States was also neutral, Brazil did not feel uncomfortable in that category. It did, however, support the anti-Axis resolution of the Pan-American foreign ministers meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 1942. Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Brazil broke diplomatic and trade relations with the Axis powers. In the summer of 1942 a rash of U-boat sinkings of Brazilian freighters led to the abandonment of neutrality in favor of participation in the European war on the side of the Allies.

The Brazilian contribution to the war effort was considerably greater than it had been during World War I. The United States, for example, was permitted to establish air and naval bases in the Northeast, and American forces were allowed to use Natal in Rio Grande do Norte as a staging area for transit to Africa. The islands of Fernando de Noronha were made available to Allied forces as a base of operations for patrolling South Atlantic sea-lanes, and the Brazilian navy joined other Allied navies in antisubmarine defense, providing corvettes and destroyers for Atlantic patrols and for convoy escort duty.

In contrast to other Latin American countries, Brazil dispatched troop units to Europe to participate in combat. The Brazilian Expeditionary Force (Fôrça Expedicionária Brasileira—FEB), the first Latin American military organization in history to participate in combat in Europe, was about 25,000 strong when it arrived in Italy in June 1944 to become part of the American Fifth Army under command of General Mark Clark. The FEB's principal combat unit, an infantry division, was committed to combat in September and remained in almost continuous action for over 200 days, winning high praise from Allied leaders. After the war a

memorial statue of three servicemen was erected in the Parque do Flamengo on the Rio de Janeiro waterfront to honor the more than 400 servicemen who lost their lives during the conflict.

Although Brazilian armed forces have not engaged in combat since 1945, the country sent units to Suez in 1956, to the Congo (present-day Zaïre) in 1960, and to the Dominican Republic in 1965. The first two instances were in response to United Nations (UN) requests for multinational peacekeeping forces, and the third was in answer to a similar call from the Organization of American States (OAS) after President Lyndon B. Johnson had sent the United States Marines to intervene in Santo Domingo. Brazil complied by sending the largest contingent of troops, and a Brazilian general, Hugo Penasco Alvim, accepted command of the OAS force.

Since 1965 there have been no occasions for deployment of Brazilian troops outside the country. In the interim, the armed forces have been spotlighted in national affairs because of the successive military governments, and under those governments the forces have been more involved in domestic affairs than ever before. Part of the constitutional mission of the armed forces is to guarantee "law and order," and regular units have been employed frequently in roles that could be considered more appropriate to police than to military.

Political Role

A line in the Brazilian military anthem declares, "we are the guardians of the nation." The armed forces, more specifically, the regular officers of the armed forces, have traditionally given broader meaning to the phrase than mere defense against external foes. The military hierarchy has thought of itself as a stabilizing force, ready to intervene when necessary for the preservation of the country's laws and institutions. This view, however, was not only self-asserted but was also endorsed by civilian constituent assemblies that invariably charged the military with the duty of bolstering the political structure. In governmental crises in 1930, 1945, 1954, and 1961, various leading politicians and numerous writers appealed to the military to perform the role of "moderator" that had come to be expected by politicians and public alike (see The Vargas Era, 1930–45, ch. 1). Traditionally, the army has been prominent in military interventions in governmental affairs and it has been dominant in the military governments that have ruled since 1964.

Historically, the army had thought of its political interventions as temporary aberrations, that is, involvement in the political process until order had been established, after which the reins of government were returned to civilians and soldiers returned to their barracks. A turning point came in 1964, however, when the officers who perpetrated the coup labeled it a revolution and

established themselves as a new government. In late 1982 the military hierarchy was well into its nineteenth year as the government of Brazil, but some signs pointed to a return to democratic processes, and some Brazilians, as well as outside observers, were of the opinion that when his term ends in 1985, President Figueiredo might be followed by a popularly elected president. Others thought it would be 1991 before a civilian held the highest office (see Electoral Politics, ch. 4). The fact that Vice President Antônio Aureliano Chaves de Mendonça—a civilian—was permitted to fulfill his constitutional duties to assume the presidential responsibilities when Figueiredo was hospitalized in 1981 was seen as a step toward democratization. During a similar crisis in 1969 when President Costa e Silva was incapacitated, the military high command stepped in immediately to push aside the civilian vice president and keep the presidency in its own hands.

A key institution in the formation and evolution of the broadened concept of the military in post-World War II Brazilian life has been the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra—ESG). Created in 1949, the mission of the college was stated as the preparation of selected military and civilian personnel for executive and advisory positions, especially in those government agencies responsible for the formulation, development, planning, and execution of national security policies. It is important to note that high-ranking civilians have always made up a substantial part of the student body at the ESG. A related institution having an important role in inculcating the same concepts of national security has been the Army Command and General Staff School (Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército—ECEME). The curricula at both schools emphasized that the military, because of its expertise in national security affairs, must play the leading role in government (see Training, this ch.).

Economic and Social Role

The Brazilian armed forces have a long tradition of participation in so-called civic action programs and have made important contributions to the development of the economy. These programs have resulted in substantial achievement in the communications and transportation fields, particularly in the vast hinterland of the huge country. The army, for example, was responsible for much of the building of roadbeds and the tracklaying in the extensive railroad construction program and also built many of the highways to the remote border areas which, though largely uneconomical, had strategic importance. Army engineer construction battalions have also erected dams, power plants, and bridges.

The air force, through its Directorate of Civil Aviation, was responsible for the early development of civil air operations. In addition to subsidizing the purchase of equipment for private airlines, the air force also instituted airmail and passenger service

to sparsely settled areas that would not have been profitable for private companies. The navy carried out an extensive mapping program in the Amazon Basin region through its Directorate of Hydrographics and Navigation. Other naval components have provided rescue operations, medical assistance and training, and literacy programs.

An unusual contribution to the economy by individual officers of the three armed forces has been participation as executives in various commercial enterprises. Officers on detached service have headed state organizations, such as the Brazilian Petroleum Corporation (Petróleo Brasileiro—Petrobrás), the Volta Redonda steel mill, the merchant marine, the postal and telegraph service, some national railroads and airlines, the National Motor Plant, and some aircraft factories. The military services have also built their own equipment plants, munitions factories, and shipyards, which have provided considerable civilian employment in addition to conserving foreign exchange by restricting imports.

Perhaps a surprise to some critics has been the fact that during more than 18 years in power the military regime had not appropriated excessively large sums of money to build up the armed forces. For the fiscal year ending December 31, 1981, Brazil spent about US$1.7 billion on defense, which amounted to 7.8 percent of the overall budget of the central government. For comparison with other Latin American countries during the same period, defense spending in Argentina and Mexico accounted for 16.6 percent and 2.3 percent of their overall budgets, respectively. Less money was spent on defense by the military regime in the early 1980s than had been expended for the same purpose by the last civilian government during the early 1960s.

General Walter Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque, minister of army, speaking only for his own service, said in 1980 that the army budget had been considerably reduced during the 1970s, and one independent estimate stated that the central government's budget allotted to the military had been reduced from 9.5 percent in 1976 to 7.8 percent in 1981. After the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982, however, Pires and his navy and air force counterparts became vociferous in advocating much larger defense expenditures.

In its social role the military has served as a channel for upward social mobility. The officer class, predominantly of upper class origin in the nineteenth century, was estimated to be approximately 80 percent of middle-class origin in the 1980s. Because of their middle-class backgrounds, many officers reportedly shun the ostentatious life-style of the leading industrialists, but at the same time, they have not supported populist demands for more equitable distribution of income. The military hierarchy tended to view the high economic growth rate of the 1970s as a justification of its stewardship, but it has been reluctant to accept responsibility for the economic woes of the early 1980s and the failure of the

"trickle-down" theory to improve living conditions for the lower classes.

In the past the armed forces had a high level of acceptance among the general population. These attitudes were attributed not only to a long tradition of civic action but also to the army's general avoidance of violent confrontations with the poorest members of society who live in the shantytowns (*favelas*) around the major cities. The army preferred to leave the handling of public disorder to the police, except when the latter were unable to control a situation considered to be dangerous. In addition, soldiers did not become estranged from their own people, generally returning to their homes after a year or less of conscript service. Officers have not taken on the attributes of a separate class but have remained essentially middle class.

As the second decade of military rule nears its end, some officers have expressed the fear that their governing role over such a long period has hurt their image as professional armed forces and, according to this argument, a return to barracks is imperative. Others have argued that the country still needs the authoritarianism of military government and, in their view, a return to barracks would be irresponsible under existing conditions; therefore, democratization should be a slow process extending into the distant future. The social and political roles that the armed forces will play for the remainder of the twentieth century hinge on the outcome of this continuous debate within the military (see Conservative Groups, ch. 4).

Personnel

Maintaining the strength of the armed forces—about 273,000 in late 1982—did not cause a serious drain on the overall manpower pool. The country's population of almost 125 million, which ranked sixth in the world, easily supported the relatively modest strength of the armed forces and would even accommodate general mobilization without serious problems. Demograhic estimates for 1982 placed the number of males between the ages of 15 and 49 at 31,263,000, of whom 21,155,000 (67.5 percent) were judged fit for military service. Each year about 1,393,000 Brazilians reach age 18, at which time they become eligible for military service, although they are not usually conscripted until age 21. Service in the armed forces is compulsory for all males, but because of the large number of eligibles, only a few are drafted each year. The term of service for conscripts is one year, but they are frequently discharged one to two months before the end of their term.

Mostly for economic reasons the army tends to assign conscripts to units near their homes, and it is not uncommon, even for basic trainees, to spend considerable time at home rather than at the posts to which they are assigned. Most conscripts are drafted from cities rather than from rural areas because most large garrisons are

located in urban areas, and conscripts come from the areas surrounding the posts. Although the army has boasted about being a national integrating factor, Alfred Stepan, an authority on the Brazilian military, has referred to this assertion as "a gross oversimplification." In addition to saving money by drafting men who live near army posts, local commanders also prefer urban youths because they are more likely literate and, as weapons and weapon systems have become more highly technical, the need for literate conscripts has become much greater. The conscript's tour of active duty is usually devoted to basic training, weapons training, and unit training, which includes some field exercises.

Article 92 of the Constitution states: "All Brazilians are obligated to military service or other duties necessary to the national security, under the terms and penalties of the law." The implementing law requires military service from all males between the ages of 21 and 45. Because only a relative handful are selected for active duty out of the several million in the age category, most Brazilian males fulfill their military obligation as untrained reservists. There are different classes of reserves depending on age, previous service, or previous training in some kind of military school. Most reservists are untrained and, in effect, simply constitute a large manpower pool. Although in theory, reservists should receive some training and former conscripts should be recalled periodically for training tours, in practice, little such training seems to take place, probably because of funding restrictions. The viable reserve, therefore, would constitute the most recent classes of conscripts, that is, those discharged within the preceding three or four years. Other reservists would need extensive retraining or, in most instances, the full cycle of training given to new conscripts.

Defense Industry

Arms production by Brazilian industry began in a limited manner in the early 1960s with the manufacture of rifles, pistols, and machine guns under licenses secured from Belgium, Italy, and the United States, respectively. From that small beginning a large, thriving industry evolved, and during the next two decades aggressive Brazilian arms salesmen, spearheaded by military attachés, cornered about one-tenth of the world's arms deals, ranking the country seventh among arms exporters. In November 1981 Minister of Finance Ernane Galvêas led a group of 55 businessmen on a tour of the Middle East that reportedly resulted in lucrative arms contracts in addition to contracts for many other products.

The arms business received its initial impetus from the military governments that have ruled since 1964. Convinced that Brazil was on the way to becoming a first-line power in the world, knowing that modernization of the armed forces was prerequisite to that development, and lacking the necessary capital to buy expensive weaponry abroad, the military leaders encouraged the

development of the domestic arms industry. Brazil's armed forces, however, could not possibly absorb the production of a major arms industry, and exports became mandatory. In a very short time the arms manufacturers had earned reputations for producing weapons and equipment of high quality and moderate technological complexity at reasonable prices, quickly attracting the attention of many Third World countries. Furthermore, there were no political connotations to the Brazilian arms deals as was so often the case with the Soviet Union and the United States, the two leading arms exporters. Income from arms exports was reported as US$1.2 billion in 1981 and was expected to be about US$1.6 billion in 1982, it was predicted to reach US$2 billion in 1983.

About 50 countries were using Brazilian military equipment or weapons in the early 1980s. Although most sales have been to Third World countries, others have also been attracted by the Brazilian exports. The United States, for example, tested the Urutu along with other amphibious armored personnel carriers in competition for employment with the Rapid Deployment Force, which on January 1, 1983, was upgraded and redesignated the Unified Command for South West Asia (SWA). The Urutu is made by Engesa (Engenheiros Especializados, meaning specialized engineers), the leading manufacturer of wheeled vehicles in Latin America. Two other armored vehicles that have become well known to armed forces around the world are the Cascavel and the Jararaca, also made by Engesa. Iraq purchased large quantities of Brazilian military equipment and, in effect, became a proving ground for Engesa-built armor, which was said to have performed admirably in combat during the Iraq-Iran conflict in the early 1980s. In addition to its armored vehicles—named, incidentally, after poisonous snakes—Engesa also produced a wide range of trucks for the armed forces and for export. Engesa was located in the heavily industrialized city of São José dos Campos in the state of São Paulo, about 100 kilometers northeast of the city of São Paulo.

Also located in São José dos Campos was Embraer (Empresa Brasileira Aeronautica, meaning Brazilian aeronautics enterprise), the country's foremost manufacturer of airframes. Brazil in 1982 had not yet begun to produce aircraft engines. In addition to its popular commercial airliner known as the Bandeirante, Embraer also made Xingu jet trainers and Xavante jet fighters for its own forces and for export. In 1981 Embraer was ranked among the top 10 aircraft producers in the noncommunist world.

The EMB-110 Bandeirante was designed by the Ministry of Aeronautics as a general-purpose military aircraft, but its civilian version has been purchased by as many as two dozen countries, including the United States, where it has been used by several feeder and commuter airlines. The Transport Command of the Brazilian Air Force had about 100 Bandeirantes in inventory in

The EMB-111 Sentinel (air force designation, P-95). Maritime patrol aircraft built by Embraer; powered by Pratt & Whitney turboprop engines.

The EMB-326GB Xavante (air force designation, AT-26). Ground attack aircraft built by Embraer under license from Aeronautica Macchi of Italy; powered by a Rolls Royce turbojet engine. Photographs Courtesy Office of the Air Attaché, Embassy of Brazil, Washington.

1982. The plane's military designation is C-95. A similar aircraft, EMB-111, was designed for maritime surveillance and designated P-95 by the air force. The Coastal Command used 12 P-95s in its patrol operations in 1982. Power plants (twin turboprop) for the EMB-110 and EMB-111 were supplied by Pratt and Whitney Aircraft of Canada. The AT-26 Xavante, named after an Indian tribe, is the Italian Aermacchi MB-326, a ground attack jet manufactured by Embraer under license. In addition to Brazilian Air Force use in both the Tactical Command and the Training Command, the AT-26 has also been sold to the air forces of Paraguay and Togo, which purchased nine and six aircraft, respectively. The Xingu (air force designation VU-9) is a twin-turboprop general-purpose transport and advanced trainer used by the Transport Command; it has also been used in Colombia, Britain, Belgium, and some Middle Eastern countries. In March 1982 France received the first two Xingus of an order placed in late 1980 for a total of 41 of the popular planes. The French will assign 25 to the air force and 16 to the navy for transport and training activities.

A new basic trainer for the Brazilian Air Force reached the production stage in 1982, and the first aircraft—EMB-312, designated T-27 Tucano by the air force—were scheduled for delivery to air force units before the end of the year. A São Paulo newspaper reported in October 1982 that Embraer had agreed to supply 100 Tucanos to Libya. Also reported in the development stage was the AMX, a supersonic jet fighter that will be coproduced by Aermacchi and Embraer with a view toward competing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) market.

Analysts estimated that in addition to Engesa and Embraer—the giants of the Brazilian armaments industry—from 25 to 55 other companies were producing various kinds of weapons and military equipment in 1982. Much of the production was for export. National planning was such that the arms producers did not overlap in production and did not compete with each other for markets. Some of the companies were privately owned, some were mixed public and private, and some were joint Brazilian-foreign enterprises. The government also operated several army arsenals and munitions factories, as well as three naval shipyards. As an example of joint ownership, Helibrás (Helicópteros do Brasil, meaning helicopters of Brazil) was owned jointly by Aérospatiale of France and the state of Minas Gerais, each owning 45 percent; the remaining 10 percent was owned by Aerofoto of Brazil. Helibrás began operations in 1980, assembling Aérospatiale Lama and Ecureuil helicopters, known in Brazil as Gavião and Esquilo, respectively. Eventually the factory, located in Itajubá, Minas Gerais, will manufacture helicopters rather than merely assemble them. Another example of a joint production effort was the building of two Niteroi-class frigates at the Rio de Janeiro

Navy Yard. Four of the frigates had been built in Britain by the Vosper-Thornycroft company on Brazilian order. For the remaining two ships, Vosper-Thornycroft set up and directed the construction at the Rio yard. But it was not only in collaboration with foreign companies that ships—both naval and merchant—were being built. Including production from its government-owned shipyards, as well as from privately owned facilities, Brazil ranks second among the world's shipbuilders.

Another company located in São José dos Campos—Industria Aerospacial, known as Avibrás—has been involved in the manufacture of rockets and missiles for several years. The respected newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* in January 1981 referred to Avibrás as "a small and mysterious industry." Actually, the work done at Avibrás, both in research and in production, has been done at the behest of the Army Institute of Research and Development and the Army Department of Studies and Technological Research; although much of the work is classified, Avibrás and its products have become rather well known. Further, Avibrás is not a small company as indicated in *O Estado de São Paulo*. The Rio de Janeiro newspaper *Jornal do Brasil* said in April 1982 that Avibrás "will start operating the world's largest rocket factory in 1983," and the "bulk of its production will be earmarked for exports."

An interesting privately owned company is Bernardini, which has specialized in the reconditioning of old tanks. The army's tank force has consisted primarily of 75 M-4 Sherman main battle tanks (American World War II medium tanks) and about 250 Stuart M-3s and 300 Sherman M-41s, both American light tanks also of World War II vintage. Bernardini has mounted 90mm cannon in the Stuart tanks and changed the engine to diesel, thus extending the firepower, the cruising range, and the life span of the tanks. The M-41s were also converted, extending the operating range from 180 kilometers to about 600 kilometers, and the tanks were expected to be operational through the 1980s.

A Chinese military delegation, visiting Brazil in 1980 to inspect the products of Engesa, Embraer, and other armaments manufacturers, expressed interest in the Brazilian techniques for converting old tanks. The Chinese were evidently interested in purchasing the technology used by Bernardini, but in late 1982 it was not known whether agreements had been reached.

Administration, Organization, and Training

Under the Constitution the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces. In the broad area of national security, he is assisted at the top governmental level by a complex structure of agencies and offices that have overlapping membership and seemingly overlapping responsibilities. According to the Constitution the CSN is the highest level advisory group for national

security policy. The president is designated presiding officier of the CSN, and the vice president and cabinet ministers are listed as members ex officio.

The chiefs of the Civilian Household (Casa Civil), the Military Household (Casa Militar), and the National Intelligence Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações—SNI), all of whom enjoy ministerial rank, are also in the CSN, raising the membership to more than 20. But the Constitution also states that by the law that regulates the organization, competence, and functioning of the council, others may be admitted as ex officio or special members. In the early 1980s it was believed that the membership, in addition to those named, also included the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (Estado-Maior das Fôrças Armadas—EMFA), the chiefs of staff of the three armed services, and various high-ranking generals and admirals who commanded the most important organizations and bases. In effect, the size of the CSN membership seemed large for its designated purpose, but some outside observers have expressed the opinion that the top military officials have the strongest voices in advising the president on security policy and decisionmaking (see Constitutional Basis, this ch.).

The president was also advised on subjects dealing with the armed forces and with national security by the three members of his cabinet who headed the service ministries, that is, army, navy, and aeronautics. Some analysts have concluded that even though the president was supreme commander, the three service ministers held a great deal of power within their respective services. The ministers of army, navy, and aeronautics in late 1982 were General Pires, Admiral Maximiano Eduardo da Silva Fonseca, and Lieutenant Brigadier Delio Jardim de Mattos, respectively. As ministers they were members of the CSN but were also called on for advice concerning their specific services in addition to their input to the major security body. A proposal to establish a defense ministry, made after the military takeover of the government, was set aside because of opposition from navy and air force officers who feared domination of such a central ministry by army generals.

The president was also able to call the members of the EMFA for direct consultation if he desired to hear from the armed forces chief of staff and the three service chiefs outside the CSN structure. Among the functions assigned to EMFA by decree-law are "to elaborate and propose to the President of the Republic principles, norms, and directives referring to subjects common to the Armed Forces." EMFA had a large staff of military personnel and civilians assigned to sections for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, mobilization and statistics, research and development, training, health, cartography, communications, and industry and technology. The office of the chief of staff of the armed forces does not have inherent power because the individual services have

jealously guarded their individuality and have not surrendered any of their prerogatives to the ostensibly higher body. In day-to-day peacetime operations, for example, the chief of the EMFA cannot be compared to the chairman of the joint chiefs in the United States structure.

Another ostensibly top-level armed forces agency, the High Command of the Armed Forces (Alto-Comando das Fôrças Armadas), was established by law in the 1960s to provide "assistance to the President on decisions relative to military policy and the coordination of subjects pertinent to the Armed Forces." A small group designed to act like a board of directors, theoretically it would not duplicate the functions of EMFA, which served as a headquarters staff for the three services. The members were the three service ministers, the chief of staff of the armed forces, and the three service chiefs. As far as is known, the High Command has not held regular meetings, and only a few of its essions have been recorded. One of the more important meetings concerned the presidential succession after Costa e Silva was incapacitated. The choice of a successor was discussed by officers down to and including colonels (navy captains), who were allowed to indicate their preferences to their superiors. The results of this very informal polling were transmitted to the High Command, which sat as an electoral college in choosing General Médici, commander of the Third Army, to be president.

In addition to the agencies and individuals already named, the chief of the Military Household is an important adviser to the president in the national security area. The Military Household provides liaison between the office of the president and EMFA as well as with the armed forces ministries and some other executive agencies. It is also responsible for the personal security of the president and the presidential palace. Brigadier General Danilo Venturini, chief of the Military Household under Figueiredo and also general secretary of the CSN, gave up the first position but retained the second in a change of cabinet appointments in late 1982. Brigadier General Rubem Carlos Ludwig, who had been minister of education and culture, took over the Military Household but not the CSN.

An agency established by the Castello Branco government in 1964, the SNI, quickly gained influence in national security affairs. A federal agency staffed by military personnel and designed to combine many of the functions of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency, the SNI was soon recognized as a locus of power within the military regime. Its first chief, General Golbery, was already well known as the author of books on geopolitics and as a strong advocate of the ESG ideology (see Training, this ch.). The SNI was established as a kind of clearinghouse for domestic and foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and the scope of its activities spread into all facets of national security. By the end of the 1960s SNI agents

were present in every governmental ministry to ensure that all policy makers stayed abreast of national security requirements.

In the early 1970s the strength of the agent-staff of the SNI was estimated at about 200 military officers who were supported by an unknown number of administrative and technical personnel. Such an estimate was not available for the early 1980s, but the organization remained strong and influential. The chief of the SNI, General Octávio Aguiar de Medeiros in 1982, was a member of the cabinet and of the CSN. Two of the five military presidents—Médici and Figueiredo—earlier held the SNI post. The intelligence agencies of the three armed forces, as well as the federal and state police forces, had information-gathering intelligence units that fed the central files of the SNI, ensuring that dossiers existed on any Brazilian of interest to the federal authorities. Stepan in *Authoritarian Brazil* (1973), referring to the system and criticizing its reputation, said, "The result has been the creation of a vast information-gathering network, using both the most modern techniques of data processing and retrieval and the most medieval methods of 'data extraction,' that penetrates all private institutions and levels of government."

Army

The army, for a variety of reasons including its size, deployment, and historical development, is the most influential of the three armed forces. Senior army generals have occupied the presidency since 1964, and of the many military officers who have held cabinet posts during that time, most have been army generals and colonels rather than navy or air force officers. In late 1982, in addition to the three service ministries, active or retired officers headed the ministries of communications, interior, mines and energy, and the newly created Special Ministry for Land-Related Issues, as well as the Military Household and the SNI. General Pires, who at one time had headed the federal police forces, had been appointed minister of army by President-elect Figueiredo and has held the office since the latter was inaugurated on March 15, 1979. Cabinet ministers served indefinite terms at the pleasure of the chief of state.

The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in *The Military Balance, 1982-1983,* listed army strength at 182,750 (the same as the previous year) out of a total armed forces strength of 272,850. The army, therefore, accounted for about 67 percent of the total. The IISS also estimated that 132,000 conscripts served in the 1982 Brazilian army, a high percentage considering the short conscript tour (usually nine to 10 months) and the need for literate and skilled young men to handle modern weapons. In effect, the army has served as a training ground for a large reserve force. Its highly professional officer corps and NCO corps would serve as a nucleus around which the trained reserve

would be mobilized if required.

The army was deployed territorially in four numbered field armies—First, Second, Third, and Fourth—and two independent commands, the Amazon Military Command and the Brasília Military Command. Under these six major field commands, the country was divided into 11 sequentially numbered military regions. The First Army, headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, historically has had the best troop units and the most modern equipment because of the importance of Rio to the overall economics, politics, and culture of the country, even after the move of the capital to Brasília in 1960. The Vila Militar, the city's garrison or military community, continued to be regarded as one of the most important centers of military influence in the entire country, and command of the First Army has always been a coveted assignment because of the influence wielded by the incumbent. In 1982 the First Army was commanded by General Heitor de Almeida. The two military subdivisions of the First Army were the 1st Military Region, comprising the states of Espírito Santo and Rio de Janeiro, and the 4th Military Region, the borders of which were the same as those of Minas Gerais.

Next in importance among the four field armies was the Third Army, under the command in 1982 of General Tulio Chagas Nogueira, whose headquarters was located in Pôrto Alegre. The Third Army's importance derived from its historically strategic location in the extreme south of the country. It included the 3rd Military Region, consisting of Rio Grande do Sul, and the 5th Military Region, comprising Santa Catarina and Paraná. Those three states border Uruguay and Paraguay and were the scenes of hard-fought wars in the nineteenth century. The whole area has been considered of strategic importance since then, and the Third Army has been kept strong in troops and equipment.

Having noted the importance of the two armies that control the area along the southern Atlantic coast, it must be said that the Second and Fourth armies were also important organizations, although they were not maintained at the same level as the more prestigious First and Third. All armies were commanded by four-star generals, and all of those commanding generals were members of the Army High Command along with the minister, the chief of staff, and about four other four-star generals who occupied high-level staff positions. The Second Army, headquartered in São Paulo and commanded by General Sergio de Ary Pires in 1982, included the 2d Military Region, encompassing the state of São Paulo, and the 9th Military Region, comprising the states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. The Fourth Army covered Brazil's northeastern bulge, the area that was so important to the World War II Allies for patrol of the South Atlantic and easy access to Africa. Army headquarters was located at Recife; the 6th Military Region included Bahia and Sergipe, and the 7th Military Region

included Alagoas, Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte. The commmander of the Fourth Army in 1982 was General Enio Gouveia dos Santos.

The Amazon Military Command was larger by far than any of the field armies, but because it was located in the sparsely settled backcountry, it did not rank in importance with the other field commands. It contained the 8th Military Region, which was made up of the states of Rôndonia, Acre, Amazonas, and Pará, and the territories of Roraima and Amapá; and the 10th Military Region, containing Maranhão, Piauí, and Ceará. Headquarters of the Amazon Military Command was located in Manaus. The remaining field command was the Brasília Military Command, headquartered in the capital. This command contained the 11th Military Region, which consisted of the state of Goiás and the Federal District.

Subordinate to the armies, independent commands, and military regions were the major tactical units that in 1982 consisted of eight divisions, each containing four armored, mechanized, or motorized infantry brigades, or some combination of such. In addition to the divisions there were also three independent infantry brigades, two parachute brigades, and five light jungle units ranging in size from battalion to brigade. The divisions and separate brigades contained organic combat support and service support units. There were also support units—engineer, communications, and the like—at army level.

Navy

The navy is the senior service, tracing its heritage to the tiny Portuguese ships and crews that protected the earliest coastal colonies form seaborne marauders. The minister in 1982, Admiral Fonseca, assumed office on March 15, 1979, when President Figueiredo was inaugurated. The minister and the naval chief of staff (Admiral José Gerardo Albano de Aratanha in 1982) were both ex officio members of the CSN and the High Command.

Naval operations were directed from the Ministry of Navy at Brasília through six naval districts and one fleet command. The First Naval District was located at the country's main naval base at Rio de Janeiro. Other naval district headquarters locations were as follows: Second, Salvador; Third, Recife; Fourth; Belém; Fifth, Florianópolis; and Sixth, São Paulo. In addition to the cities where the district headquarters were located, other important naval bases were Ladário near Corumbá on the Rio Paraguai, and São Pedro da Aldeia Naval Air Station at Rio de Janeiro.

Total naval strength in 1982 was estimated to be slightly over 47,000, including the naval air arm and the Marine Corps (Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais). Only about 2,000 conscripts served in the navy. The flagship of the oceangoing navy was the aircraft carrier *Minas Gerais* (the ex-British H.M.S. *Vengeance*), which has been

in service since 1945. Purchased from Britain in 1956, the *Minas Gerais* was reconstructed in the Netherlands in 1960 and extensively refitted in Brazil in the late 1970s, but in the view of many Brazilian and foreign observers, it was obsolescent and should be retired by the end of the 1980s if it could be replaced. Because of interservice rivalry between the navy and the air force, only the latter was allowed to operate fixed-wing aircraft. The complement of aircraft carried by the *Minas Gerais* included six Grumman S-2A antisubmarine planes in addition to several Sikorsky SH-3D Sea King helicopters and Aérospatiale HB-350 Esquilo helicopters. The S-2A aircraft were flown by air force pilots, and the helicopters, by navy pilots. In late 1982 the crew with full air complement consisted of about 1,300 officers and men. The interservice imperatives of who is allowed to fly what kind of aircraft cause what some critics called serious command and control problems. Nevertheless, the anomaly has existed since 1965 when Castello Branco decreed the division of responsibilities in order to settle the navy-air force dispute.

The pride of the surface fleet in the early 1980s focused on the six Niteroi-class frigates that entered service in the late 1970s. Named *Niteroi, Defensora, Constituição, Liberal, Independência,* and *União,* the frigates resulted from a contract between the Brazilian navy and Vosper-Thornycroft of Britain that called for the building of four of the ships in Britain and two in the Rio de Janeiro Navy Yard. A seventh frigate of similar design but modified to become a training ship was under construction in Rio in 1982. The first four frigates are specifically designed for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) as opposed to the other two, which are general-purpose vessels. Both configurations carried two Seacat surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, two single 40mm guns, one twin 375mm ASW rocket launcher, two triple torpedo mounts, and one Westland WG-13 Lynx helicopter. In addition, the ASW ships had one single 4.5-inch gun and a single Ikara ASW missile launcher; the general-purpose version had two 4.5-inch guns and two twin Exocet antiship missile launchers. The complement was the same on both versions—21 officers and 179 men.

The destroyer fleet consisted in 1982 of 12 ex-United States ships, all of which had been commissioned during World War II. The *Marcilio Dias* and the *Mariz e Barros* were both Gearing Fram I class, armed with four 127mm guns, one eight-tube ASROC (antisubmarine rocket), and one Wasp helicopter. Each carried 274 officers and men. The *Maranhão, Paraná, Pernambuco, Piauí,* and *Santa Catarina* were Fletcher class, carrying a complement of 260 and armed with four or five 127mm guns, two quad 40mm and one twin 40mm antiaircraft guns, and varying combinations of torpedo tubes and depth charge racks. The *Alagoas, Espírito Santo, Mato Grosso, Rio Grande do Norte,* and *Sergipe* were Sumner Fram II class, each carrying six 127mm guns, one

Wasp helicopter, two triple torpedo tubes, and two Hedgehogs. *Mato Grosso* did not carry a Wasp but did have depth charges and a Seacat SAM system.

The submarine inventory in 1982 included three of 1970s vintage and five veterans of World War II. The three newer boats were British Oberon class that were built for Brazil by Vickers-Barrow in Britain. Named *Humaitá*, *Riachuelo*, and *Toneleros*, they each carried eight torpedo tubes and a crew of 68 men and were placed in service in the mid-1970s. The five older submarines were ex-United States Guppy II- and Guppy III-class boats commissioned in the 1940s, each carrying 10 torpedo tubes. The remainder of the fleet consisted of a large number and wide variety of patrol vessels, mine warfare ships, landing craft, and support vessels of many kinds.

Brazil has become a major shipbuilding nation—both naval and merchant ships—and takes great pride in the home-built vessels that have entered service in recent years. A large number of river and coastal patrol craft have been constructed in Brazilian yards, and the modernization program for the 1980s called for the local production of many new ships, including patrol craft, corvettes, possibly a submarine, and—before the end of the decade—a start on the construction of a new aircraft carrier. Some of the design and production will be purely Brazilian, and other projects will be jointly undertaken with foreign companies operating in Brazilian shipyards. News reports in the summer of 1982 stated that two new submarines had been ordered built in Kiel and that the contract was awaiting approval by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Unconfirmed reports claimed that the deal included agreement for a third boat to be built in a Brazilian yard.

Air Force

The strength of the Brazilian Air Force (Fôrça Aerea Brasileira—FAB) of almost 43,000 officers and men and about 600 aircraft in 1982 made it the largest air force in Latin America. The minister of aeronautics, in addition to commanding the air force, had the added responsibility of controlling all civil air activities. The line of military command extended from the minister through his chief of staff down to the commanders of five major commands: Air Defense, Tactical, Maritime, Transport, and Training. There were also six territorial air commands that covered the entire country. Numbered from one to six, the headquarters of the regional air commands were located at Belém, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Pôrto Alegre, and Brasília, respectively.

The Air Defense Command consisted of a one-squadron wing, the 1st Air Defense Wing (1° Ala de Defesa Aérea, known as 1° ALADA), which operated 16 Mirage III aircraft, 12 interceptors, and four trainers. In early 1981 Mattos announced that construc-

Naval station, Guanabara Bay
Courtesy P.A. Kluck

Ministry of Army, Brasília
Courtesy Michaël Borg-Hansen

tion of the country's first SAM missile base was to begin near Florianópolis, the capital city of Santa Catarina on the southern coast. This was to be the first in a planned series of such bases that would become part of the Air Defense Command. Whether or not the project ever started and what kind of missile was to be emplaced had not been made public as of late 1982. Meanwhile, however, a French company, Thompson CSF, had installed communications systems, computers, and radars in the Brasília-Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo triangle that will be part of the overall air defense system. Army-operated Roland mobile SAM launchers were deployed in the same general area.

The Tactical Command (Comando Aerotático) comprised three groups of fighter aircraft equipped with a total of 32 Northrop F-5E fighters and four F-5B trainers. There were also six to eight counterinsurgency and reconnaissance squadrons equipped with 139 AT-26 Xavante strike-trainers (including 11 RT-26 reconnaissance version).

The Maritime, or Coastal, Command (Comando Costeiro) operated the fixed-wing aircraft aboard the carrier *Minas Gerais* in addition to various land-based squadrons engaged in antisubmarine patrols and search-and-rescue activities. Aircraft used included the EMB-111, the maritime patrol and reconnaissance version of the Bandeirante; the Lockheed RC-130E Hercules; and the Grumman Albatross, production of which began in 1949. The command also had Bell 47G and SA-330 Puma helicopters. The major bases of the Maritime Command were located in Santa Cruz, Rio Grande do Sul; Florianópolis, Santa Catarina; Salvador, Bahia; and Recife.

In late 1982 the Air Transport Group had various groups for general transport missions. Aircraft included two KC-130 Hercules for air-to-air refueling in addition to several other C-130s and Bandeirantes for routine transport. The Troop Transport Group (Grupo de Transporte de Tropas) at Campo dos Afonças supported the army's paratroop units using 21 DeHaviland Buffalos, some of which operated as troop carriers at Camp Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Manaus, Amazonas. The Special Transport Group (Grupo de Transporte Especial) was equipped with a wide variety of aircraft for VIP transport and special missions. The Training Command also had a variety of aircraft, including Brazilian as well as foreign-made planes (see Training, this ch.).

Training

It has frequently been written that Brazil's annual conscript class contains large numbers of illiterates who, during their short conscript tour, are taught reading and writing in addition to various basic technical skills. In fact, the percentage of illiterate conscripts is usually quite small because the officers selecting those who will be drafted are well aware that the army's capability

to fulfill its missions would be seriously hampered if it were required to carry on mass literacy training every year. The army, however, does recognize the importance of the public service it provides by teaching large numbers of conscripts basic skills that can be valuable to the overall economy when the young men return to civilian life. The relatively small number of illiterates who are drafted do learn to read and write, but for most conscripts the tour is devoted to basic military training, weapons familiarization, equipment handling and maintenance, and small-unit training. The conscript system is primarily a means of providing fundamental military training annually to a sizeable group of young men who then return to civilian life and are retained on the reserve rolls until age 45.

For the regular enlisted personnel of the three services, training was a constant in their military careers. Much of their time was devoted either to retraining others or to being trained themselves in various military institutions. Like officers, NCOs who aspired to higher ranks were expected to complete advanced training and educational courses. Technical courses given by army branches, for example, were open to all who qualified; competition was strong for the courses that were prerequisites to advancement, and an added incentive was the importance placed on such technical training by employers after the serviceman had been discharged. The navy and air force also had a variety of educational institutions to train the technicians who were essential for the operation of modern weapons and equipment.

An example of the importance placed on education by the military was the School for Sergeants of the Armed Forces (Escola de Sargentos das Armas), which acquired a reputation for excellence in the post-World War II period when the drive for professionalization of the military was particularly strong. In a manner similar to that used by officer candiate schools, the year-long course of instruction was opened to civilian applicants, as well as to lower ranking enlisted personnel, who aspired to become career NCOs. Although qualifications for admission were high and the entrance examination was difficult, competition for admission always remained strong. The curriculum has been weighted toward technical subjects to meet the demands of advancing technology in the services. One of the side effects of professionalization of the NCO corps came after the military takeover of the government when NCOs demanded and received the rights to vote and to run for office. The Constitution of 1967 includes those rights for NCOs whereas previous constitutions had granted them only to officers.

The Brazilians considered the educational systems developed for their armed forces, particularly in the army, to be as good as any and better than most in the world. Many officers on active duty in 1982 entered the system at the secondary level, beginning at one of the military preparatory schools that were supervised

and directed by the armed forces. These officers, therefore, began their military careers at about age 12 or 13. Qualified graduates of these schools and other secondary schools were permitted to take the written examination that determined who would be admitted to the Military Academy of the Black Needles (Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras). The odd name derives from nearby mountains, but the school is usually referred to simply as the Military Academy or frequently by the acronym AMAN. Those who survive the competition for admission enroll as cadets to face a difficult four-year course leading to an army commission. Since 1964 the curriculum has stressed the national security doctrine, but more emphasis has also been placed on social science courses in addition to the engineering and science subjects that have always been given priority. Midway through the course, cadets indicate the branch to which they desire assignment (infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, etc.), and during the last two years at the academy they receive some specialized branch training. After commissioning, young officers usually attend a branch school.

For the officer who aspires to high rank in the army, successful completion of each step in the educational system is essential. For those who would be generals, finishing each academic step in the highest percentile is required; high standing in graduating classes is among the most important criteria for promotion. After commissioning, the system begins for company-grade officers with attendance at the Officers' Postgraduate School (Escola Aperfeiçomento de Oficias—EsAO), which offers a one-year course that is required for promotion to field grade. Routinely during a career, officers maintain contact with branch schools through correspondence or refresher courses.

The prize achievement for an army officer climbing the rungs of the education system, however, is admittance to the Army Command and General Staff School (Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército—ECEME). The stiff entrance examination regularly weeds out about 75 percent of the field-grade applicants, and without successful completion of the three-year course, promotion to general officer rank is unheard of. Appointment to faculty positions at military schools (including ECEME) and attainment of the highly coveted general staff badge also require completion of the command and general staff course.

In the navy an officer's education begins at the Naval School (Escola Naval) in Rio de Janeiro, where midshipmen receive a four-year academic course equivalent to that given to cadets at the Military Academy. Graduation is followed by a year of shipboard training, and naval officers also attend a network of specialist schools similar to the branch schools of the army. In addition, naval officers attend courses at the Naval Research Institute and the Naval War College. As its name implies, the research institute is concerned with naval science and technology and research in

advanced concepts. The war college, the navy's highest educational institution, offers a nine-month curriculum for qualified officers, usually those who have reached the rank of commander.

The education of air force officers follows two different paths, depending on whether a cadet will become a flying officer or a technical officer. The Air Force Academy at Pirassununga, São Paulo, is primarily a flight training school to which students are admitted after completion of the Air Cadets' Preparatory school in Barbacena, Minas Gerais. Technical officers are trained at the São José dos Campos Aerospace Technical Center, São Paulo. Before attaining field grade, all officers attend the Officers' Advanced Training School at São Paulo, for courses in command, leadership, and administration. The next step in the educational progression of the air force officer is the Air Force Command and General Staff School, but admission requirements and the entrance examination eliminate many applicants. From among its graduates come the relatively small number of officers who will be promoted to general officer rank.

Several Brazilian officers are sent abroad annually to military schools in various countries, including the United States. Many Brazilian officers have attended United States basic and advanced service schools, and many senior officers have attended the command and staff schools as well as the service war colleges, the National War College, and the Inter-American Defense College. During the period of strained relations between Brazil and the United States from 1977 through 1980, Brazilian students were rare on United States military campuses, but in 1981 they began returning to the United States for various kinds of training.

The top of the educational ladder for armed forces officers in Brazil was the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra—ESG), located in Rio de Janeiro. Students were selected from among colonels and generals or navy captains and admirals, as well as from among civilians who had attained high government status or prominence in varied fields, such as business and industry, education, medicine, economics, and even religion. Since the early 1970s a few civilian women have also gained admittance to the ESG.

The ESG academic year was divided into segments of varying length during which lectures and seminars covered national security doctrine as it pertained to all aspects of Brazilian life. Several weeks of discussions on basic doctrine were followed by a longer period devoted to national and international affairs as they affected security and development. Lecturers included senior military officers, cabinet ministers, key government officials, academic specialists, and, occasionally, foreign diplomats. Subject matter concerned all those areas that have a bearing on the government, politics, economics, and society of the world power that the military hierarchy expects Brazil to become in the remaining years of the twentieth century.

The idea for the establishment of the ESG grew out of the close association of Brazilian and United States army officers during World War II and the experience of the FEB (see Military Traditions, this ch.). After the war several high-ranking FEB veterans, dissatisfied with their own staff operations and particularly with joint service staffs, requested that a United States mission be sent to Brazil to assist in the establishment of a war college. A mission arrived in 1948, helped with the founding of ESG in 1949, and remained in an advisory capacity until 1960. The chief of the United States mission enjoyed faculty status at the ESG.

According to Stepan in *The Military in Politics*, General Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias, who was charged with planning for the war college in 1948, wanted the school to have "the functions of the U.S. Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College" and further advocated that "emphasis on internal aspects of devlopment and security be greater than in the U.S. National War College." The other major distinction that the Brazilians wanted to make was that there be much greater civilian participation in the ESG than was true of the American school. Stepan quotes a decree of December 1963, just four months before the military coup, stating the mission of the ESG as preparing "civilians and military to perform executive and advisory functions especially in those organs responsible for the formulation, development, planning, and execution of the politics of national security." In the curriculum of ESG, development and security were inseparably linked. The ESG philosophy, as taught to the highest level military and civilian leaders during the school's more than three decades, has had an incalculable effect on the country's five military governments since 1964.

The influence of the ESG on its alumni has been perpetuated by the Association of Graduates (Associação dos Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra—ADESG), which has maintained contact with graduates and has kept them informed of ESG policies and events. The ADESG has been a powerful force in the military governments, always keeping the ideology of the school foremost in the minds of the many graduates who have attained positions of power. Under the direction of powerful luminaries, such as Golbery, who served as chief of intelligence under Castello Branco and chief of the Civilian Household under both Geisel and Figueiredo, the philosophy of the school was incorporated into the curricula of all service schools, including the army's influential ECEME. A dichotomy has long existed in the armed forces officer corps concerning, albeit an oversimplification, the emphasis that should be given to political liberalization vis-à-vis that given to security. The ESG people, known as the Sorbonne group, stressing the crucial need for continuing general development of the society

along with its security, have been opposed by the hard-line (*linha dura*) adherents who have championed security as the country's foremost need (see The Military in Power, ch. 1).

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

In 1982 the three armed forces used several different uniforms, including full dress, dress, service, and fatigue. The army service uniform was green; the navy, dark blue; and the air force, a lighter blue. The senior commissioned rank in the army was marshal (*marechal*); in the navy, admiral (*almirante*); and in the air force, air marshal (*marechal-do-ar*). Officer rank insignia were worn on shoulder boards by army and air force officers and on the sleeve cuffs by navy officers. Each service had 10 officer grades, excluding officer candidates. Army officer grades from second lieutenant to colonel equated directly with counterparts in the United States Army. A Brazilian brigadier general (*general de brigada*) wore two stars, and the next higher rank, known as division general, wore three. There was no rank corresponding to the United States lieutenant general. The next higher rank, designated by four stars, was the army general (*general de exército*), and the marshal wore five stars, but that rank was rarely attained on active duty. Air force ranks had the same designations through colonel, and there was also no rank corresponding to lieutenant general. The air force general officer ranks were brigadier, major brigadier, lieutenant brigadier, and air marshal. Again, the five-star rank was rarely seen. Navy ranks corresponded directly to the United States Navy counterparts except that there was no rank of commodore. The flag ranks were rear admiral, vice admiral, squadron admiral, and admiral (see fig. 10).

Public Order and Internal Security

Federal Police

The Constitution assigns to the "union of the states, the Federal District, and the territories" the power to organize and maintain federal police for the purposes of performing the services of maritime, air, and border police; preventing and suppressing narcotics traffic; investigating criminal activities involving national security, activities that have repercussions on the social and political order, or other infractions having interstate implications; and providing censorship of public amusements. In 1982 the overall strength of the federal police (sometimes referred to as Public Security Forces) was estimated at 185,000. Officially, the federal police force was known as the Department of Federal Police (Departmento de Polícia Federal—DPF), and its headquarters was located in Brasília. In addition to the Federal District, DPF units were distributed throughout the states and territories. The DPF headquarters provided technical services relating to data

Army			Aspirante-a-Oficial	Segundo-Tenente	Primeiro-Tenente	Capitão	Major	Tenente Coronel	Coronel	General de Brigada	General de Divisão	General de Exercito	Marechal
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT			Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	General	General of the Army
Navy			Guarda Marinha	Segundo-Tenente	Primeiro-Tenente	Capitão-Tenente	Capitão de Corveta	Capitão de Fragata	Capitão de Mar-e-Guerra	Contra-Almirante	Vice-Almirante	Almirante de Esquadra	Almirante
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT			Ensign	Lieutenant (junior grade)	Primeiro-Tenente	Lieutenant	Lieutenant Commander	Commander	Captain	Rear Admiral	Vice Admiral	Admiral	Fleet Admiral
Air Force			Aspirante-a-Oficial	Segundo-Tenente	Primeiro-Tenente	Capitão	Major	Tenente Coronel	Coronel	Brigadeiro	Major-Brigadeiro	Tenente-Brigadeiro	Marechal do Ar
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT			Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	Primeiro-Tenente	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	General	General of the Air Force

NOTE-There are no Brazilian equivalents to United States ranks of lieutenant general or commodore.

Figure 10. Insignia of Officers' Ranks, 1982

processing, collection and dissemination of police intelligence, and scientific assistance to the state police forces and was also responsible for Brazil's input to and cooperation with the Paris-based International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol. Among the many agencies subordinated to the DPF were the National Police Academy, the National Institute of Criminalistics, and the National Institute of Identification, all located in Brasília.

The DPF is headed by a director general who is appointed by the president and has usually been an active-duty army general. The minister of army in President Figueiredo's cabinet in 1982, General Walter Pires, was director general of the DPF under President Médici in the early 1970s. The line of command extended from Brasília to the nationwide DPF units through the superintendencies of federal police established in each state.

Because of the intense preoccupation with internal threats to national security on the part of the military governments of the post-1964 era, a special division of the DPF, the Division of Political and Social Order (Divisão de Ordem Política e Social—DOPS), was created during the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas to concentrate on national security affairs and has continued in that role. DOPS has collaborated closely with the military commands in the fulfillment of its missions. Among its specialized functions, DOPS has provided protection for Brazilian dignitaries as well as to the many foreign officials posted to Brasília. Two other federal law enforcement agencies—the Federal Highway Police and the Federal Railroad Police—were subordinated to the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works. The highway police controlled traffic on major interstate roads and supplemented state traffic police forces. The railroad police, uniformed and plainclothes, maintained order at railroad stations and yards and aboard trains. The Maritime, Air, and Border Police, also a federal force, was located at the ports of entry, international airports, and border crossing points to handle the customs and maintain registers of foreign visitors or immigrants entering the country.

State Police

The police forces of the several states, nominally under the supervision of the state governors, were in fact closely associated with federal authorities. The state police, by definition, were powerful forces in their states because municipal police did not exist. All police functions not performed by personnel of the DPF were responsibilities of the state forces. State police generally consisted of three separate forces: the Military Police, the Civil Police, and the Traffic Police. The Secretariat of Public Security, an important agency of each state government, supervised police activities. The secretary of public security, usually an active-duty army general or colonel, was, in fact, the chief of police.

The Military Police, sometimes referred to as the State Militia, have been controlled by the Ministry of Army during periods of declared national emergency since 1969. Historically, these forces had been under individual state control, and frequently "the governors' armies," as they were sometimes dubbed, outnumbered regular troops in many states. The Military Police of any state are organized as a military force, and rank structure is military; training is weighted more heavily toward police matters, but substantial counterinsurgency training is included. Arms and equipment of states forces included machine guns and armored cars, in addition to other items generally associated with police. In effect, the Military Police are auxiliary army forces that could be quickly mobilized to augment national armed forces in an emergency. In the past Military Police units were often commanded by active-duty army officers, but that has occurred less frequently as professional police officers have achieved higher ranks and positions. The commandant of a state's Military Police was usually a general or colonel whose command was divided into police regions, which deployed police battalions and companies. Fire fighting was also a Military Police function; fire fighters were organized in separate battalions.

Each state also maintained a Civil Police that was the investigatory force, handling routine criminal cases and public security affairs. Because there were no municipal police, the state forces were stationed in populated areas and were responsible for all police functions. Cities were divided into precincts through which the Civil Police operated, using methods familiar to detective agencies in most other countries. Senior officers of the Civil Police were known as delegates (*delegados*), and the force was usually commanded by the delegate general, whose rank was equal to that of the commandant of the Military Police. Lower ranking officers were known as investigators. Promotion to the higher ranks of the Civil Police usually required a law degree.

Criminal Law and Procedure

The Penal Code in use in 1982 has been considerably amended since its adoption in 1940 as a replacement for an older code. A general section of the code distinguishes between felonies and misdemeanors and outlines the individual citizen's responsibilities under the law. Another section defines criminal behavior more comprehensively, spelling out crimes against persons, property, custom, public welfare, and public trust. Misdemeanors are also defined.

The power of arrest vested in the police, other than the power arising from judicial warrant, is derived from decree-laws. These provide that any member of the public can—and police must—arrest anyone found in flagrante delicto. The privilege of not being subject to arrest unless caught in the act or by judicial warrant

derives from the constitution of 1891 and has been included in subsequent versions. Paragraph 12 of Article 153 of the Constitution of 1967 states: "No one shall be arrested except in the act of committing a crime or by written order issued by competent authority" and further states that an arrest must be immediately communicated to a competent judge who, if he finds the arrest to be illegal, must order the release of the arrestee. The arrest power is also limited by Paragraph 10 of the same article, which declares the home to be "the inviolable refuge of the individual." In practice, there have been many violations of the constitutional guarantees, particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The process of bringing violators or suspected violators of the law to justice usually begins in one of three ways. The first and most simple occurs in cases of flagrante delicto. The second method is followed when illegal activity is uncovered during routine investigative work, after which a competent judge issues a warrant for the persons involved, and arrests are made. The third method involves complaints from private citizens that, if borne out by evidence or otherwise deemed reasonable, result in the issuance of a warrant. Violations of these official procedures have been reported frequently, particularly when police have been operating under the provisions of the National Security Law (the collected decree-laws and legislation that delineate crimes against the state).

The handling of arrestees varies according to the nature of the crime or the nature of the charges. Felonies that are punishable by imprisonment and for which the arrestee must be detained require thorough investigation followed by trial in an appropriate court (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). Offenses punishable by ordinary confinement of 30 days or less, or by small fines, are usually disposed of quickly at the lowest court level possible. A judge may direct that a prisoner be held in custody pending a preliminary hearing, or he may allow bail depending on the severity of the case. Prisoners may also be released on writs of habeas corpus.

According to law, within 24 hours of arrest a prisoner must be given a copy of the complaint, signed by competent authority and containing not only the details of the charge or charges but also the names of accusers and witnesses. To comply with these provisions the police must immediately initiate an investigation, including a visit to the scene of the incident, the collection of available evidence, the interrogation of witnesses, and the compilation of a coherent account of what actually occurred. This information is presented as a police report to a judge, who then sets a date for a hearing.

The first step in the legal process is a hearing, popularly known as an instruction session, to identify the parties involved and to determine whether a punishable offense occurred. Except for misdemeanors, the instruction session is not a trial but rather a hearing at which both the prosecution and the defense are heard

in presentation, rebuttal, and final argument. If the offense is a misdemeanor, the judge is permitted to turn the proceeding into a summary court and pronounce sentence. If the case involves a felony, no judgment is possible at the instruction session. If the judge believes that there is evidence of probable guilt, the accused is indicted, and a trial date is set.

Crime

According to the *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1980*, there were 64,915 arrests for felonies and 16,243 for misdemeanors during 1978. Of the total number of felonies, 27,104, or almost 42 percent, were listed as crimes against the person, that is, murder, attempted murder, inflicting bodily injury, or other such crimes. Crimes against property—theft, robbery, and extortion, swindling and other frauds, and similar violations—accounted for 25,239 (almost 39 percent). Three categories of crimes against custom— rape, pandering, and similar acts—accounted for 2,961 (4.5 percent). Under crimes against the public welfare, there were 6,848 arrests for trafficking in or using illegal narcotics and 187 arrests listed under "others" of that general heading, amounting to almost 11 percent of the total arrests. There were 841 arrests (1.2 percent) for crimes against the public trust, including embezzlement, smuggling, and others. The remaining 1,735 arrests (about 2.6 percent) were simply listed under the heading "others". The 16,243 arrests on misdemeanor charges were categorized as illegal carrying of weapons, illegal gambling, vagrancy, and like offenses. Vagrancy, for which arrests numbered 6,516 for the year, was by far the leading misdemeanor. There were no statistics available concerning the disposition of the cases resulting from the arrests made in 1978.

It was impossible to describe accurately the incidence of crime and the penal situation in Brazil. The official data, for example, did not refer to arrests and trials for violations of the National Security Law, yet such occurrences were frequently reported in the media. Charges brought under the National Security Law were handled by military courts, a system that has been accused of flagrant violations of citizens' rights; however, the number of reported violations dropped markedly under the presidencies of Geisel and Figueiredo.

As for ordinary crime, Brazil, like other industrialized or industrializing countries in which large segments of the population continue to live in abject poverty, has had a serious and rising crime problem. Robert M. Levine, writing in the February 1982 issue of *Current History,* stated: "Random, often violent, street crime continued to plague not only the cities but the formerly placid towns and villages of the countryside. Stories of assaults and armed robberies monopolized conversations among the affluent, who demanded additional protection against the muggers and

trambadinhas (attackers, often children and adolescents) preying
on a rising number of victims." Crimes of violence also became
prevalent during the political campaigns leading up to the elec-
tions of November 1982. Threats against candidates, vandalism,
and the stoning of vehicles occurred, but more serious incidents
involved shootings, and some deaths were reported.

Penal Institutions

There were two general categories of penal institutions: correc-
tional and detention, that is, roughly, prisons and jails. The first
category included penitentiaries, houses of custody and treatment,
penal and agricultural colonies, and houses of correction. The
second category included military prisons, houses of detention,
and juvenile correctional institutions. Operation of the penal
system was a responsibility of the Military Police of the states. The
separate women's penal institutions were usually operated by
nuns. Prisoners in penitentiaries were assigned to work units in
maintenance shops and in light industrial plants that produced and
maintained the clothing and furnishings used in the institutions.
In some minimum security agricultural colonies, inmates had their
families live with them during their incarceration.

The official statistics for 1977 stated that there were 3,343
prison establishments: 234 for men, 23 for women, and 3,086 in
which both sexes were confined. The capacity of the penal system
was listed as 92,500, and the overall cost for maintenance of the
system for 1977 was given as Cr$672,882,000 (for value of the
cruzeiro—see Glossary). The total number of persons incarcerated
at the end of 1977 was 37,251, much below the stated capacity of
the system. The data were incomplete concerning the breakdown
of prisoners according to sex (as well as for various other
classifications), but it appeared that men outnumbered women in
prison by at least three to one, and perhaps a much higher ratio
actually existed.

Threats to Internal Security

The Brazilian military in 1964 described the takeover of the gov-
ernment as a "revolution" and proclaimed that the twin mainstays of
their revolutionary rule would be development and security. Although
the governments of the five military presidents who led the country
between 1964 and 1982 varied, particularly in their degree of
authoritarianism, all placed extreme emphasis on internal security
and, to some degree, suppressed political dissent. The so-called
distensão (decompression) and *abertura* (literally, opening; political
liberalization) initiated by Geisel and carried forward under Figueiredo
have brought the regime a long way from its most authoritarian era
under their predecessors; nevertheless, some adherents of the hard
line still held high-level positions and still believed that rigid authoritari-
anism was the only course for Brazil.

In a report prepared for the United States Department of State by the Rand Corporation in 1971, Luigi R. Einaudi and Stepan posed a series of questions about security and development under the military regimes of Brazil and Peru. They asked, for example, whether the major threat to national security came from outside the country or from within and, if from within, did underdevelopment constitute a threat. They also wondered what the role of the military should be in the institutional development of such countries and, in the case of Brazil, should the regime try to push the country toward military great-power status.

The Brazilian military obviously decided at the outset of their "revolution" that the internal threat greatly outweighed any danger from outside the borders. The armed forces and the police forces have been closely interwoven, particularly regarding command and control of the latter, and the principal mission of both has been maintenance of internal security. At times, critics have complained that such concerns have been grossly overemphasized, resulting in repression rather than security.

The blocking of the encroachment of communism was high on the agenda of the new military government in 1964 and, because of the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba and his pledge to spread the communist doctrine to all of Latin America, Brazil's leaders could justify their concern about the possibility of subversion. Countering the activities of foreign and indigenous agents of the communist movement became the most important objective of the armed forces and the police. Antiguerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency were included in the curricula of the service schools, particularly at the ESG, which had become the dominant academic influence on the country's leaders, both military and civilian. At the Army Command and General Staff School, according to Einaudi and Stepan, "the 1956 curriculum of the ECEME had included no lectures on counterguerrilla warfare, internal security, or communism," but by 1968 "222 hours on internal security and 129 hours on irregular warfare" had been added. Military personnel were also being sent to the School of the Americas in Panama, where the curriculum was heavily weighted with counterinsurgency and antiguerrilla courses.

Through four presidencies and part of a fifth, the military regime has followed the dual course of development and security, always seeking to balance the objectives, sometimes succeeding, sometimes failing. Castello Branco's time in office was a period of adjustment during which the military tried to adapt to its new posture, and the opposition tried to get the military to return to barracks. In general, the armed forces intervention of 1964 had been accepted, even condoned, by a rather large segment of the politically aware public, but after the restoration of order and the deposal of the "radical" Goulart, the military was expected to

withdraw. The indications by the "revolutionary" military government that it intended to stay in power indefinitely were much less well received than the initial intervention. The first purge of political opponents and military officers who opposed the military government alerted the public to the authoritarian nature of the new rulers. By 1965, in their zeal to ensure the security of the state, the security forces were ignoring the civil rights of the people, and reports of brutality and torture were becoming commonplace.

Costa e Silva seemed unable to translate his extensive military experience into presidential terms as his predecessor had done. When economic problems brought street demonstrations and the killing of a student by police resulted in riots, Costa e Silva and the CSN were convinced that the demonstrators and rioters wanted to overthrow the government. In December 1968 the president promulgated Institutional Act Number 5, proroguing the legislature and greatly increasing the powers of the executive. Despite the new hard-line rule (or possibly spurred on by it), opposition to the government, political unrest, and terrorism increased. The military hierarchy, convinced that the forces arrayed against the government (communists, leftists, students, clergy, workers, and large numbers of the poorest members of society) were an imminent threat to the security of the state, ignored the Constitution. When Costa e Silva suffered a stroke, the ministers of army, navy, and aeronautics refused to allow the civilian vice president to assume the office of president as provided in the Constitution and instead installed another general, Médici, in the presidency (see The Military in Power, ch. 1).

Médici certainly inherited a country in chaos or at least on the verge of chaos, but Institutional Act Number 5 had provided the president with tools to deal with the situation. Congress was suspended, the right of habeas corpus was set aside, the constitutional limitations on the federal government's right to intervene in state and municipal affairs were suspended, the death penalty was restored, censorship was introduced, and public demonstrations were banned. In the view of many Brazilians, the country had become a military dictatorship. As government repression increased, so too did crime and violence, ensuring an escalation of repression, thus perpetuating the cycle.

Médici's administration proved to be the nadir of military rule during the period from 1964 to 1982. The police and the armed forces (acting as police) were accused of brutality and torture, and the first death squad made its appearance in São Paulo, a phenomenon that would repeat itself many times in many parts of the country. The death squads were made up of off-duty policemen who appointed themselves (vigilante style) to assist the government by eliminating criminal or subversive elements. They acquired a reputation for viciousness, brutality, torture, and murder, and

their activities continued even after some policemen were brought to trial, convicted, and sentenced to long prison terms. The government move (under pressure) against the death squads did not discourage other right-wing groups from joining the battle against subversives. The Command for Hunting Communists and the Anticommunist Movement both sent vigilante groups into the fray, evidently in the mistaken belief that the official security forces were unequal to the task.

The Médici government has been criticized for the violence of its reaction against the terrorists; in effect, it has been criticized for the lawlessness of its officers of the law. However justified the criticism, the fact remains that there was a real threat to the national security. Random terrorist acts had turned into urban guerrilla warfare. Bank robberies to finance guerrilla operations, diplomatic kidnappings to force release of imprisoned guerrillas, and attacks on police and army barracks demanded and received government reaction. Whether or not the government overreacted remains controversial; nevertheless, in a relatively short time the security forces had killed, imprisoned, or exiled communist and other dissident leaders and had dispersed the guerrilla units. The problem that plagued the Médici, Geisel, and even the Figueiredo administrations has been the retention of harsh attitudes and brutal methods by the security forces. The level of police brutality in 1982, however, could not be compared to that which existed a decade earlier.

By the time that President Geisel took over in 1974, the militant opposition had been defeated. Geisel had the opportunity to lead the country toward the democratization that his military predecessors had verbally advocated but had been advocated but had been unable to approach actively. Geisel accepted the opportunity for the building of a less repressive regime by appointing an almost completely new cabinet, but faced with an economic downturn and the fact that many hard-line military and civilian personnel still held important positions, the new president was, of necessity, cautious in altering the rigid authoritarianism of the recent past. Reining in the security forces—police and military—was a priority item on his agenda, however. An embarrassment to the administration occurred in 1975 when a well-known journalist, Vladimir Herzog, was arrested and a short time later found dead in his cell at an army interrogation center—a suicide according to army authorities, another case of death by torture as far as the public was concerned. Geisel reprimanded the commanding general of the Second Army within whose jurisdiction the incident occurred, and a few months later he fired the general when another death occurred under similar circumstances. That a military president would fire a member of the Army High Command over a case of police brutality was an important example, not only to the security

Out-of-work youths demonstrate in Rio de Janeiro, April 1983.
Courtesy United Press International

Riot police block a street in Rio de Janeiro, April 1983.
Courtesy United Press International

331

forces but also to the public. Some years later a federal court ruled that Herzog's death had, in fact, been caused by the authorities, and his widow was entitled to collect damages.

Geisel's administration was not without turmoil—workers went out on strike in several cities, and students demonstrated against the government on several campuses. The president, however, did not see every strike and every demonstration as a move to overthrow his government, leading some right-wing critics to complain about his leniency; but in curbing the abuses of power, Geisel had not relinquished his power. Political opponents were repressed if the president and his associates decided that their rivals had overstepped the bounds of acceptable opposition, and the bounds were established by the administration. When a local politician predicted the downfall of the government "if not through its own rottenness, because of corruption," and another said that it was time to put an end to the "dictatorship," Geisel issued decrees abrogating their civil and political rights, thus denying them their seats in the state legislature. When a federal deputy complained about such high-handed treatment of political opponents, he was afforded the same treatment. Although Geisel was operating under a plan for democratization and the political climate had improved significantly during his administration, authoritarianism remained real, particularly in the face of a perceived threat.

Whatever his perceptions about the internal threat during his presidency, Geisel before leaving office abolished the despised Institutional Act Number 5, which he had used on different occasions to declare a state of exception, to override congressional actions, to relieve congressional deputies of their mandated offices, or to suspend the rights of ordinary citizens. Toward the end of his term, Geisel must have believed that his chosen successor would not need the exceptional powers given to the president by Institutional Act Number 5. Additional reforms approved at the same time included the abolition of the death penalty, life imprisonment, and banishment; the reinstatement of habeas corpus; and the further easing of censorship. The formation of new political parties was also to be made easier by the lifting of restrictions that had been in force.

President Figueiredo, taking office in March 1979, was faced with a strike by 160,000 metalworkers in the heavily industrialized cities of São Paulo state. For the new president the situation grew tense as security forces seized the metalworkers union headquarters and arrested several hundred workers. A cooling-off period of 45 days was arranged through negotiations, but this strike was only the beginning of labor troubles that would plague the administration. The progress toward *abertura*, however, was not suspended because of this "threat" to the regime; Figueiredo insisted that a greater threat was posed by the high rate of

inflation that was severely damaging the economy and hurting the people.

Figueiredo also declared that bombs would not derail *abertura*—after a sensational bombing incident received widespread publicity for about two months in early 1981 and reportedly raised tensions within the regime to crisis proportions. On April 30, 1981, a bomb exploded in the car being used by two security officers, killing one, an army sergeant, and severely wounding the other, an army captain. Both were agents of a high-level military security and intelligence agency. The car in which they were sitting when the bomb exploded was parked near the Rio de Janeiro Convention Center, where a May Day observance was in progress. Charges and countercharges from left-wing and right-wing groups filled the news media. Left-wing groups charged that the two agents had been attempting to plant bombs in the Convention Center in order to cause a panic among the leftists assembled there. A bomb did explode in the power plant of the center about 10 minutes after the car explosion. The left-wing groups charged that the bomb in the car exploded prematurely. Right-wing militants attributed the the automobile explosion to left-wing terrorists who attempted to assassinate both agents, intending to spread the story about their being blown up by one of their own bombs.

Some supporters of Figueiredo and some opponents expressed the opinion that the bombing was instigated by hard-line military elements opposed to *abertura.*Figueiredo ordered an investigation to be conducted by the First Army, within whose jurisdiction the incident occurred. The results were inconclusive, the army investigators asserting that they could not unravel the mystery. Some outspoken opposition deputies in Congress expressed the opinion that the army covered up the findings of the investigators in order to protect right-wing military factions.

Although the first three and one-half years of Figueiredo's six-year term presented a great many problems—economic, political, social—his government was not seriously threatened by internal subversion. Because of his program of *abertura,* there had been opposition from hard-line groups, but the dichotomy between the hard-liners and the more moderate factions had existed since 1964, and Figueiredo appeared to be in control of that situation. Some labor problems, industrial and agricultural, at times led to ugly incidents, but the security forces were quickly in control of those situations. The communists operated and organized openly but were factionalized and did not pose a threat either from underground or through political channels. By late 1982 there did not appear to be any major threat to internal security from subversive elements (see Elections under Military Rule, ch. 4).

*   *   *

Alfred Stepan's *The Military in Politics,* even though published in 1971, continues to be an excellent source not only on Brazilian military participation in politics but also on the military per se. His *Authoritarian Brazil* is also a reliable source. Several general studies on the politics or on the foreign policy of Brazil during the 1960s and 1970s naturally include significant information on the armed forces and national security in general; among these are Georges-André Fiechter's *Brazil since 1964,* Ronald M. Schneider's *The Political System of Brazil,* and Robert G. Wesson's *The United States and Brazil.* Of particular importance because of its historical perspective and the detail provided on the post-1964 military régime is Peter Flynn's *Brazil: A Political Analysis.* Two interesting articles by Eduardo Italo Pesce, "The Brazilian Mk-10 Frigates" and "The Brazilian Naval Modernization Program," appeared in the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* for March 1981 and March 1982, respectively. (For further information and complete citation, see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table 1.   Metric Conversion Coefficients

When you know	Multiply by	To Find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m^2)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9 divide by 5 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2.   Racial Composition by State and Territory, 1980

State or Territory	White	Mixed	Black	Yellow	Unstated	Total
Rio de Janeiro.........	63.1	26.6	9.9	0.1	0.3	100.0
São Paulo...............	75.1	17.8	4.7	2.3	0.1	100.0
Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul......	83.7	12.7	3.0	0.4	0.2	100.0
Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo......	56.9	34.6	8.2	0.1	0.2	100.0
Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, and Bahia...........	27.6	64.9	7.0	0.1	0.4	100.0
Federal District.......	51.5	44.5	3.3	0.4	0.3	100.0
Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará, Amapá, Mato Grosso, and Goiás.................	35.4	60.3	3.3	0.4	0.5	100.0*
BRAZIL	54.8	38.4	5.9	0.6	0.3	100.0

*Figures do not add to total because of rounding

Source: Based on information from Brazil, Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência da República, Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, *IX Recenseamento Geral do Brasil—1980*, 1, Pt. 1, Rio de Janeiro, 1981.

Table 3. Estimated Average Annual Rural and Urban Growth Rates
by Region, 1940-80
(in percentage)

Region	1940-50	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80
North				
Urban	4.3	6.5	7.0	5.1
Rural	2.0	2.7	2.3	2.5
Northeast				
Urban	4.0	5.8	5.6	4.6
Rural	2.0	1.1	1.2	1.2
Southeast.........................	4.8	6.3	6.6	4.9
Rural	0.6	1.1	−1.8	−3.4
South				
Urban	4.5	8.8	6.8	5.1
Rural	3.3	3.4	2.4	2.5
Center-West				
Urban	5.5	34.8	2.8	7.4
Rural	3.3	4.7	3.6	3.5
BRAZIL				
Urban	4.6	6.7	6.6	5.0
Rural	1.7	1.7	0.6	0.9

Source: Based on information from Brazil, Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência
da República, Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, *Anuário*
Estatístico do Brasil 1980, 41, Rio de Janeiro, 1980, 72-73, 77.

Table 4. Estimated Population by Metropolitan Center, 1980

Metropolitan Center	Population	Metropolitan Center	Population
Belém.......................	1,015,451	Recife.......................	2,399,117
Curitiba	1,471,811	Belo Horizonte	2,584,740
Fortaleza...................	1,615,517	Rio de Janeiro.............	9,153,516
Salvador....................	1,795,089	São Paulo...................	12,708,600
Pôrto Alegre...............	2,284,250		
		TOTAL...............	35,028,091

Source: Based on information from Brazil, Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência
da República, Fundação Institutio Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, *Anuário*
Estatístico do Brasil 1980, 41, Rio de Janeiro, 1980, 76.

Table 5. Summary of Federal Budget 1977-79
(in billions of Cruzeiros)[1]

	1977	1978	1979[2]
Revenues			
Income taxes, business and individual	82	108	188
Taxes on goods and services	138	201	282
Foreign trade revenues.........................	20	27	43
Other tax receipts...............................	3	5	14
Other revenues..................................	10	13	17
Total Revenues	253	354	544
Expenditures			
Current Expenditures			
Wages and salaries............................	30	45	68
Goods and services	19	19	44
Payment of interest...........................	4	5	10
Total Current Expenditures	54[3]	69	122
Transfers of Earmarked Taxes			
Special funds and autonomous agencies..	49	72	88
State and local governments................	41	63	97
Public enterprises.............................	10	14	15
Other	9	14	12
Total Transfers of Earmarked Taxes....	109	163	212
Subsidies and Other Transfers			
Welfare..	19	28	47
Social security................................	4	5	8
Other	6	33	71
Total Subsidies and Other Transfers...	29	66	126
Capital Expenditures...........................	53	49	44
Total Expenditures	245	347	504
SURPLUS	8	7	40

[1]For value of the cruzeiro—see Glossary.
[2]Preliminary.
[3]As published.

Table 6. Labor Force by Sector, Selected Years, 1950-78
(in thousands)

Sector	1950*	1960*	1970*	1978
Agriculture	10,253	12,277	13,088	15,127
Industry	1,843	2,232	3,705	7,640
Construction	585	281	3,194	
Commerce.......................	958	1,487	2,263	4,295
Personal services	1,673	2,746	3,627	7,665
Transportation and				
communications	689	1,047	1,227	1,669
Social services...................	398	690	1,406	2,858
Public administration..........	512	713	1,151	1,489
Other services	206	777	1,370	1,055
TOTAL.....................	17,117	22,750	29,557	44,992

*Based on census data.

Source: Based on information from Brazil, Secretaria de Planejamento de Presidência da República, Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1980*, 41, Rio de Janeiro, 1980, 120.

Table 7. *Production of Selected Minerals, 1976-79*

Mineral	Unit	1976	1977	1978	1979
Metallic Minerals					
Bauxite.........................	thousands of tons	988	1,352	1,401	2,884
Lead ore......................	—do—	283	266	274	329
Copper ore...................	tons	571	621	647	687
Chromium ore	thousands of tons	887	683	958	891
Tin ore........................	—do—	8	9	11	12
Iron ore.......................	millions of tons	107	100	104	118
Manganese ore..............	—do—	3	3	3	3
Nickel ore....................	thousands of tons	422	339	286	247
Gold...........................	tons	5	5	9	22
Silver.........................	—do—	1	12	16	1
Zinc...........................	thousands of tons	285	458	498	545
Nonmetallic Minerals					
Limestone....................	millions of tons	35	39	46	45
Kaolin........................	thousands of tons	710	940	1,595	1,343
Dolomite	—do—	1,599	1,663	1,092	1,712
Feldspar......................	—do—	85	100	99	370
Gypsum	—do—	545	543	475	465
Graphite......................	—do—	31	54	48	136
Magnesite....................	—do—	415	481	410	590
Talc...........................	—do—	151	190	195	297
Coal	—do—	7,876	10,045	11,816	13,943

Source: Based on information from Brazil, Secretaria de Planejamento de Presidência da República, Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1980*, 41, Rio de Janeiro, 1980, 120.

Table 8. Production of Selected Industrial Products, 1978-80

Industrial Product	Unit	1978	1979	1980
Electrical power	billions of kilowatt-hours	113	126	137
Coke	thousands of tons	3,487	3,930	4,079
Pig iron	—do—	10,043	11,594	12,685
Steel	—do—	12,107	13,893	15,337
Cement	millions of tons	23	25	27
Automobiles	thousands	535	548	600
Other vehicles	—do—	527	580	565
Tractors	—do—	56	64	70
Tires	—do—	20	22	24
Sugar	thousands of tons	7,913	7,362	8,200
Synthetic rubber	—do—	206	224	249
Newsprint	—do—	134	109	109
Paper and paperboard products	—do—	2,534	2,870	3,360
Airplanes	each	221	279	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

Table 9.   Landholding by Region, 1975
(in percentage)

Region	Under 10 Hectares		10 to 100 Hectares		100 to 1,000 Hectares		1,000 to 10,000 Hectares		Over 10,000 Hectares	
	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area
North...............	44.7	1.8	40.0	14.7	14.5	28.9	0.7	21.8	0.1	32.8
Northeast..........	70.0	5.4	24.0	22.8	5.6	41.6	0.4	23.3	---	6.9
Southeast..........	31.8	1.9	52.2	22.6	15.0	47.1	1.0	24.8	---	3.6
South.............	40.0	5.2	54.5	36.0	5.1	33.8	0.4	22.8	---	2.2
Center-West.......	26.6	0.4	39.4	4.6	28.1	25.8	5.5	40.0	0.4	29.2
BRAZIL	52.3	2.8	37.9	18.6	8.9	35.9	0.9	28.3	---	14.4

--- means less than 0.1 percent.

Table 10. *Landholdings, Selected Years, 1920-75*
(in percentage)

Size (in hectares)	1920		1940		1950		1960		1970		1975	
	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area
Under 10............	71.6	9.0	34.4	1.7	34.4	2.3	44.8	2.4	51.2	3.1	52.2	2.8
10 to 20			16.6	2.3	16.7	2.1	16.4	3.1	15.7	3.7	14.8	3.2
20 to 50			23.9	7.2	23.7	6.5	20.2	8.3	16.8	8.6	16.3	7.8
50 to 100...........			10.8	7.2	10.6	6.6	8.2	7.6	6.9	8.1	6.9	7.6
100 to 1,000........	24.4	27.6	12.8	33.5	13.0	32.5	9.4	34.4	8.5	37.0	8.9	35.8
1,000 to 10,000.....	3.8	37.4	1.4	31.4	1.5	30.7	0.9	28.6	0.8	27.2	0.9	27.7
Over 10,000.........	0.2	26.0	0.1	17.0	0.1	19.3	0.1	15.6	0.1	12.3	---	15.1
TOTAL.........	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

--- means less than 0.1 percent.

Table 11.   *Average Size of Landholding, Selected Years, 1920-75*
(in hectares)

Size	1920	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975
Under 10	⎫	4.4	4.2	4.0	3.6	3.5
10 to 20	⎪ 34 ⎧	14	15	14	14	14
20 to 50	⎪ ⎨	31	31	31	31	31
50 to 100	⎭ ⎩	70	70	70	70	70
100 to 1,000............	307	271	282	273	262	260
1,000 to 10,000........	2,657	2,337	2,357	2,313	2,260	2,267
Over 10,000	27,274	26,320	27,938	24,354	24,976	26,897
AVERAGE..............	270	104	112	75	60	65

Table 12.   *Landholdings by Form of Tenancy, by Region, 1975*
(in percentage)

Region	Owners		Renters		Sharecroppers		Squatters	
	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area
North	36.6	58.8	6.0	5.7	1.3	1.0	56.1	34.5
Northeast	53.8	90.9	17.2	2.3	4.4	1.0	24.6	5.8
Southeast..........	80.6	92.7	6.5	3.6	6.2	1.1	6.7	2.6
South..............	71.5	87.1	7.6	6.0	11.9	3.5	9.0	3.4
Center-West	61.4	89.2	11.8	2.3	4.8	0.5	22.0	8.0
BRAZIL...........	61.8	87.4	12.1	3.4	6.3	1.2	19.8	8.0

Table 13.   *Land Distribution by Tenancy, 1975*
(in percentage)

Size (in hectares)	Owners		Renters		Sharecroppers		Squatters	
	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area	Holdings	Area
Under 1 hectare..........	3.6	---	26.3	0.9	7.4	0.4	17.3	0.4
1 to 5................	18.6	0.6	47.4	5.8	44.7	9.9	46.4	4.3
5 to 10	13.8	1.1	10.2	3.9	24.7	13.9	12.4	3.2
10 to 20............	18.4	2.8	6.0	4.5	14.5	15.3	8.3	4.3
20 to 50............	22.2	7.6	4.3	7.3	6.3	14.2	7.8	8.9
50 to 100	9.9	7.5	2.1	8.0	1.3	6.7	3.2	8.5
100 to 1,000	12.3	35.7	3.5	41.8	1.0	19.4	4.3	39.2
1,000 to 10,000 ..	1.2	29.5	0.2	20.0	0.1	13.2	0.3	21.3
Over 10,000	---	15.2	---	7.8	---	7.0	---	9.9
TOTAL...	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

--- means less than 0.1 percent.

Table 14.   Area Harvested, Production, and Average Yields of Selected Crops, 1978, 1980, and 1981
(area in thousands of hectares; production in thousands of tons; yield in tons per hectare)

Crop	1978			1980			1981		
	Area	Production	Yield	Area	Production	Yield	Area	Production	Yield
Bananas	341	4,375	12.8	376	4,900	13.0	385	4,800	12.5
Beans, dry	4,593	2,390	0.5	4,785	1,969	0.4	4,800	2,339	0.5
Castor beans	350	410	1.2	440	320	0.7	486	300	0.6
Cacao beans	542	310	0.6	640	357	0.6	640	334	0.5
Coffee	2,867	1,200	0.4	3,020	1,290	0.4	3,145	1,950	0.6
Manioc	2,240	26,880	12.0	2,000	23,400	11.7	2,100	25,000	11.9
Oranges	457	7,854	17.2	562	8,977	16.0	656	8,898	13.6
Peanuts, in shell	253	350	1.4	320	545	1.7	235	310	1.3
Potatoes	210	2,015	9.6	180	1,947	10.8	200	1,907	9.5
Rice, paddy	5,200	7,481	1.4	6,469	9,638	1.5	6,638	9,119	1.4
Sisal	251	175	0.7	308	200	0.6	310	203	0.7
Sorghum	105	228	2.2	74	182	2.5	100	251	2.5
Soybeans	7,600	10,200	1.3	8,755	15,140	1.7	8,699	15,525	1.8
Sugarcane	1,680	8,863	5.3	1,489	6,968	4.7	1,680	8,100	4.8
Tobacco	256	329	1.3	250	350	1.4	239	315	1.3
Wheat	2,974	2,691	1.0	3,062	2,676	0.9	2,180	2,100	1.0
Corn	10,700	13,900	1.3	11,621	20,214	1.7	12,810	22,555	1.8
Cotton	1,965	483	0.2	1,980	577	0.3	2,000	596	0.3

Table 15.   *Livestock, Selected Years, 1920-80*
(in thousands)

Year	Cattle	Sheep	Swine	Goats	Poultry
1920	31,987	7,013	14,397	4,160	49,766
1940	34,392	9,285	16,839	6,520	59,274
1950	44,600	13,066	22,971	6,958	73,920
1960	56,041	14,276	25,580	7,820	132,275
1970	78,562	17,643	31,524	5,709	213,198
1980	91,000	18,000	36,500	8,000	394,924*

*1979

Table 16. Livestock by Region, 1979
(value in billions of cruzeiros)[1]

	North		Northeast		Southeast		South		Center-West	
	Thousands	Value	Thousands	Value	Thousands	Value	Thousands	Value	Thousands	Value
Cattle	2,800	22.4	20,513	175.3	35,115	311.1	21,160	202.0	29,590	231.3
Draft Animals[2]	424	4.5	3,505	12.5	2,020	13.1	1,340	8.3	1,034	5.1
Swine	1,456	1.6	19,546	10.4	6,861	12.3	13,245	3.1	3,587	3.7
Sheep	89	0.1	6,117	4.1	266	0.2	11,146	9.8	187	0.1
Goats	55	0.03	7,429	4.1	203	0.1	293	0.2	91	0.04
Poultry...............	17,810	1.5	78,259	6.1	160,934	8.2	118,795	5.6	19,125	1.3

[1]For value of the cruzeiro—see Glossary.
[2]Horses, donkeys, mules, and buffalo.

349

Table 17. *Animal Products Production, 1975-82*
(in thousands of tons)

Year	Beef and Veal	Pork	Mutton, Lamb, and Goat Meat	Poultry	Milk	Wool, Greasy Basis	Eggs (in millions)
1975	2,150	760	56	534	8,849	32	6.0
1976	2,230	784	52	604	9,296	31	6.1
1977	2,400	834	51	691	9,539	27	6.3
1978	2,200	850	44	858	10,800	26	6.6
1979	2,100	900	48	1,096	10,100	31	7.2
1980	2,150	1,000	45	1,326	10,265	28	9.6
1981	2,250	980	44	1,491	10,500	30	10.2
1982*	2,500	970	44	1,591	10,700	n.a.	10.2

n.a.--not available.
*Projected.

Table 18. *Exports of Wood Products, Selected Years, 1975-80*
(quantity in thousands of tons;
value in thousands of United States dollars)

	Wood		Processed Wood Products		Total	
	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value
1975	413,474	135,326	279,110	100,120	692,584	235,446
1977	468,860	161,209	289,732	94,358	758,592	255,567
1979	654,521	275,328	923,460	352,469	1,577,981	627,797
1980	750,073	337,673	1,293,694	608,416	2,043,767	946,089

Table 19. Fish Production by Region, 1979
(quantity in tons; value in thousands of cruzeiros)*

Region	Quantity	Value
North	88,929	1,685
Northeast	166,035	5,774
Southeast.........................	280,966	3,659
South.............................	317,501	4,137
Center-West	4,752	99
TOTAL	858,183	15,354

*For value of the cruzeiro—see Glossary.

Table 20. Fish Production by Variety, 1979
(quantity in thousands of tons; value in millions of cruzeiros)*

Variety	Saltwater		Freshwater	
	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value
Fish	543	7,004	117	2,427
Crustaceans......................	98	4,864	7	201
Mollusks...........................	3	78	---	---
Cetaceans	3	26	---	---
Other	85	716	2	37
TOTAL	732	12,688	126	1,665

---means not applicable.
*For value of the cruzeiro—see Glossary.

Table 21. Agricultural Output and Credit, 1969-79
(1969 = 100)

Year	Net Agricultural Output	Total Credit	Ratio of Credit to Output
1969......................	100	100	0.45
1970......................	100	119	0.54
1971......................	116	137	0.54
1972......................	126	170	0.61
1973......................	159	241	0.69
1974......................	183	298	0.74
1975......................	191	434	1.02
1976......................	213	445	0.95
1977......................	256	397	0.70
1978......................	250	404	0.73
1979......................	268	503	0.85

Table 22. Exports of Selected Agricultural Commodities, 1975-81
(quantity in millions of tons; value in billions of United States dollars)

Year	Tropical Products		Oilseed Products		Tobacco and Cotton		Animal Products		Horticultural Products		Grains and Grain Products	
	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value
1975	3.45	2.56	6.35	1.43	0.25	0.36	0.12	0.22	0.42	0.17	1.10	0.16
1976	2.99	3.27	8.06	1.95	0.15	0.29	0.15	0.34	0.35	0.17	1.39	0.19
1977	4.07	4.10	7.93	2.32	0.19	0.42	0.18	0.38	0.36	0.26	1.76	0.23
1978	3.50	3.71	6.27	1.72	0.21	0.48	0.17	0.37	0.53	0.49	0.31	0.01
1979	3.32	3.90	6.15	1.91	0.19	0.55	0.18	0.49	0.56	0.49	0.17	---[1]
1980	4.29	5.12	8.49	2.45	0.20	0.59	0.27	0.68	0.60	0.51	0.05	0.01
1982[2]	4.29	3.78	11.06	3.41	0.23	0.67	0.47	1.00	0.88	0.84	0.05	0.02

[1] Less than US$.01 billion.
[2] Estimated.

Table 23. **Summary of Imports by Commodity Group, 1977-80**
(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity Group	1977	1978	1979	1980[1]
Consumer Goods				
Cereals	280	702	984	1,239
Foods and oils...............	420	494	815	n.a.
Other	511	622	767	1,316
Total Consumer Goods .	1,211	1,818	2,566	2,555
Crude Oil and Products	4,081	4,483	6,773	10,210
Intermediate Goods				
Fertilizers.....................	301	309	422	620
Iron and steel products	579	476	482	584
Copper and products.......	263	218	369	489
Aluminum and products...	141	121	163	162
Other metals	101	96	134	n.a.
Chemicals.....................	893	1,026	1,385	n.a.
Plastics.........................	176	202	254	454
Rubber	111	139	172	n.a.
Paper...........................	138	135	166	248
Other	926	1,107	1,423	3,247
Total Intermediate Goods...................	3,629	3,829	4,970	5,804
Capital Goods				
Machinery and equipment.................	2,569	2,893	3,310	3,514
Transportation materials...	533	660	464	878
TOTAL (f.o.b)[2]	12,023	13,683	18,083	22,961

n.a.--not available.
[1] Preliminary.
[2] Freight on board.

Table 24. Summary of Major Exports, Selected Years, 1972-79
(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity	1972	1977	1978	1979
Coffee beans.....................	989	2,288	1,935	1,918
Soluble coffee	68	326	349	409
Soybean meal	128	710	170	179
Soy meal	152	1,150	1,050	1,138
Soybean oil	0	274	283	327
Sugar..............................	404	463	350	364
Cotton	189	40	53	1
Cacao	59	435	454	486
Corn...............................	10	136	2	2
Wool	16	53	60	59
Tobacco...........................	47	186	239	284
Other agricultural products.	470	720	723	861
Iron ore...........................	232	907	1,029	1,288
Manganese ore..................	27	32	49	59
Other minerals..................	15	24	17	32
Semiprocessed materials	310	714	1,105	1,538
Transport equipment..........	69	492	828	1,094
Machinery (including boilers)	55	427	566	711
Steel manufactures.............	52	101	214	446
Shoes.............................	55	175	281	351
Electrical equipment..........	39	281	315	344
Orange juice.....................	42	177	333	282
Cotton thread	23	120	117	155
Office equipment...............	31	113	127	154
Processed meat	51	119	98	127
Cotton textiles	26	69	67	110
Other manufactured products	387	1,309	1,667	2,369
Other exports	45	279	178	156
TOTAL (f.o.b.)*	3,991	12,120	12,659	15,244

*Freight on board.

Table 25. Summary of Balance of Payments, 1977-80
(in millions of United States dollars)

	1977	1978	1979	1980[1]
Exports (f.o.b.)[2]	12,120	12,659	15,244	20,132
Imports (f.o.b.)	−12,023	−13,683	−18,084	−22,961
Trade Balance..........	97	−1,024	−2,840	−2,829
Interest Payments (net).......	−2,462	−3,344	−5,347	−7,150
Other Service Payments				
(net)	−1,672	−1,647	−1,834	−2,200
Balance on Current				
Account..............	−4,037	−6,015	−10,021	−12,179
Direct Foreign Investment				
(net)	810	1,071	1,491	1,202
Brazilian Loans to				
Foreigners	−267	−357	−610	568
Medium- and Long-term				
Loans (net)...................	940	988	759	1,011
Financial Credits (net)	3,690	7,857	4,606	4,440
Other Capital Movements[3]..	−506	718	560	1,459
Balance on Capital				
Account..................	4,667	10,277	6,806	8,680
Change in Reserves[4]	−630	−4,262	3,215	3,499

[1]Preliminary.
[2]Freight on board.
[3]Includes errors and omissions.
[4]A negative sign indicates an increase in currency reserves.

Bibliography

Chapter 1

Alexander, Robert J. "Brazilian Tenentismo." Pages 119–24 in Richard Graham (ed.), *A Century of Brazilian History since 1865.* New York: Knopf, 1969.

Alves, Marcio Moreira. *A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1973.

Arino de Melo Franco, Afonso. "Getúlio Vargas." Pages 141–49 in Richard Graham (ed.), *A Century of Brazilian History since 1865.* New York: Knopf, 1969.

Arruda, Marcos, Herbet de Souza, and Carlos Afonso. *Multinational Corporations and Brazil.* Toronto: Latin American Research Unit, 1975.

Bandeira, Luís Alberto Moníz. "O Golpe Militar de 1964 e a Espoliação do Brasil." (Research paper.) Rio de Janeiro: n.d.

———. *O Governo João Goulart: as Lutas Sociais no Brasil, 1961–1964.* (4th ed.) Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1978.

———. *A Renuncia de Jânio Quadros.* (2d ed.) Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Brasiliense, 1979.

Bandeira, Samuel. *Brief History of Brazilian Literature.* Washington: Pan American Union, 1958.

Bernstein, Harry. "Brazil: History and Government." Pages 468–75 in *Encyclopedia Americana*, 34. New York: Encyclopedia Americana, 1969.

Black, Jan Knippers. *United States Penetration of Brazil.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977.

Boxer, Charles R. *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.

———. *The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695–1750: Growing Pains of a Colonial Society.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.

Brown, Peter G., and Douglas MacLean (eds.). *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Principles and Applications.* Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1979.

Burns, E. Bradford. *A Documentary History of Brazil.* New York: Knopf, 1966.

———. *A History of Brazil.* (2d ed.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

———. *Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey.* New York: Praeger, 1968.

Burns, E. Bradford, and Colin MacLacklin. "History: Brazil." Pages 369–92 in Donald E. J. Stewart (ed.), *Handbook of Latin American Studies,* 34. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972.

Busey, James L. *Latin America: Political Institutions and Processes.*

New York: Random House, 1964.

Calogeras, João Pandia. "The Paraguayan War as Seen by a Brazilian." Pages 76–81 in Richard Graham (ed.), *A Century of Brazilian History since 1865*. New York: Knopf, 1969.

Campos, Robert. *Ensaios de Historia Economica e Sociologia*. Rio de Janeiro: APEC, 1963.

Carrazoni, André "The Achievements of Getúlio Vargas." Pages 137–40 in Richard Graham (ed.), *A Century of Brazilian History since 1865*. New York: Knopf, 1969.

Castedo, Leopoldo. *A History of Latin American Art and Architecture from Pre-Columbian Times to the Present*. (Trans., ed., Phyllis Treeman.) New York: Praeger, 1969.

Cehelsky, Marta. *Land Reform in Brazil: The Management of Social Change*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Chacon, Vamireh. *Estado e Povo no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1977.

Chagos, Carlos. "Impedimento e Morte de Costa e Silva," *O Estado de São Paulo* [São Paulo], January 7–February 7, 1970.

Chilcote, Ronald H. *The Brazilian Communist Party: Conflict and Integration, 1922–1972*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Chilcote, Ronald H. (ed.). *Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil: Comparative Studies*. (Published under the auspices of the African Studies Center and the Latin American Studies Center.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972.

D'Adesky, Serge. "Brazil's Rise to Dominance in Latin America," *Fletcher Forum*, 3, Summer 1979, 46–65.

Davis, Harold Eugene. *History of Latin America*. New York: Ronald Press, 1968.

——— . *Latin American Social Thought*. Washington: University Press of America, 1961.

——— . *Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.

Dreifuss, René Armand. *1964: A Conquista do Estado: Ação Politica, Poder e Golpe de Classe*. Petrópolis Brazil: Editôra Vozes, 1981.

Dulles, John W. F. *Castelo Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1978.

——— . *Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955–1964*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969.

Erickson, Kenneth Paul. "Brazil: Corporatism in Theory and Practice." Pages 144–81 in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (eds.), *Latin American Politics and Development*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979.

——— . *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-Class Politics*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.

Fialho, Anfriso. "The Emperor Pedro II: A Favorable View" and

"The Emperor Pedro II: An Unfavorable View." Pages 19–44 in Richard Graham (ed.), *A Century of Brazilian History since 1865*. New York: Knopf, 1969.

Fishlow, Albert. "Brazil's Economic Miracle," *World Today* [London], 29, No. 11, November 1973, 474–81.

Fitzgibbon, Russell, and Julio Fernandez. *Latin America: Political Culture and Development*. (2d ed.) Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971.

Flynn, Peter. *Brazil: A Political Analysis*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Fontaine, Roger W. *Brazil and the United States: Toward a Maturing Relationship*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975.

Freyre, Gilberto. *The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization*. (Trans., Samuel Putnam.) New York: Knopf, 1966.

———. *New World in the Tropics: The Culture of Modern Brazil*. New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1963.

———. *Order and Progress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic*. (Ed., trans., Rod W. Horton.) New York: Knopf, 1970.

Furtado, Celso. *The Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey from Colonial to Modern Times*. (Trans., Ricardo W. de Aguiar and Eric Charles Drysdale.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971.

Goes, Walder de. *O governo do General Geisel*. Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Nova Fronteira, 1978.

Graham, Richard. "Brazil: The National Period." Pages 51–72 in Roberto Esquenazi-Mayo and Michael C. Meyer (eds.), *Latin American Scholarship since World War II: Trends in History, Political Science, Literature, Geography, and Economics*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971.

———. *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850–1914*. (Latin American Studies, No. 4.) London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Graham, Richard (ed.). *A Century of Brazilian History since 1865*. New York: Knopf, 1969.

Grupo de Trabalho GTELB. *Brasil*. Brasília: Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, 1979.

Hewlett, Sylvia Ann. *The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth-Century Brazil*. New York: Basic Books, 1980.

Horowitz, Irving Louis. *Revolution in Brazil: Politics and Society in a Developing Nation*. New York: Dutton, 1964.

Kantor, Harry. *Patterns of Politics and Political Systems in Latin America*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.

Keith, Henry H., and Robert A. Hayes (eds.). *Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil*. Tempe: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, 1976.

Langguth, A.J. *Hidden Terrors*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Lipset, Seymour M. "Values, Education, and Entrepreneurship." Pages 3–59 in Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Lopez, Juarez. *Desenvolvimento e Mundança Social*. São Paulo: Editôra Nacional, 1968.

McCann, Frank D., Jr. *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Marshall, Andrew. *Brazil*. New York: Walker, 1966.

Mendes, Candido. *Beyond Populism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977.

Needler, Martin. *An Introduction to Latin American Politics*. (2d ed.) Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983.

Normano, J.F. "Viscount Mauá as Seen by an Admirer." Pages 44–48 in Richard Graham (ed.), *A Century of Brazilian History since 1865*. New York: Knopf, 1969.

Parker, Phyllis R. *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979.

Perry, William. *Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of an Emerging Power*. (Foreign Policy Papers series, 2, No. 6.) Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976.

Peterson, Phyllis. "Brazil: Revolution or Reaction?" Pages 516–76 in Martin C. Needler (ed.), *Political Systems of Latin America*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1964.

Poppino, Rollie E. "Brazil after a Decade of Revolution," *Current History*, 66, No. 389, January 1974, 1–5.

––––––––. *Brazil: The Land and People*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Raine, Philip. *Brazil: Awakening Giant*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1974.

––––––––. "The Catholic Church in Brazil," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, No. 2, April 1971, 279–95.

Ratinoff, Luis. "The New Urban Groups: The Middle Classes." Pages 61–93 in Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Robock, Stefan H. *Brazil: A Study in Development Progress*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1975.

Rodrigues, José Honorio. *Brazil and Africa*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965.

––––––––. *The Brazilians: Their Character and Aspirations*. (Trans., Ralph E. Dimmick.) Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967.

Roett, Riordan. *Brazil in the Sixties*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972.

––––––––. *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972.

––––––––. *The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972.

Roett, Riordan (ed.). *Brazil in the Seventies.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976.

Rosenbaum, H. Jon, and William G. Tyler (eds.). *Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development.* New York: Praeger, 1972.

Sanders, Thomas G. "Catholicism and Development: The Catholic Left in Brazil." Pages 81–101 in Kalman H. Silvert (ed.), *Churches and States: The Religious Institution and Modernization.* New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1967.

Schmitter, Philippe C. "The Portugalization of Brazil?" Chapter 6 in Alfred Stepan (ed.), *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Schneider, Ronald M. *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Silva, Francisco de Assis, and Pedro Iro de Assis Bastos. *Historia do Brasil.* São Paulo: Editôra Moderna, 1982.

Skidmore, Thomas E. *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Smith, T. Lynn. *Brazil: People and Institutions.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963.

―――― . "The Race Between Population and Food Supply in One-Half of a Continent: The Case of Brazil," *International Review of Modern Sociology* [New Delhi], 2, No. 1, March 1972, 1–10.

Smith, T. Lynn, and Alexander Marchant (eds.). *Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent.* New York: Dryden Press, 1951.

Soares, Glancio. *Sociedade e Politica no Brasil.* São Paulo: Difusão Europeia do Livro, 1973.

Stead, W. T. "The Eagle of the Hague." Pages 97–104 in Richard Graham (ed.), *A Century of Brazilian History since 1865.* New York: Knopf, 1969.

Stepan, Alfred. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Stepan, Alfred (ed.). *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Sternberg, Hilgard O'Reilly. "Brazil: Complex Giant," *Foreign Affairs,* 43, No. 2, January 1965, 297–311.

Wagley, Charles. *An Introduction to Brazil.* (rev. ed.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Walker, Thomas W. "From Coronelismo to Populism: The Evolution of Politics in a Brazilian Municipality." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Albuquerque: Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico, 1974.

Walters, Vernon A. *Silent Missions.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1978.

Warren, Harris G. "The Paraguayan Image of the War of the Triple Alliance." Pages 81–89 in Richard Graham (ed.), *A*

Century of Brazilian History since 1865. New York: Knopf, 1969.

Wesson, Robert. *The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence.* New York: Praeger, 1981.

Worcester, Donald E. *Brazil: From Colony to World Power.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.

Worcester, Donald E., and Wendell G. Schaeffer. *The Growth and Culture of Latin America.* (2d ed.) New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Chapter 2

Aguiar, Neuma (ed.). *The Structure of Brazilian Development.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1979.

Ahluwalia, Montek S., et al. "Who Benefits from Economic Development? Comment," *American Economic Review*, 10, No. 1, March 1980, 242–62.

Alves, Marcio Moreira. *A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1973.

Amado, Jorge. *The Violent Land.* (Trans., Samuel Putnam.) New York: Knopf, 1965.

American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil-São Paulo. *Education in Brazil: A Key Factor for Development.* São Paulo: 1977.

Andrade, Manuel de Correia. *The Land and People of Northeast Brazil.* (Trans., Dennis V. Johnson.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1980.

Antoine, Charles. *Church and Power in Brazil.* (Trans., Peter Nelson.) Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1973.

Azevedo, Fernando de. *Brazilian Culture: An Introduction to the Study of Culture in Brazil.* (Trans., William Rex Crawford.) New York: Hafner, 1971.

Azevedo, Sérgio de, and Luis Aureliano Gama de Andrade. *Habitação e Poder.* Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982.

Bacha, Edmar L. "Issues and Evidence on Recent Brazilian Economic Growth," *World Development* [London], 5, Nos. 1 and 2, 1977, 47–67.

Baer, Werner. *Industrialization and Economic Development in Brazil.* Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1965.

Bastide, Roger. *The African Religions of Brazil: Toward a Sociology of the Interpenetration of Civilizations.* (Trans., Helen Sebba.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Black, Jan Knippers. "The Military and Political Decompression in Brazil," *Armed Forces and Society*, 6, No. 4, Summer 1980, 625–37.

Borba Neves, Mozart. "Uma Experiência com o bóia-fria," *Ensaios de Opinião* [Rio de Janeiro], 11, 1979, 63–68.

Boxer, Charles R. *The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695–1750: Growing Pains of a Colonial Society.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.

Brazil. Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência da República. Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1980*, 41. Rio de Janeiro: 1980.

————. *IX Recenseamento Geral do Brasil—1980* 1, Pt. 1. Rio de Janeiro: 1981.

————. *IX Recenseamento Geral do Brasil—1980* 1, Pt. 2. Rio de Janeiro: 1981.

Bruneau, Thomas C. *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Bruneau, Thomas C., and Philippe Faucher (eds.). *Authoritarian Capitalism: Brazil's Contemporary Economic and Political Development.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

Bunker, Stephen G. "Forces of Destruction in Amazonia," *Environment*, 22, No. 7, September 1980, 14–43.

Burns, E. Bradford. *A History of Brazil.* (2d ed.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Burton, Richard F. *Explorations of the Highlands of the Brazil; with a Full Account of the Gold and Diamond Mines.* 2 vols. New York: Greenwood Press, 1969 (reprint.).

Cardoso de Oliveira, Robert. "Indigenous Peoples and Sociocultural Change in the Amazon." Pages 111–35 in Charles Wagley (ed.), *Man in the Amazon.* Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1974.

Carvalho, José Alberto M. de, and Charles H. Wood. "Mortality, Income Distribution, and Rural-Urban Residence in Brazil," *Population and Development Review*, 4, No. 3, 1978, 405–20.

Castro, Josué de. *Death in the Northeast.* New York: Random House, 1966.

Cava, Ralph Della. "Catholicism and Society in Twentieth-Century Brazil," *Latin American Research Review*, 11, No. 2, 1976, 7–50.

————. *Miracle at Joaseiro.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.

Cehelsky, Marta. *Land Reform in Brazil: The Management of Social Change.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

César, Waldo A. "Urbanização e Religiosidade Popular," *Vozes* [Petrópolis, Brazil], 68, September 1974, 19–28.

Chiarelli, Carlos Alberto G. "Social Security for Rural Workers in Brazil," *International Labour Review* [Geneva], 113, No. 2, March–April 1976, 159–69.

Coles, Robert. "Children of a Brazilian Favela," *Harvard Educational Review*, 51, No. 1, February 1981, 79–84.

Conniff, Michael L. *Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925–1945.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981.

Conrad, Robert. *Brazilian Slavery: An Annotated Research*

Bibliography. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1977.

_____ . *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850–1888*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972.

Costa, Manoel Augusto. *Urbanização e migração urbana no Brasil*. (Monograph series, No. 21.) Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Planejamento Economico e Social, Instituto de Pesquisas, 1975.

Costa Gomes, Cândido Alberto da. "Educação Vocacional e Mobilidade Social: O Caso do Brasil," *La Educación: Revista Interamericana de Desarrollo Educativo*, 26, No. 89, 1982, 29–45.

Cupertino, Fausto. *Classes e Camadas Sociais no Brasil*. (Realidade Brasileira series, No. 8.) Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1978.

_____ . *A Concentração da Renda no Brasil (O bolo está mal divido)*. (Realidade Brasileira series, No. 1.) Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1976.

Daland, Robert T. *Exploring Brazilian Bureaucracy: Performance and Pathology*. Washington: University Press of America, 1981.

Davis, Shelton, and Robert O. Matthews. "The Geological Imperative: Anthropology and Development in the Amazon Basin of South America." (Report of the Anthropology Resource Center.) Boston: November 1976.

Dean, Warren. *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880–1945*. Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas Press, 1969.

_____ . *Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820–1920*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.

Degler, Carl N. *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States*. New York: Macmillan, 1971.

Denevan, William M. *The Native Population of the Americas in 1492*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976.

Dickenson, John P. *Brazil*. Kent, England: William Dawson and Sons, 1978.

Diegues, Manuel Júnior, *Etnias e Culturas no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Paralelo, 1972.

Diehl, Jackson. "Rio's Rejected Children Learn to Read in Slum's Makeshift School," *Washington Post*, September 13, 1982, A17.

Dillon Soares, Glaucio Ary. "Despúes del milagro," *Revista Mexicana de Sociologia* [Mexico City], 41, No. 2, April–June 1979, 429–53.

Eberstadt, Nick. "Recent Declines in Fertility in Less Developed Countries, and What 'Population Planners' May Learn from Them," *World Development* [London], 8, 1980, 37–60.

Eisenberg, Peter L. "The Consequence of Modernization for Brazil's Sugar Plantations in the Nineteenth Century." Pages

345–68 in Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge (eds.), *Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Erickson, Kenneth Paul. *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-Class Politics.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.

Evans, Peter. *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Fábio, Stefano Erber. "Science and Technology Policy in Brazil: A Review of the Literature," *Latin American Research Review,* 16, No. 1, 1981, 3–56.

Fernandes, Florestan. *The Negro in Brazilian Society.* (Trans., Jacqueline D. Skiles et al.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.

Fishlow, Albert. "Brazilian Development in Long Term Perspective," *American Economic Review,* 70, No. 2, May 1980, 102–108.

————. "The United States and Brazil: The Case of the Missing Relationship," *Foreign Affairs,* 60, No. 4, Spring 1982, 904–23.

Flynn, Peter. *Brazil: A Political Analysis.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Fonseca, Marcos G. da. "An X-Ray of Brazilian Income Distribution: Decomposing the Gini Coefficients," *Luso-Brazilian Review,* 18, No. 1, Summer 1981, 41–58.

Forman, Shepard. *The Brazilian Peasantry.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.

————. "Disunity and Discontent: A Study of Peasant Political Movements in Brazil," *Journal of Latin American Studies* [London], 3, No. 1, 1971, 3–24.

————. *The Raft Fisherman: Tradition and Change in the Brazilian Peasant Economy.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970.

————. "The Significance of Participation: Peasants in the Politics of Brazil." Pages 36–50 in Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth (eds.), *Political Participation in Latin America, Vol. II: Politics and the Poor.* New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979.

Foweraker, Joe. *The Struggle for Land: A Political Economy of the Pioneer Frontier in Brazil from 1930 to the Present Day.* (Cambridge Latin American Series, No. 39.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Freyre, Gilberto. *The Mansions and the Shanties: The Making of Modern Brazil.* (Trans., ed., Harriet de Onís.) New York: Knopf, 1963.

————. *The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization.* (Trans., Samuel Putnam.) New York: Knopf, 1966.

————. *New World in the Tropics: The Culture of Modern*

Brazil. New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1963.

Furtado, Celso. *The Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey from Colonial to Modern Times*. (Trans., Ricardo W. de Aguiar and Eric Charles Drysdale.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971.

_____ . *O Mito do Desenvolvimento Econômico*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1974.

Gall, Norman. *Letter from Rondônia: A Report on the Brazilian Frontier. Part I: BR–364*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 9.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1978.

_____ . *Letter from Rondônia: A Report on the Brazilian Frontier. Part II: Strategic Reach*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 10.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1978.

_____ . *Letter from Rondônia: A Report on the Brazilian Frontier. Part III: The Settlers*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 11.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1978.

_____ . *Letter from Rondônia: A Report on the Brazilian Frontier. Part IV: Ridge of the West*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 12.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1978.

_____ . *Letter from Rondônia: A Report on the Brazilian Frontier. Part V: Resource Horizons*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 13.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1978.

_____ . "Ludwig's Amazon Empire," *Forbes*, 123, No. 10, May 14, 1979, 127–44.

_____ . "The Rise of Brazil," *Commentary*, 63, No. 1, January 1977, 45–55.

Gereffi, Gary, and Peter Evans. "Transnational Corporations, Dependent Development, and State Policy in the Semiperiphery: A Comparison of Brazil and Mexico." *Latin American Research Review*, 16, No. 3, 1981, 31–64.

Graff, Harvey J. "Literacy, Education, and Fertility, Past and Present: A Critical Review," *Population and Development Review*, 5, No. 1, March 1979, 105–40.

Graham, Douglas H., and Sergio Buarque de Hollanda Filho. *Migration, Regional and Urban Growth, and Development in Brazil: A Selective Analysis of the Historical Record, 1872–1970*. (Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas series, No. 1.) São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, 1971.

Gross, Daniel R. "Factionalism and Local Level Politics in Rural Brazil," *Journal of Anthropological Research*, 29, No. 2, Summer 1973, 123–44.

_____ . "The Indians and the Brazilian Frontier," *Journal of International Affairs*, 36, No. 1, 1982, 1–14.

———— . "Protein Capture and Cultural Development in the Amazon Basin," *American Anthropologist*, 77, No. 3, September 1975, 526–49.

———— . "Ritual and Conformity: A Religious Pilgrimage to Northeastern Brazil," *Ethnology*, 10, No. 2, April 1971, 129–48.

Gross, Daniel R. (ed.). *Peoples and Cultures of Native South America: An Anthropological Reader*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Natural History Press, 1973.

Gross, Daniel R., and Barbara A. Underwood. "Technological Change and Caloric Costs: Sisal Agriculture in Northeastern Brazil," *American Anthropologist*, 73, No. 3, June 1971, 725–40.

Guilherme Velho, Otávio. *Sociedade e Agricultura*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982.

Haar, Jerry. *The Politics of Higher Education in Brazil*. New York: Praeger, 1977.

Haddad, Paulo Roberto, et al. (eds.). *Desequilíbrios regionais e descentralização industrial*, 16. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Planejamento Econômico e Social, 1975.

Hahner, June E. "Feminism, Women's Rights, and the Suffrage Movement in Brazil," *Latin American Research Review*, 15, No. 1, 1980, 65–112.

Haller, Archibald O., Manoel M. Tourinho, and David B. Bills. "Migration and Socioeconomic Status in Brazil: Interregional and Rural-Urban Variations in Education, Occupational Status, and Income," *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 18, No. 1, Summer 1981, 117–38.

Harris, Marvin. *Patterns of Race in the Americas*. New York: Walker, 1964.

———— . *Town and Country in Brazil*. New York: Norton, 1971.

Haussman, Fay, and Jerry Haar. *Education in Brazil*. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1978.

Heimer, Franz-Wilhem. "Education and Politics in Brazil," *Comparative Education Review*, 19, No. 1, February 1975, 51–67.

Hewlett, Sylvia Ann. *The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth-Century Brazil*. New York: Basic Books, 1980.

———— . "Poverty and Inequality in Brazil." Pages 317–38 in Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert (eds.), *Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development*. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982.

Holloway, Thomas H. "The Coffee *Colono* of São Paulo, Brazil: Migration and Mobility, 1880–1930." Pages 301–23 in Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge (eds.), *Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Hutchinson, Harry W. *Village and Plantation Life in Northeastern Brazil*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957.

Ianni, Octavio. *O ABC da Clase Operária.* São Paulo: Editôra Hucitec, 1980.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. *Brazil: Human Resources Special Report, Annex III: Health, Nutrition, and Education.* (Comp., Peter T. Knight et al.) Washington: 1979.

———. *World Development Report, 1982.* New York: Oxford University Press for The World Bank, 1982.

Johnson, Allen W. *Sharecroppers of the Sertão: Economics and Dependence on a Brazilian Plantation.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Katzman, Martin T. *Cities and Frontiers in Brazil: Regional Dimensions of Economic Development.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

———. "Colonization as an Approach to Regional Development: Northern Paraná, Brazil," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* 26, No. 4, July 1978, 709–24.

Kellman, Shelly. "The Yanomamis: Their Battle for Survival," *Journal of International Affairs,* 36, No. 1, 1982, 15–42.

Kleinpenning, J.M.G. "The Integration and Colonisation of the Brazilian Portion of the Amazon Basin." (Research paper for the Geografisch en Planologisch Institut, Katholieke Universiteit.) Nijmegen, Netherlands: 1975.

Kluck, Patricia. "Decision-Making among Descendants of German Immigrant Farmers in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil." (Latin American Studies Dissertation Series, No. 65.) Ithaca: Latin American Studies Program, Cornell University, 1975.

Knight, Peter T., and Ricardo Moran. *Brazil.* Washington: World Bank, 1981.

Kutcher, Gary P., and Pasquale L. Scandizzo. *The Agricultural Economy of Northeast Brazil.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1981.

Leacock, Seth, and Ruth Leacock. *Spirits of the Deep: A Study of an Afro-Brazilian Cult.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Press, 1975.

Leeds, Anthony. "Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Model and Case History," *American Anthropologist,* 66, Pt. 1, December 1964, 1321–47.

Lerch, Patricia Barker. "Spirit Mediums in Umbanda Evangelizada of Porto Alegre, Brazil: Dimensions in Power and Authority." Pages 129–59 in Erika Bourguignon (ed.), *A World of Women: Anthropological Studies of Women in the Societies of the World.* New York: Praeger, 1980.

Lernoux, Penny. *Cry of the People.* New York: Doubleday, 1980.

———. "The Latin American Church," *Latin American Research Review,* 15, No. 2, 1980, 201–11.

Levine, Robert M. "Brazil: Democracy Without Adjective," *Current*

History, 78, No. 454, February 1980, 49–52.

———. "Brazil: The Dimensions of Democratization," *Current History*, 81, No. 472, February 1982, 60–63.

McDonough, Peter. "Developmental Priorities among Brazilian Elites," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 29, No. 3, April 1981, 535–39.

———. "Mapping an Authoritarian Power Structure: Brazilian Elites During the Médici Regime," *Latin American Research Review*, 16, No. 1, 1981, 79–106.

———. *Power and Ideology in Brazil.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

McDonough, Peter, and Amaury DeSouza. *The Politics of Population in Brazil: Elite Ambivalence and Public Demand.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.

Macedo, Murillo. "Reflections on the Problem of Employment in Brazil," *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 18, No. 1, Summer 1981, 5–28.

Macedo, Robert. "Minimum Wages and Income Distribution in Brazil," *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 18, No. 1, Summer 1981, 59–76.

Mahar, Dennis J. *Frontier Development Policy in Brazil: A Study of Amazonia.* New York: Praeger, 1979.

Margolis, Maxine L. *The Moving Frontier: Social and Economic Change in a Southern Brazilian Community.* (Latin American Monograph series, 2, No. 11.) Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1973.

Margolis, Maxine L., and William E. Carter (eds.). *Brazil: Anthropological Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Charles Wagley.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.

Martine, George. "Adaptation of Migrants or Survival of the Fittest? A Brazilian Case," *Journal of Developing Areas*, 14, No. 1, October 1979, 23–41.

Matta, Roberto da. *Um Mundo Divido: A Estrutura Social dos Indios Apinayé.* (Coleção Anthropologia series, No. 10.) Petrópolis, Brazil: Editôra Vozes, 1976.

Maybury-Lewis, David. *Akwẽ-Shavante Society.* London: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Meggers, Betty J. "Environment and Culture in Amazonia." Pages 91–110 in Charles Wagley (ed.), *Man in the Amazon.* Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1974.

Mendes de Almeida, Angela, and Michael Lowy. "Union Structure and Labor Organizations in the Recent History of Brazil," *Latin American Perspectives*, 3, No. 1, Winter 1976, 98–119.

Merrick, Thomas W. "Fertility and Land Availability in Rural Brazil." *Demography*, 15, No. 3, August 1978, 321–36.

Merrick, Thomas W., and Douglas H. Graham. *Population and Economic Development in Brazil: 1800 to the Present.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

Moog, Vianna. *Bandeirantes e Pioneiros: Paralelo entre Duas Culturas.* (10th ed.) Pôrto Alegre: Editôra Globo, 1973.

Moran, Emilio F. "The Adaptive System of the Amazonian Caboclo." Pages 136–59 in Charles Wagley (ed.), *Man in the Amazon.* Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1974.

———. *Developing the Amazon.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.

———. "Ecological, Anthropological, and Agronomic Research in the Amazon Basin," *Latin American Research Review*, 17, No. 1, 1982, 3–41.

Morey, Robert V., Jr., and John P. Marwitt. "Ecology, Economy and Warfare in Lowland South America." Pages 439–50 in Martin A. Nettleship et al. (eds.), *War: Its Causes and Correlates.* The Hague: Mouton, 1975.

Morse, Richard M. *From Community to Metropolis: A Biography of São Paulo.* Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958.

Nogueira-Neto, Paulo, and José Candido de Melo Carvalho. "A Programme of Ecological Stations for Brazil," *Environmental Conservation* [Lausanne], 6, No. 2, Summer 1979, 95–104.

Ornellas, Manoelito de. *Gaúchos e Beduínos: a origem étnica e a formação social do Rio Grande do Sul.* (3d ed.) (Coleção Documentos Brasileiros series, No. 57.) Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editôra, 1976.

Packenham, Robert A. "Yankee Impressions and Brazilian Realities," *Wilson Quarterly*, 1, No. 1, Autumn 1976, 63–72.

Pang, Eul-Soo. "Abertura in Brazil: A Road to Chaos?" *Current History*, 80, No. 463, February 1981, 57–61.

Pastoré, José. *Desigualidade e Mobilidade Social no Brasil.* São Paulo: Editôra da Universidade de São Paulo, 1979.

Pereira de Queiroz, Maria Isaura. "Messiahs in Brazil," *Past and Present* [Oxford], No. 31, July 1965, 62–86.

Perlman, Janice E. *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976.

Pfefferman, Guy Pierre, and Richard Webb. *The Distribution of Income in Brazil.* (World Bank Staff Working Paper, No. 356.) Washington: World Bank, 1979.

Pierson, Donald. *Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact at Bahia.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967.

Prado, Caio, Jr. *The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil.* (Trans., Suzette Macedo.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.

Pressel, Esther. "Spirit Magic in the Social Relations Between Men and Women (São Paulo, Brazil)." Pages 107–27 in Erika Bourguignon (ed.), *A World of Women: Anthropological Studies of Women in the Societies of the World.* New York: Praeger, 1980.

Raven, Peter H. "Tropical Rain Forests: A Global Responsibility,"

Natural History, 90, No. 2, February 1981, 28–32.

Reichel-Dolmatoff, Gerardo. *Amazonian Cosmos: The Secular and Religious Symbolism of the Tukano Indians*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.

Reis, Jaime. "From *bangue* to *usina:* Social Aspects of Growth and Modernization in the Sugar Industry of Pernambuco, Brazil, 1850–1920." Pages 369–96 in Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge (eds.), *Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Robock, Stefan H. *Brazil: A Study in Development Progress*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1975.

Roche, Jean. *A Colonização Alemã e o Rio Grande do Sul*. 2 vols. (Trans. from French, Emery Ruas.) Pôrto Alegre: Editôra Globo, 1969.

Roett, Riordan. *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972.

Roett, Riordan (ed.). *Brazil in the Seventies*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976.

Rolim, Francisco Cartaxo. "Pentecotisme et Societe au Bresil," *Social Compass* [Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium], 26, Nos. 2 and 3, 1979, 345–72.

Roquette-Pinto, E. *Ensaios de Antropologia Brasiliana*. (2d ed.) São Paulo: Companhia Editôra Nacional, Ministério da Educação e Cultural, 1978.

Rout, Leslie B., Jr., "Race and Slavery in Brazil," *Wilson Quarterly*, 1, No. 1, Autumn 1976, 73–89.

Saint, William S. "The Wages of Modernization: A Review of the Literature on Temporary Labor Arrangements in Brazilian Agriculture," *Latin American Research Review*, 16, No. 3, 1981, 91–110

Sanders, Thomas G. *Brazil's Labor Unions*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 48.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.

——— . *Colonization on the Transamazonian Highway*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. East Coast South America Series, 17, No. 3.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1973.

——— . *Japanese in Brazil*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. East Coast South America Series, 14, No. 3.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1970.

——— . *Racial Discrimination and Black Consciousness in Brazil*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 42.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.

Saunders, John (ed.). *Modern Brazil: New Patterns and Development*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971.

Saunders, John H., and Frederick L. Bein. "Agricultural Develop-

ment on the Brazilian Frontier: Southern Mato Grosso," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 24, No. 3, April 1976, 593–610.

Schmink, Marianne. "Women in Brazilian *Abertura* Politics," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 7, No. 1, Autumn 1981, 115–34.

Schmitter, Philippe C. *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Selcher, Wayne A. *Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

Shirley, Robert W. *The End of a Tradition: Culture Change and Development in the Município of Cunha São Paulo, Brazil*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Siegel, Bernard J. "Migration Dynamics in the Interior of Ceará, Brazil," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 27, No. 3, Autumn 1971, 234–58.

Siskind, Janet. *To Hunt in the Morning*. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Smith, T. Lynn. *Brazilian Society*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974.

———. *Brazil: People and Institutions*. (4th ed.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.

Souza, Heitor Gurgulino de. "Federative Republic of Brazil." Pages 669–76 in *International Encyclopedia of Higher Education*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1977.

Stein, Stanley J. *Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850–1900*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Stein, Stanley J., and Barbara H. Stein. *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Stepan, Alfred. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Steward, Julian H., and Louis C. Faron. *Native Peoples of South America*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

Taylor, Lance et al. *Models of Growth and Distribution for Brazil*. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1980.

Teixeira, Anisio S. "The Changing Role of Education in Brazilian Society." Pages 71–95 in John Saunders (ed.), *Modern Brazil: New Patterns and Development*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971.

Tyler, William G. *The Brazilian Industrial Economy*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1981.

Wagley, Charles. *Amazon Town: A Study of Man in the Tropics*. New York: Knopf, 1964.

———. *An Introduction to Brazil*. (rev. ed.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

———. *Welcome of Tears: The Tapirapé Indians of Central*

Brazil. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Wagley, Charles (ed.). *Man in the Amazon*. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1974.

Wagley, Charles, and Marvin Harris. "A Typology of Latin American Subcultures," *American Anthropologist*, 57, No. 3, June 1955, 428–51.

Wallerstein, Michael. "The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil: Its Economic Determinants," *Latin American Research Review*, 15, No. 3, 1980, 3–40.

Werner, Dennis. "Trekking in the Amazon Forest," *Natural History*, 87, No. 9, November 1978, 42–55.

Wigder, Roberta C. *Brazil Rediscovered*. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1977.

Willems, Emilio. *Followers of the New Faith: Culture Change and the Rise of Protestantism in Brazil and Chile*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967.

Wright, Charles L., et al. "Analyzing Bottlenecks in Grain Transportation and Storage Systems: A Brazilian Case Study," *Journal of Development Studies* [London], 18, No. 1, October 1981, 68–84.

Yoder, Michael L., and Glenn V. Fuguitt. "Urbanization, Frontier Growth, and Population Redistribution in Brazil," *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 16, No. 1, Summer 1979, 67–90.

Chapter 3

Almeida-Filho, Naomar de. "The Psychosocial Costs of Development: Labor, Migration, and Stress in Bahia, Brazil," *Latin American Research Review*, 17, No. 3, 1982, 91–118.

Andrade, Manuel de Correia. *The Land and People of Northeast Brazil*. (Trans., Dennis V. Johnson.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1980.

Araujo, Paulo F.C. de, and Richard L. Meyer. "Agricultural Credit Policy in Brazil: Objectives and Results," *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 59, No. 5, December 1977, 957–61.

Baer, Werner. *Industrialization and Economic Development in Brazil*. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1965.

———. "The Trouble with Index-Linking: Reflections on the Recent Brazilian Experience," *World Development*, 8, No. 9, September 1980, 677–704.

Bamber, Derek. "Brazil: The Road to Recovery," *Euromoney* [London], November 1981, 1–33, (supplement.).

Barraclough, Solon. *Agrarian Structure in Latin America*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath, 1973.

Barzelay, Michael, and Scott R. Pearson. "The Efficiency of Producing Alcohol for Energy in Brazil," *Economic Develop-*

ment and Cultural Change, 31, No. 1, October 1982, 131–44.

Berry, R. Albert, and William R. Cline. *Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing Countries.* Geneva: Johns Hopkins University Press for the International Labour Office, 1979.

Blanchard, Olivier Jean. "Debt and Current Account Deficit in Brazil." (Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper, No. 882.) Cambridge: Harvard University, February 1982.

Brazil. Central Bank of Brazil, *Monetary Budget, 1981.* Brasília: 1981.

Brazil. Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência da República. Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1980*, 41. Rio de Janeiro: 1980.

————. *Sinopse Preliminar de Censo Agropecuário*, 14. Rio de Janeiro: 1975.

"Brazil." Pages 1679–1709 in *Europa Year Book, 1981: A World Survey*, 1. London: Europa, 1981.

Bruneau, Thomas C., and Philippe Faucher (eds.). *Authoritarian Capitalism: Brazil's Contemporary Economic and Political Development.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

Burns, E. Bradford. *A History of Brazil.* (2d ed.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Caplan, Basil. "Brazil's Delicate Balancing Act," *Banker* [London], 131, December 1981, 19–23.

Cardoso, Eliana A. "The Great Depression and Commodity Exporting LDCs: The Case of Brazil," *Journal of Political Economy*, 89, No. 6, December 1981, 1239–50.

————. "Indexation, Monetary Accommodation and Inflation in Brazil." (Center for Latin American Development Studies, Discussion Paper Series, No. 49.) Boston: Boston University, November 1981.

Cehelsky, Marta. *Land Reform in Brazil: The Management of Social Change.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Chiarelli, Carlos Alberto G. " Social Security for Rural Workers in Brazil," *International Labour Review* [Geneva], 113, No. 2, March–April 1976, 159–69.

Chilcote, Ronald H., and Timothy F. Harding (eds.). "Brazil, Part I: Capitalist Crisis and Workers' Challenge," *Latin American Perspectives*, 6, No. 23, Fall 1979 (entire issue).

————. "Brazil, Part II: Class Interests and the State," *Latin American Perspectives*, 7, No. 24, Winter 1980 (entire issue).

Cline, William R. *Economic Consequences of a Land Reform in Brazil.* (Contribution to Economic Analysis series, No. 67.) Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1970.

Dean, Warren. *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880–1945.* Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas Press, 1969.

Dickenson, John P. *Brazil.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Elias, Victor J. "Government Expenditures on Agriculture in

Latin America." (Research Report, No. 23.) Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute, May 1981.

Erber, Fábio Stefano. "Science and Technology Policy in Brazil: A Review of the Literature," *Latin American Research Review,* 16, No. 1, 1981, 3.

Fishlow, Albert. "The United States and Brazil: The Case of the Missing Relationship," *Foreign Affairs,* 60, No. 4, Spring 1982, 904–23.

Flynn, Peter. *Brazil: A Political Analysis.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Forman, Shepard. *The Raft Fisherman: Tradition and Change in the Brazilian Peasant Economy.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970.

Fox, Roger. "Brazil's Minimum Price Policy and the Agricultural Sector of Northeast Brazil." (Research Report, No. 23.) Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute, June 1979.

Foxley, Alejandro. "Sterilization Policies and Stagflation: The Cases of Brazil and Chile," *World Development,* 8, No. 11, November 1980, 887–912.

Francois, Patrick, and Sizret Francois. "Pulse Consumption in Brazil: Protein Intake Threatened by Uncertain Supply," *Food and Nutrition* [Rome], 7, No. 2, February 1981, 11–17.

Furtado, Celso. *The Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey from Colonial to Modern Times.* (Trans., Ricardo W. de Aguiar and Eric Charles Drysdale.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971.

Galbraith, Eugene K. "Observations on Corporative Institution and Rural Labor in Brazil." (Paper for Symposium on Latin American Political and Rural Institutions.) Ithaca: Cornell University, 1980.

Gall, Norman. "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All," *Foreign Policy,* No. 23, Summer 1976, 155–201.

————. *Letter from Rondônia: A Report on the Brazilian Frontier. Part V: Resource Horizons.* (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 13.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1978.

————. "The Rise of Brazil," *Commentary,* 63, No. 1, January 1977, 45–55.

Garland, Paul Griffith. *Doing Business in and with Brazil.* São Paulo: Banco Lar Brasileiro, 1978.

Gereffi, Gary, and Peter Evans. "Transnational Corporations, Dependent Development, and State Policy in the Semiperiphery: A Comparison of Brazil and Mexico," *Latin American Research Review,* 16, No. 3, 1981, 31–64.

Guilherme Velho, Otávio. *Sociedade e Agricultura.* Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982.

Hewlett, Sylvia Ann. *The Cruel Dilemmas of Development:*

Twentieth-Century Brazil. New York: Basic Books, 1980.

Hewlett, Sylvia Ann, and Richard S. Weinert (eds.). *Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development.* Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982.

Homem de Mello, Fernando. "Economic Policy and the Agricultural Sector in Brazil," *Luso-Brazilian Review,* 15, No. 2, Winter 1978, 195–222.

Inter-American Development Bank. "Brazil." Pages 208–16 in *Economics and Social Progress in Latin America, 1982 Report.* Washington: 1982.

International Monetary Fund. "Brazil." Pages 93–99 in *Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1982.* Washington: 1982.

Jallade, Jean-Pierre. "Basic Education and Income Inequality in Brazil," *World Development,* 10, No. 3, March 1982, 187–97.

Johnson, Allen W. *Sharecroppers of the Sertão: Economics and Dependence on a Brazilian Plantation.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Johnson, Roger G., and Rueben C. Buse. "A Study of Farm Size and Economic Performance in Old Santa Rosa, Rio Grande do Sul." (Reprint Series, No. 27.) Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1967.

Katzman, Martin T. *Cities and Frontiers in Brazil: Regional Dimensions of Economic Development.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Kluck, Patricia. "Small Farmers and Agricultural Development Policy: A Look at Brazil's Land Reform Statute," *Human Organizations,* 38, No. 1, Spring 1979, 44–51.

Knight, Peter T. *Brazilian Agricultural Technology and Trade: A Study of Five Commodities.* New York: Praeger, 1971.

Kutcher, Gary P., and Pasquale L. Scandizzo. *The Agricultural Economy of Northeast Brazil.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1981.

McNally, Leonard. "Brazil: The Effects of Modernization and Political Policy," *Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques* [Geneva], 59, No. 3, June–September 1981, 177–200.

Mahar, Dennis J. *Frontier Development Policy in Brazil: A Study of Amazonia.* New York: Praeger, 1979.

Meyer, Richard L., et al. "Rural Capital Markets and Small Farmers in Brazil, 1960–1972." (Research paper for A.I.D. Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit, Small Farmer Credit in South America series, No. 3.) Washington: 1973.

Miller Paiva, Ruy et al. *Setor Agrícola do Brasil: Comportamento econômico, problemas e possibilidades.* São Paulo: Editôra da Universidade de São Paulo, 1976.

Moran, Emilio F. "Ecological, Anthropological, and Agronomic

Research in the Amazon Basin," *Latin American Research Review*, 17, No. 1, 1982, 3–41.

"Oh, Brazil," *Economist* [London], August 4, 1979, 3–22 (survey.).

Pfeffermann, Guy Pierre, and Richard Webb. *The Distribution of Income in Brazil.* (World Bank Staff Working Paper, No. 356.) Washington: World Bank, 1979.

Pinstrup-Andersen, Per. "Energy Cropping," *Mazingira*, 5, NO. 1, 1981, 60–69.

Prado, Caio, Jr. *The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil.* (Trans., Suzette Macedo.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.

Price Waterhouse. *Doing Business in Brazil.* New York: July 1980.

Rask, Norman. "The Differential Impact of Growth Policy on the Small Farmer of Southern Brazil." (Paper presented at Purdue Workshop on Empirical Studies of Small-Farm Agriculture in Developing Nations.) West Lafayette, Indiana: November 1972.

————. "Technical Change and the Traditional Small Farmer of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil." (Studies in Agricultural Capital and Technology, Economics, and Sociology, Occasional Paper, No. 85.) Columbus: Ohio State University, January 1973.

Robock, Stefan H. *Brazil: A Study in Development Progress.* Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1975.

Roett, Riordan (ed.). *Brazil in the Seventies.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976.

Saint, William S. "Farming for Energy: Social Options under Brazil's National Alcohol Programme," *World Development*, 10, No. 3, March 1982, 223–38.

————. "The Wages of Modernization: A Review of the Literature on Temporary Labor Arrangements in Brazilian Agriculture," *Latin American Research Review*, 16, No. 3, 1981, 91–110.

Sanders, Thomas G. *Brazil's Labor Unions.* (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 48.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.

Schuh, G. Edward. *The Development of Brazilian Agriculture.* New York: Praeger, 1970.

Simonsen, Mario Henrique. "Brazil—Economic Outlook—Prospects for the Eighties," *Brasilians*, 10, No. 105, June 1982, 6–7.

Taylor, Lance, et al. *Models of Growth and Distribution for Brazil.* New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1980.

Tyler, William G. *The Brazilian Industrial Economy.* Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1981.

United States. Congress. 97th, 1st Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Status of U.S. Bilateral Relations with Countries of Latin America.* (Report of a study mission to Jamaica, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica, January 8–17, 1981.) Washington: GPO, April 20, 1981.

United States. Department of Agriculture. Foreign Agriculture Service. *Brazil: Agricultural and Trade Policies.* (FASM–305.) Washington: September 1981.

United States. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. *Brazil.* (Comp., Patricia M. Rowe.) Washington: GPO, 1981.

United States. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Brazil.* (Paper prepared by the Embassy in Brasília, International Marketing Information series, No. FET82–034.) Washington: GPO, May 1982.

Wagley, Charles (ed.). *Man in the Amazon.* Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1974.

Wallerstein, Michael. "The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil: Its Economic Determinants," *Latin American Research Review,* 15, No. 3, 1980, 3–40.

Weisskopf, Richard. "The Growth and Decline of Import Substitution in Brazil—Revisited," *World Development,* 8, No. 9, September 1980, 647–76.

Zenun, Augusto. *Legislacão Agrária e Sua Aplicação.* Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Forense, 1970.

Zibretti, Darcy Walmor. *Legislação Agrária Brasileira.* São Paulo: Distribuidora Paulista de Jornais, Revistas, Livros e Impressos, 1968.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Agriculture Abroad; Brasil Florestal* [São Paulo]; *Business Latin America; Financial Times* [London]; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America; InfoBrazil; International Financial Statistics; Latin America Regional Reports: Brazil* [London]; *Latin America Weekly Report* [London]; *New York Times;* and *Washington Post.*)

Chapter 4

Alexander, Robert J. "Brazil." Pages 68–71 in Richard F. Staar (ed.), *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1982.* Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

Baaklini, Abdo I., and David V. Fleischer. "Legislatures and Regime Stability/Instability: Brazil and Lebanon." (Paper prepared for the XIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 9–14, 1982.) Rio de Janeiro: 1982.

Bethell, Leslie, et al. "Brazil," *Index on Censorship* [London], 8, No. 4, July/August 1979, 3–53.

Black, Jan Knippers. "Challenging the Divine Right of Generals in Latin America: Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru," *Comparative Social Research,* 4, 1981, 319–52.

———. "The Military and Political Decompression in Brazil,"

Armed Forces and Society, 6, No. 4, Summer 1980, 625–37.

Brazil. Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência da República. Fundação Instituto Brazileiro de Geografia e Estatística. *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1980*, 41. Rio de Janeiro: 1980.

"Brazil." Pages 1667–97 in *Europa Year Book, 1980: A World Survey*, 1. London: Europa, 1980.

Brooke, Jim. "Dateline Brazil: Southern Superpower," Foreign Policy, No. 44, Fall 1981, 167–80.

Bruneau, Thomas C. *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Bruneau, Thomas C., and Philippe Faucher (eds.). *Authoritarian Capitalism: Brazil's Contemporary Economic and Political Development*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

Burns, E. Bradford. *A History of Brazil*. (2d ed.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. *The Authoritarian Regime at the Crossroads: The Brazilian Case*. (Working Paper, No. 93.) Washington: Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, 1981.

————. "Political Regime and Social Change: Some Reflections Concerning the Brazilian Case," *Buletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe* [Amsterdam], No. 30, June 1981.

Cehelsky, Marta. *Land Reform in Brazil: The Management of Social Change*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Chilcote, Ronald H. (ed.). *Brazil and Its Radical Left: An Annotated Bibliography of the Communist Movement and the Rise of Marxism, 1922–1972*. Millwood, New York: Kraus International, 1980.

Chilcote, Ronald H., and Timothy F. Harding (eds.). "Brazil, Part I: Capitalist Crisis and Workers' Challenge," *Latin American Perspectives*, 6, No. 23, Fall 1979 (entire issue.)

————. "Brazil, Part II: Class Interests and the State," *Latin American Perspectives*, 7, No. 24, Winter 1980 (entire issue.).

Collier, David (ed.). *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Commission on United States-Brazilian Relations. *The Report*. Washington: Center of Brazilian Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and Center for Inter-American Relations, 1980.

Conniff, Michael L. *Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925–1945*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981.

Constitution of Brazil 1967 (as amended by Constitutional Amendment No. 1 of October 17, 1969). Washington: General Secretariat, Organization of American States, n. d.

Daland, Robert T. *Exploring Brazilian Bureaucracy: Performance and Pathology*. Washington: University Press of America, 1981.

Dos Santos, Teotonio. "Brazil: Origins of a Crisis." Pages 415–90 in Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein (eds.), *Latin*

America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1974.

———. "Brazil: Unmasking the Miracle," *NACLA's Latin America and Empire Report*, 11, No. 6, July/August 1977, 6–14.

Enders, Thomas O. "Brazil and the United States Today," *Department of State Bulletin*, 81, November 1981, 87–89.

Erickson, Kenneth Paul. "Brazil: Corporatism in Theory and Practice." Pages 144–81 in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (eds.), *Latin American Politics and Development.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979.

———. *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-Class Politics.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.

Evans, Peter. *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Fishlow, Albert. "The United States and Brazil: The Case of the Missing Relationship," *Foreign Affairs*, 60, No. 4, Spring 1982, 904–23.

Flynn, Peter. *Brazil: A Political Analysis.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

———. "The Brazilian Development Mode: The Political Dimension," *World Today* [London], 29, No. 11, November 1973, 481–94.

Folha de São Paulo, November 27, 1982.

Forman, Shepard. "The Significance of Participation: Peasants in the Politics of Brazil." Pages 36–50 in Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth (eds.), *Political Participation in Latin America, Volume II: Politics and the Poor.* New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979.

Gall, Norman. "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All," *Foreign Policy*, No. 23, Summer 1976, 155–201.

———. *In the Name of Democracy: Brazil's Presidential Succession.* (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 3.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1978.

———. "The Rise of Brazil," *Commentary*, 63, No. 1, January 1977, 45–55.

Garcia-Zamor, Jean-Claude (ed.) *Politics and Administration in Brazil.* Washington: University Press of America, 1978.

Garland, Paul Griffith. *Doing Business in and with Brazil.* São Paulo: Banco Lar Brasileiro, 1978.

Gereffi, Gary, and Peter Evans. "Transnational Corporations, Dependent Development, and State Policy in the Semiperiphery: A Comparison of Brazil and Mexico," *Latin American Research Review*, 16, No. 3, 1981, 31–64.

Goodman, D.E. "The Brazilian Economic 'Miracle' and Regional Policy: Some Evidence from the Urban Northeast," *Journal of Latin American Studies* [Cambridge], 8, No. 1, May 1976, 1–27.

Hartness-Kane, Ann. "Governments as Publishers of Reference Materials: Mexico and Brazil, 1970–1980," *Latin American Research Review*, 17, No. 2, 1982, 142–55.

Hewlett, Sylvia Ann. *The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth-Century Brazil*. New York: Basic Books, 1980.

Hewlett, Sylvia Ann, and Richard S. Weinert (eds.). *Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development*. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982.

Hoge, Warren. "A General Loosens the Reins in Brazil," *New York Times Magazine*, December 6, 1981, 110–26.

Jenks, Margaret Sarles. "Political Parties in Authoritarian Brazil." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Durham: Department of Political Science, Duke University, 1979.

Keith, Henry H., and Robert A. Hayes (eds.). *Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil*. Tempe: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, 1976.

Kucinski, Bernardo. *Brazil, State and Struggle*. London: Latin American Bureau, 1982.

Leal, Victor Nunes. *Coronelismo: The Municipality and Representative Government in Brazil*. (Trans., June Henfrey.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Levine, Robert M. "Brazil: Democracy Without Adjectives," *Current History*, 78, No. 454, February 1980, 49–52.

––––––. "Brazil: The Dimensions of Democratization," *Current History*, 81, No. 472, February 1982, 60–63.

McDonough, Peter. "Mapping an Authoritarian Power Structure: Brazilian Elites During the Médici Regime," *Latin American Research Review*, 16, No. 1, 1981, 79–106.

––––––. *Power and Ideology in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

McDonough, Peter, and Amaury DeSouza. *The Politics of Population in Brazil: Elite Ambivalence and Public Demand*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.

McNally, Leonard. "Brazil: The Effects of Modernization and Political Policy," *Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques* [Geneva], 59, No. 3, June–September 1981, 177–200.

Malloy, James M. *The Politics of Social Security in Brazil*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979.

––––––. "Social Insurance Policy in Brazil: A Study in the Politics of Inequality," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 30, No. 3, Winter 1976, 41–67.

Marighella, Carlos. *For the Liberation of Brazil*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1971.

Maurer, Harry. "Is Brazil on the Brink of Democracy?" *New York Review of Books*, 24, No. 14, September 28, 1978, 43–48.

Mendes, Candido. "The Post-1964 Brazilian Regime: Outward Redemocratization and Inner Institutionalization," (Trans., L.

Gray Cowan.) *Government and Opposition* [London], 15, No. 1, Winter 1980, 48–74.

Mendonça de Barros, José Roberto, and Douglas H. Graham. "The Brazilian Economic Miracle Revisited; Private and Public Sector Initiative in a Market Economy," *Latin American Research Review*, 13, No. 2, 1978, 5–38.

Mericle, Kenneth S. "Corporatist Control of the Working Class: Authoritarian Brazil since 1964." Pages 303–38 in James M. Malloy (ed.), *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977.

Morton, F. W. Orde. "Brazil's Emergence on the World Stage," *Canadian Institute of International Affairs* [Toronto], 37, No. 1, Winter 1981/82, 13–41.

Murilo de Carualho, José. *Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil 1930–1945*. (Working Paper, No. 95.) Washington: Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, September 1980.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A. *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. (Politics of Modernization series, No. 9.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973.

Overholt, William H. (ed.). *The Future of Brazil*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Page, Joseph. *The Revolution That Never Was*. New York: Grossman, 1972.

Pang, Eul-Soo. "Abertura in Brazil: A Road to Chaos?" *Current History*, 80, No. 463, February 1981, 57–61.

Parker, Phyllis R. *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979.

Perry, William. *Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of an Emerging Power*. (Foreign Policy Papers series, 2, No. 6.) Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976.

Pompermayer, Malori José. "The State and the Frontier in Brazil: A Case Study of the Amazon." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Stanford: Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 1979.

Poppino, Rollie E. *Brazil: The Land and People*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Portes, Alejandro. "Housing Policy, Urban Poverty, and the State: The *Favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, 1972–1976," *Latin American Research Review*, 14, No. 2, 1979, 3–24.

Raine, Philip. *Brazil: Awakening Giant*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1974.

Roett, Riordan. *Brazil in the Sixties*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972.

———. *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society*. (rev. ed.) New York: Praeger, 1978.

———. "Brazil's International Relations in Perspective," *Orbis*, 26 No. 1, Spring 1982, 257–67.

Rosenbaum, H. Jon. "A Critique of the Brazilian Foreign Service," *Journal of Developing Areas*, 2, No. 3, April 1968, 379–92.

Sanders, Thomas G. *Brazil's Foreign Policy in Africa*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 43.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.

———. *Brazil's Labor Unions*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 48.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.

———. *The Catholic Church in Brazil's Political Transition*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 48.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1980.

———. *Development and Security are Linked by a Relationship of Mutual Causality*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. East Coast South America Series, 15, No. 3.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1971.

———. *Human Rights and Political Process in Brazil*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 11.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1980.

———. *Racial Discrimination and Black Consciousness in Brazil*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. South America, No. 42.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.

Schmidt, Benico Viero. "The State and Urban Policy in Brazil." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Stanford: Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 1979.

Schmink, Marianne. "Women in Brazilian *Abertura* Politics," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 7, No. 1, Autumn 1981, 115–34.

Schmitter, Philippe C. *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Schneider, Ronald M. *The Political System in Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Schneider, Ronald M. (ed.). *Brazil Election Factbook*. (No. 2.) Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, Operations and Policy Research, September 1965.

———. *Brazil Election Factbook*. (No. 2, supplement). Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, Operations and Policy Research, November 1966.

Selcher, Wayne A. "Brazilian Relations with Portuguese Africa in the Context of the Elusive 'Luso-Brazilian Community'," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 18, No. 1, February 1976, 25–58.

———. *Brazil's Multilateral Relations: Between First and Third Worlds*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

———. "The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government," *Parameters*, 7, No. 1, 1977, 10–24.

Selcher, Wayne A. (ed.). *Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

Siegel, Gilbert B. *The Vicissitudes of Governmental Reform in Brazil: A Study of the DASP*. Washington: University Press of America, 1978.

Skidmore, Thomas E. *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Smith, T. Lynn. *Brazil: People and Institutions*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963.

Stepan, Alfred. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

——— . "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil." Pages 110–37 in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Stepan, Alfred (ed.). *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Stern, Fritz. "Between Repression and Reform: A Stranger's Impressions of Argentina and Brazil," *Foreign Affairs*, 56, No. 4, July 1978, 800–18.

Tyson, Brady B. "Brazil." Pages 221–58 in Harold Eugene Davis and Larman C. Wilson (eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.

United States. Congress. 97th, 1st Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Status of U.S Bilateral Relations with Countries of Latin America*. (Report of a study mission to Jamaica, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica, January 8–17, 1981.) Washington: GPO, April 20, 1981.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of Public Communication. *The United States and Brazil*. (Reprint from September 1979 Department of State Bulletin.) Washington: October 1979.

Uricoechea, Fernando. *The Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.

Weinstein, Barbara. "Brazilian Regionalism," *Latin American Research Review*, 17, No. 2, 1982, 262–76.

Wesson, Robert. *The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence*. New York: Praeger, 1981.

Worcester, Donald E. *Brazil: From Colony to World Power*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; Christian Science Monitor; Financial Times* [London]; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America; InfoBrazil; Latinamerica Press* [Lima]; *Latin America Regional Reports: Brazil* [London]; *Latin America Weekly Report* [London]; *Manchester Guardian Weekly* [London]; *New York Times; Times of the Americas;* and *Washington Post.*)

Chapter 5

Alexander, Robert J. "Brazil." Pages 39–41 in Richard F. Staar (ed.), *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1981.* Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981.

———. "Brazil." Pages 68–71 in Richard F. Staar (ed.), *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1982.* Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

Alves, Marcio Moreira. *A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1973.

Black, Jan Knippers. "The Military and Political Decompression in Brazil," *Armed Forces and Society,* 6, No. 4, Summer 1980, 625–37.

———. *United States Penetration of Brazil.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977.

Boxer, Charles R. *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.

Brazil. Secretaria de Planejamento do Presidência da República. Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. *Annúario Estatístico do Brasil 1980,* 41. Rio de Janeiro: 1980.

"Brazil." Pages 127–29 in *Amnesty International Report, 1977.* London: Amnesty International, 1977.

"Brazil." Pages 51–53 in *Amnesty International Report, 1979.* London: Amnesty International, 1979.

"Brazil." Pages 113–15 in *Amnesty International Report, 1980.* London: Amnesty International, 1980.

"Brazil." Pages 118–21 in *Amnesty International Report, 1981.* London: Amnesty International, 1981.

"Brazil." Pages 27–28 in *The World Factbook, 1982.* Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1982.

Brooke, Jim. "Dateline Brazil: Southern Superpower." *Foreign Policy,* No. 44, Fall 1981, 167–80.

Burns, E. Bradford. *A History of Brazil.* (2d. ed.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Chiefs of State and Cabinet Ministers of Foreign Governments. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1982.

Combat Fleets of the World, 1980/81: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament. (Ed., Jean Labayle Couhat.) Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1980.

Constitution of Brazil 1967 (as amended by Constitutional Amendment No. 1 of October 17, 1969.) Washington: General Secretariat, Organization of American States, n. d.

DMS Market Intelligence Report: Brazil Summary. Greenwich: DMS, 1981–82.

Dulles, John W.F. *Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955–1964.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969.

Dyer, Gwynne. "Brazil." Pages 77–95 in John Keegan (ed.), *World*

Armies. New York: Facts on File, 1979.

Einaudi, Luigi R., and Alfred C. Stepan. *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*. Santa Monica: Rand, 1971.

Evans, Robert Dervel. *Brazil: The Road Back from Terrorism*. (Conflict Studies, No. 47.) London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, July 1974.

Fiechter, Georges-André. *Brazil since 1964: Modernization under a Military Regime*. New York: Halstead Press, 1975.

Fishlow, Albert. "The United States and Brazil: The Case of the Missing Relationship," *Foreign Affairs*, 60, No. 4, Spring 1982, 904-23.

Flynn, Peter. *Brazil: A Political Analysis*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Freed, Kenneth. "Brazil: World's Fifth-Largest Arms Maker," *Los Angeles Times*, November, 15, 1981, 4.

Garcia-Zamor, Jean-Claude (ed.). *Politics and Administration in Brazil*. Washington: University Press of America, 1978.

Gonçalves, João Carlos. *Historia Maritima*. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1980.

Graham, Richard (ed.). *A Century of Brazilian History since 1865*. New York: Knopf, 1969.

Gross, Daniel R. "The Indians and the Brazilian Frontier," *Journal of International Affairs*, 36, No. 1, 1982, 1-14.

Gunston, Bill (ed.). *Encyclopedia of World Air Power*. New York: Crescent, 1980.

Hewish, Mark, et al. *Air Forces of the World*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.

Hoge, Warren. "A General Loosens the Reins in Brazil," *New York Times Magazine*, December 6, 1981, 110-26.

Ingleton, Roy D. *Police of the World*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979.

International Air Forces and Military Aircraft Directory. Essex, England: Aviation Advisory Services, 1980.

Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1981-82. (Ed., John W.R. Taylor.) New York: Jane's, 1981.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1981-82. (Ed., John Moore.) New York: Jane's, 1981.

Jane's Military Vehicles and Ground Support Equipment, 1981. (Ed., Christopher F. Foss.) New York: Jane's, 1981.

Jane's 1981-82 Naval Annual. (Ed., John Moore.) New York: Jane's, 1981.

Jane's Weapon Systems, 1981-82. (Ed., Ronald T. Pretty.) New York: Jane's 1981.

Keith, Henry H., and Robert A. Hayes (eds.). *Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil*. Tempe: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, 1976.

Levine, Robert M. "Brazil: The Dimensions of Democratization,"

Current History, 81, No. 472, February 1982, 60–63.

Lottman, Herbert R. "Brazil: A Long Way to Go," *Publishers Weekly*, November 21, 1980, 20–33.

McDonough, Peter. *Power and Ideology in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Manwaring, Max G. "Brazilian Military Power: A Capability Analysis." Pages 65–68 in Wayne A. Selcher (ed.), *Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

Maurer, Harry. "Is Brazil on the Brink of Democracy?" *New York Review of Books*, 24, No. 14, September 28, 1978, 43–48.

The Military Balance, 1981–1982. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982.

The Military Balance, 1982–1983. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983.

Milton, T.R. "The Brazil Situation," *Air Force Magazine*, 119, No. 7, March 1982, 111–15.

Moraes, João Baptista Mascarenhas de. *The Brazilian Expeditionary Force by Its Commander*. Washington: GPO, 1966.

Myers, David J. "Brazil" Pages 53–72 in Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy (eds.), *Security Policies of Developing Countries*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath, 1982.

Packenham, Robert A. "Yankee Impressions and Brazilian Realities," *Wilson Quarterly*, 1, No. 1, Autumn 1976, 63–72.

Perry, William. *Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of an Emerging Power*. (Foreign Policy Papers series, 2, No. 6.) Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976.

Pesce, Eduardo Italo. "The Brazilian Mk–10 Frigates," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 107, No. 3, March 1981, 127–29.

———. "The Brazilian Naval Modernization Program," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 108, No. 3, March 1982, 145–48.

Pessoa, Paula. "Repression and Uncertainty," *Index on Censorship* [London], 10, No. 5, October 1981, 14–15.

Poppino, Rollie E. *Brazil: The Land and People*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Raine, Philip. *Brazil: Awakening Giant*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1974.

Rebelo de Brito Poleti, Ronaldo. "Notes on Banishment and Its Effects." Pages 183–87 in National Criminal Justice Reference Service (ed.), *International Summaries: A Collection of Selected Translations in Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice*. (Trans., Technassociates.) Washington: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1978.

Robinson, Anthony (ed.). *Air Power: The World's Air Forces*. New York: Ziff-Davis, 1980.

Roete, Riordan. *Brazil in the Sixties*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972.

———. *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society*. (rev. ed.) New York: Praeger, 1978.

Roett, Riordan (ed.). *Brazil in the Seventies*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976.

Sanders, Thomas G. *Racial Discrimination and Black Consciousness in Brazil*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports, South America, No. 42.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.

Schmitter, Philippe C. *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Schneider, Ronald M. *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Schoultz, Lars. *Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Selcher, Wayne A. *Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

———. *Brazil's Multilateral Relations: Between First and Third Worlds*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

———. "The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government," *Parameters*, 7, No. 1, 1977, 10–24.

Skidmore, Thomas E. *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Stepan, Alfred. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

———. "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil." Pages 110–37 in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Stepan, Alfred (ed.). *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Stern, Fritz. "Between Repression and Reform: A Stranger's Impressions of Argentina and Brazil," *Foreign Affairs*, 56, No. 4, July 1978, 800–18.

United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970–1979*. Washington: 1982.

United States. Congress. 96th, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979*. (Report submitted by the Department of State.) Washington: GPO, February 4, 1980.

United States. Congress. 97th, 1st Session. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. (Report submitted by the Department of State.) Washington: GPO, February 2, 1981.

United States. Congress. 97th, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981.* (Report submitted by the Department of State.) Washington: GPO, February 1982.

Wesson, Robert G. *The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence.* New York: Praeger, 1981.

Williams, John Hoyt. "Brazil: Giant of the Southern Hemisphere" (Pt. 1), *National Defense,* 67, No. 381, October 1982, 40–43.

———. "Brazil: Giant of the Southern Hemisphere" (Pt. 2), *National Defense,* 67, No. 382, November 1982, 16–20.

Wynia, Gary W. *The Politics of Latin American Development.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Christian Science Monitor; Facts on File; Financial Times* [London]; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America; InfoBrazil; Keesing's Contemporary Archives* [London]; *Latinamerica Press* [Lima]; *Latin America Regional Reports: Brazil* [London]; *Latin America Weekly Report* [London]; *Manchester Guardian Weekly* [London]; *New York Times;* and *Washington Post.)*

Glossary

captaincies—Major territorial divisions of early period; consisted of huge land grants by Portuguese crown to favored individuals.

carioca—Native of the city of Rio de Janeiro; also used in reference to culture of that city.

cruzeiro (Cr$)—The national currency consisting of 100 centavos. Since August 1968 Brazil's monetary authorities have followed a flexible exchange rate policy in which the cruzeiro is adjusted by small amounts at frequent intervals—often every week or two. The adjustments take into account the movement of prices in Brazil relative to those in its main trading partners, the level of foreign exchange reserves, export results, and the country's balance of payments. In December 1979 the authorities devalued the cruzeiro by about 30 percent because a lag in mini-devaluations had caused the currency to become overvalued. Because of the frequent devaluations, an average rate for a year, as published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF—*q.v.*) in the monthly *International Financial Statistics*, is often the best way to convert between cruzeiros and dollars. The average rates in recent years of cruzeiros per US$1 were as follows: 8.13 in 1975, 10.67 in 1976, 14.14 in 1977, 18.07 in 1978, 26.94 in 1979, 52.71 in 1980, 93.12 in 1981, and 179.51 in 1982.

favela—The jerry-built squatter settlement on the fringes of Rio de Janeiro. These suburban shantytowns have other names in other major cities, but the term *favela* is recognized as descriptive of all.

favelados—Dweller in a *favela (q.v.)*.

fazenda—A large agricultural estate. Originally, the Portuguese equivalent of the hacienda of Spanish America, characterized by a personalized patron-worker relationship. The term has come to apply to almost any agricultural landholding of more than a few hectares without regard to the kind, organization, or utilization of the property.

fiscal year—Coincides with calendar year.

gáucho—Literally, a cowboy of the southern plains region, but more frequently used to designate a native of Rio Grande do Sul.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flow of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final consumption and investment are included because the values of primary and intermediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the result

is GDP at factor cost. The word *gross* indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. *See also* gross national product.

gross national product (GNP)—Gross domestic product (GDP—*q.v.*) plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. For Brazil, GNP is usually somewhat less than GDP because of factor payments abroad. GNP is the broadest measure of the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. In late 1982 the IMF had 146 members.

mineiro—Literally, miner. A native of Minas Gerais.

município—Administrative unit corresponding to a country in the United States system. It is the principal subdivision of the state and consists of a population center and its immediate surrounding territory.

pardo—Literally, brown. An official census classification referring to brown-skinned people, including blacks, Indians, or those of black, white, or Indian mixture.

parentela—Complete network of kinsmen; extended kin group.

paulista—A native of São Paulo, but specifically of the city.

prêto—Literally, black. An official census classification and vernacular term applied to blacks and their physical types.

sertão—A subregion of the Northeast. The term is used generally to describe any isolated and little-developed hinterland interior. In Brazil it applies specifically to the arid interior of the Northeast.

vaqueiro—Cowboy of the Northeast.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,

founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. In 1982 the IBRD had over 140 members, the IDA had 130, and the IFC over 120. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund. (IMF—*q.v.*).

Index

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65	Afghanistan		550-87	Greece
550-98	Albania		550-78	Guatemala
550-44	Algeria		550-174	Guinea
550-59	Angola		550-82	Guyana and Belize
550-73	Argentina		550-151	Honduras
550-169	Australia		550-165	Hungary
550-176	Austria		550-21	India
550-175	Bangladesh		550-154	Indian Ocean
550-170	Belgium		550-39	Indonesia
550-66	Bolivia		550-68	Iran
550-20	Brazil		550-31	Iraq
550-168	Bulgaria		550-25	Israel
550-61	Burma		550-182	Italy
550-50	Cambodia		550-30	Japan
550-166	Cameroon		550-34	Jordan
550-159	Chad		550-56	Kenya
550-77	Chile		550-81	Korea, North
550-60	China		550-41	Korea, South
550-26	Colombia		550-58	Laos
550-33	Commonwealth Caribbean, Islands of the		550-24	Lebanon
550-91	Congo		550-38	Liberia
550-90	Costa Rica		550-85	Libya
550-69	Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)		550-172	Malawi
550-152	Cuba		550-45	Malaysia
550-22	Cyprus		550-161	Mauritania
550-158	Czechoslovakia		550-79	Mexico
550-36	Dominican Republic and Haiti		550-76	Mongolia
550-52	Ecuador		550-49	Morocco
550-43	Egypt		550-64	Mozambique
550-150	El Salvador		550-35	Nepal and Bhutan
550-28	Ethiopia		550-88	Nicaragua
550-167	Finland		550-157	Nigeria
550-155	Germany, East		550-94	Oceania
550-173	Germany, Fed. Rep. of		550-48	Pakistan
550-153	Ghana		550-46	Panama

550–156	Paraguay	550–53	Thailand
550–185	Persian Gulf States	550–89	Tunisia
550–42	Peru	550–80	Turkey
550–72	Philippines	550–74	Uganda
550–162	Poland	550–97	Uruguay
550–181	Portugal	550–71	Venezuela
550–160	Romania	550–32	Vietnam
550–37	Rwanda and Burundi	550–183	Yemens, The
550–51	Saudi Arabia	550–99	Yugoslavia
550–70	Senegal	550–67	Zaire
550–180	Sierra Leone	550–75	Zambia
550–184	Singapore	550–171	Zimbabwe
550–86	Somalia		
550–93	South Africa		
550–95	Soviet Union		
550–179	Spain		
550–96	Sri Lanka		
550–27	Sudan		
550–47	Syria		
550–62	Tanzania		